




FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF INDIAN METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC



BY

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PREFACE

The present work aims at an objective presentation of the Indian treatment of some of the fundamental questions of Philosophy as they are discussed and elaborated in the different schools of Indian Philosophy. It has been the writer's experience during his long 41 years of service as a teacher of Indian Philosophy that a topical treatment conduces to a clearer perceptions of the issues and of the standpoints of the different schools than any exposition of Indian Philosophy, system by system, as in the different histories of Indian Philosophy. In presenting the discussions, the writer has followed closely the original Sanskrit sources as far as practicable, though he has also made use of some works both translations and expositions in English. A list of works in Sanskrit and in English, that have been consulted is given below. No separate references under each topic have been given, though particular care has been taken to avoid over-interpretation and to adhere to a strictly objective presentation consistently with the demand of intelligibility and a philosophical exposition of Ideas.

Susilkumar Maitra



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PART I
M E T A P H Y S I C S



THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

THE systems of Indian philosophy fall into three main divisions: (1) systems which are based on the recognition of the authority of the Vedas and profess to teach what is embodied in śruti (Vaidika), (2) systems which profess to be based on āgama, i.e., on an authority not strictly Vedic and yet also not being Vedavirodhī or inconsistent with Vedic authority (Vedavāhya), (3) systems which are not merely un-Vedic but anti-Vedic (Vedavirodhī).

The third group includes Cārvāka, Bauddha and Jaina systems. The second group includes the Śākta, Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva and other Tāntrika systems, while the first group comprises the orthodox systems—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.

It has been said that Indian philosophy is based on authority and is therefore not philosophy in its present accepted sense, strictly speaking. But this is an unfounded charge. Even an orthodox system like the Vaiśeṣika recognises only two sources of knowledge, viz., pratyakṣa and anumāna and rejects authority or śabda pramāṇa as an independent source of knowledge, śabda pramāṇa being, according to Vaiśeṣikas, nothing but a form of disguised inference. Besides Sāṅkhya and Yoga are regarded by some as un-Vedic and yet they are certainly two very important Indian systems. Besides these, we have also Cārvāka materialism and the Buddhist philosophy of change which reject not merely the Vedas but also all the basic concepts of the Vedas.

The Indian systems have been charged with being pessimistic in their outlook. While Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Nyāya and



THE CĀRVĀKA SYSTEM

THE Cārvākas profess to be the followers of the doctrine of Br̥haspati and are an atheistic school subscribing to materialism in metaphysics, hedonism in ethics, sensationism and even scepticism in epistemology and utter secularism in religion. They are also known as Lokāyatas and are said to divide into the three different schools in accordance with their emphasis on naturalism and materialism, on sensationism and psychological atomism, and on scepticism and denial of all knowledge. Thus there are crude or aśikṣita Cārvākas who subscribe to materialism, suśikṣita or refined Cārvākas who subscribe to sensationism and dhūrta or radical Cārvākas who subscribe to scepticism and reduction of all knowledge to guesswork lacking certitude and necessary truth.

Four elements, earth, water, air and fire are the original principles recognised by the Cārvākas. From these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced just as intoxicating power is generated in a mixture when molasses are mixed with certain other things. The intelligent soul is thus a byproduct of the body and nothing is left of it on the death of the body and its consequent disintegration into the elements which constitute it.

The moral end is to enjoy life as much as possible and extract from it the greatest possible pleasure. There is not much substance in the contention of those who say that pleasure being mixed with pain, it is not possible to enjoy unalloyed pleasure and therefore pleasure should be eschewed by the wise man if he wants to escape from the pain which accompanies it. For this is as absurd as saying that one should desist from eating fish because of the trouble of separating the fish from the scales and fish-bones, or that one should desist from preparing one's meal and eating it because of the chance of the botheration of beggars bothering one for food, or like asking one not to obtain rice because of the husk and straw from which it has to be separated before it can be obtained. Men do not refrain from cultivation because of the fear of wild animals devouring the crops. It is only

fools who give such advice and they who listen to such advice are no less fools. Those who talk of renouncing earthly pleasure for the sake of richer pleasures hereafter and prescribe various sacrifices and ceremonies for their attainment are imposters who mislead common people for their own selfish ends. There is no hereafter, no hell in which we have to suffer after death nor any heaven in which we are to be rewarded for our sacrifices here. This life is the only one that we have and to make the best of it so as to make it yield the maximum possible pleasure is the essence of wisdom. The body is the self or Ātman. With the death of the body the soul ceases to be and there is no God as dispenser of happiness or unhappiness, the visible earthly king being the only dispenser of pleasure and pain.

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF KṢĀNABHAÑGAVĀDA

'WHATEVER is, is momentary' is one of the four cardinal truths according to the Buddhists, the other three being 'whatever is, is pain, and nothing but pain', 'whatever is, is like unto itself and itself alone', and 'whatever is, is void and nothing but void'. That everything that exists is momentary and does not last beyond one moment is proved by the Buddhists as follows:—

Whatever is, is momentary, because it is or exists. To exist is to produce effects. A thing is what it does. Existence is thus the same thing as effectuation or causal efficiency. Now causal efficiency is possible only in a momentary thing. No continuant or sthāyībhāva is capable of producing effects, of exercising causal efficiency. Consider e.g., any continuant. If it is to produce effects, it must produce them either simultaneously (yugapat) or successively (kramena). There is no third alternative possible.

(1) If it produces its effects successively, then it must either possess the capacity (sāmarthya) to produce its effects,

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(1) If it produces its effects successively, then it must either possess the capacity (*sāmarthyā*) to produce its effects,



or must be devoid of the capacity. If it possesses the capacity, why should it not produce all its effects at once? Why should it produce them successively? The capacity or sāmarthyā being present, there is no bar to its producing all its effects at once. A capable or samartha thing is not prevented from exercising its capacity. If, however, it does not possess the capacity, then, as lacking the capacity to produce the effects, it will not produce any effect at any time whatsoever and will thus lack the condition of existence, namely, artha-kriyākāritva or causal efficiency.

Nor can it be said that it produces its effects with the help of auxiliary conditions (sahakārī). A thing that possesses the capacity of causal efficiency does not acquire it through auxiliary conditions. And in the contrary case of the thing not possessing the capacity, the need of auxiliary conditions becomes vyarthā or superfluous. In the case of the proximity of auxiliary conditions, the causal efficiency of the thing must be due either to the thing itself, or to the proximate auxiliary conditions. If it is due to the thing itself, then the auxiliary conditions have nothing to do in the matter. If, however, it is due to the thing as changed on account of the proximity of auxiliary conditions, then the thing has ceased to be a continuant and has become a different thing. Further, are these auxiliary conditions samartha or asamartha, capable or incapable? If they are capable, then why should they not themselves produce the effect? Why should they behave as subsidiaries to the continuant as principal? If, however, they are incapable, then they are like ministers advising a king who does not listen to the advice, i.e., their conduciveness to the effect produced is nil. Further, consider what a sahakārī or auxiliary condition really does. Does it render any upakāra or aid to the continuant in producing the effect? If the answer is in the affirmative, the question arises, is the aid rendered different or non-different from the sahakārī? If it is non-different from the sahakārī, then it is the sahakārī or auxiliary condition in another name and in so far as it is the sahakārī or auxiliary

and makes no difference to the continuant in producing the effect, it is superfluous or useless. If, however, this aid is different from the auxiliary which renders the aid, then this is the real sahakārī and the auxiliary again becomes useless. Again this upakāra or aid must either be different or non-different from the effect produced. It cannot be different, for it is not so experienced. And further if it is other than the effect produced and also is a necessary condition of the effect it will also be an additional cause of the effect besides the primary cause. And further it will be the really effective condition as the presence of the continuant without it does not produce the effect while the presence of it as aid to the continuant produces the effect. That is to say, while there is relation of agreement in presence as well as agreement in absence between the aid rendered and the effect produced, there is only agreement in absence between the continuant and the effect but no agreement in presence because in spite of the presence of the continuant there is no effect where the aid rendered is absent. This shows that the aid rendered is the real cause and not the continuant. It might be argued that the continuant is the real cause and possesses the capacity to produce it while the so-called auxiliaries make their appearance through their respective causes and have nothing to do with the production of the effect. Even this does not bear strict examination. If the continuant possesses the capacity, why should it fail to produce the effect even in the absence of the auxiliaries, since these latter have nothing to do with the effect and the continuant is the real cause? A cause possessing the capacity to produce the effect is never seen to be unable to produce the effect or to be deprived of its capacity for no reason whatsoever. It might be argued that it is the nature of the effect to be produced by a capable cause along with other conditions. This is why the continuant, though the really capable cause, does not produce the effect independently but produces it with the co-operation of auxiliary conditions. Even this does not help matters. For the continuant then becomes dependent

on the nature of the effect and has therefore no independent capacity to produce the effect. To say this is the same as saying that the continuant does not possess the necessary capacity in and by itself. It might be argued again that the continuant, though capable of producing the effect, is yet of such nature that it does not produce the effect at once but does so after the lapse of a few moments. If it were so, then no continuant would produce any effect at any time. If the nature of a continuant be such that it cannot produce an effect immediately though possessing the capacity to do it but must always defer the production of the effect till a few moments have elapsed, then since this nature will continue always, whenever the continuant reaches the time of production, it will defer the production for a few moments and this will go on every time the continuant reaches the time of production of the effect so that it will never produce any effect at any time.

If it be said that a continuant does not require the co-operation of the auxiliary conditions to produce the effect but possesses the capacity to produce the effect independently then it must be admitted that it is only a special kind of continuant that can do so. Consider, e.g., the case of the seed (*Vija*) and the sprout which it produces. The seeds are in the granary as well as in fields. But the granary seeds do not produce sprouts but only seeds in fields produce sprouts where the auxiliaries of water, earth, etc., are there as co-operating conditions. If the seed as seed were able to produce the sprout, then the granary seed would produce the sprout quite as well as the seed in the field. Therefore should the seed possess the capacity to produce the sprout, it can do so not as seed as such but only as a special variety of seed (as seed in the field). This special character can belong only to the immediately antecedent seed on which the sprout follows in the next moment or *ksana*. If it (the special character) belonged to earlier moments, i.e., moments earlier than the immediately antecedent moment, then the sprout would come forth from the seed even in earlier ante-

cedent moments but it actually does not. Therefore the special character answering to the capacity to produce the sprout belongs only to the seed at the immediately antecedent moment before the coming into being of the sprout. In other words, the seeds of earlier moments are not the same as the seed of the immediately antecedent moment which latter really produces the sprout. Therefore it is not the seed as a continuant but only the seed as a momentary immediate antecedent of the sprout that produces the effect. Causal efficiency, therefore, can belong only to the momentary and not to a continuant or *sthāyibhāva* strictly speaking.

(2) Just as a continuant cannot produce its effects successively as has been shown above, so also it cannot produce them all at once, because no continuant is actually observed to behave in this way. Further, should a continuant produce all its effects at once, then it will have nothing left to produce at any other time, for what has been produced cannot be produced again. This means that after having produced all its effects the continuant will lose its causal efficiency and therefore cease to exist, existence being the same as causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritya*). Nor can it be said that after having produced all its effects at once the continuant produces some other effect at a subsequent moment. This contradicts simultaneous production of all effects and amounts in reality to the first alternative, namely, successive production of effects.

Thus inasmuch as a continuant cannot exercise causal efficiency either successively or simultaneously and inasmuch as there is no third alternative (*tṛtīyarāśi abhāvāt*) it follows that causal efficiency which is the mark of existence being excluded from a continuant (*sthāyi*). *bhāva* existence must belong to the *kṣaṇika* or the momentary only.



THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE IN BUDDHISM, SĀNKHYA AND NYĀYA

THE above exposition of Buddhist Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda brings out the real character of the Buddhist philosophy of change as distinguished from the Sāṅkhya and Nyāya conceptions of change. For the Buddhist what is, is momentary so that there is nothing that persists after the very first moment of its being and causation thus resolves itself into certain laws regulating the appearance and disappearance of momentary reals. The difficulty in the Buddhist theory arises from a total and absolute denial of constants of any kind whatsoever. If there are nothing but momentary reals, then even the law of causation becomes meaningless as nothing really repeats itself. The Sāṅkhya theory of unconscious transformation or parināma has evidently the merit of greater consistency and internal coherence than the Buddhist philosophy of change in this respect. In their conception of the guṇas of Prakṛti as the constants whose collocation alone undergoes incessant change and so constitutes the everchanging world of experience they get over the inherent difficulties of the Buddhist theory. While with the Buddhists Sāṅkhya recognises the world as changing every moment (kṣaṇamapi aparīṇamya nāvatiṣṭhante) they yet acknowledge constants in the shape of the guṇas whose unequal aggregations alone are changing every moment. If the incessant change, both perceptible and imperceptible, be the truth about the universe of objects the same is not true about its ultimate constituents, viz., the guṇas that constitute Prakṛti. It is the arrangements of the reals or guṇas causing the appearance of ever-varying forms that are always changing but not the reals themselves. That is to say, the Sāṅkhya subscribes to what modern scientists would call the principle of the conservation of mass and energy in the world, the total quantity of mass (tamas) and energy (rajas) always remaining the same though matter or energy of one form may be changing into matter or energy of another form.

In Nyāya again though we have recognition of change, there is outright rejection of what the Buddhist will call momentary changes. According to the Naiyāyika, the momentary of the Buddhist is a creation of the imagination. There is no occurrence that lasts for one moment alone. Even a changing thing must take at least three moments—one for coming into being, one for existing and one for thereafter perishing. The Naiyāyika, in other words, recognises only the non-momentary, either (i) in the sense of the eternal as in the case of such substances as earth-atoms, water-atoms, air-atoms, fire-atoms, ether, space, time, self, etc., and in the case of some qualities of substance as also universals, ultimate differentials and the relation of inherence or (ii) in the sense of continuants such as the non-eternal compounds of the eternal atoms. A special point has to be noted here in regard to the Sāṅkhya philosophy of change set forth above. According to Sāṅkhya Prakṛti as pariṇāmī nitya or ever-changingly eternal is unintelligible without Puruṣa as unchangingly eternal. Thus in spite of its emphasis on the aspect of change, it also recognises both a permanent world that yet changes constantly and an eternal experiencer or bhoktā that makes the changing world significant.

Though the obvious parallel in European philosophy to the Buddhist philosophy of change is the philosophy of Bergson yet there are also important differences. For the Buddhists there being no relation between one momentary real and another, the successive kṣaṇika reals are a discrete series and the continuity of the series is more or less an illusion arising from our incapacity to notice the intervals between the discrete moments. The stock example of the Buddhist of the alātacakra or circle of fire caused by the rapid circular movements of a burning stick is a case in point. There is here an appearance of a continuous indivisible circle of light though in reality there are nothing but successive momentary positions of the flaming stick. Therefore for the Buddhist the discreteness of the momentary reals is the reality and the continuity is a false appearance of the discrete suc-



cessive moments generated by the rapidity of the succession. In Bergson, however, we have an enunciation of the diametrically opposite standpoint, continuous indivisible change being the reality and the discreteness and fragmentation thereof being a distortion and a falsification originating in the pragmatic need of constants and statics for the effective handling of the affairs of life.

In Śankarite Advaita we also have a diametrical contrast to the Buddhist stand-point. While for the Buddhist a dynamic manifold of unrelated successive moments is the reality while continuity and related constants are only thought-constructs (*buddhinirmāṇa*) for the Advaitin Brahman as the undifferenced, unchanging unity is the Reality while the world of change and variety is an eternally negated appearance thereof. Thus while for the Buddhist the manifold is the reality while its continuity or unity is a false appearance, for the Advaitin unity is the reality while change and difference are false appearances thereof.

FOUR BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

BUDDHISM after Buddha divided into four schools, viz., the schools of the Sautrāntikas, the Vaibhāśikas, the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas. Of these, both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāśikas accepted the reality of both mental states such as pleasure, pain, etc., and extra-mental things such as jar, cloth, etc. But while the Sautrāntikas accepted the reality of extra-mental objects they denied that they could be perceived. Whatever cognition we have, according to Sautrāntikas, is possible only in reference to an object. The object which is the referent of a cognition is cognised because the cognition has the form of the object to which it refers. E.g., the cognition of a jar has the form of a jar, the cognition of a cloth has the form of a cloth, etc. As in the absence of extra-mental referents the cognitions could not be of these different forms, the Sautrāntikas hold that external

referents or objects are a matter of inference from the differences in the forms of cognition. As distinguished from the Sautrāntikas, the Vaibhāṣikas hold not merely real extra-mental things but also that they are objects of perception and not merely of inference. How can we know the form of a mental state as the effect of the form of an extra-mental thing, unless we have direct access to the thing itself, i.e., unless things are objects of perception and not merely of inference? The Yogācāras, also called Vijñānavādī Buddhists, accept the reality of kṣaṇika vijñāna alone, i.e., of momentary states of awareness. Nothing except these momentary states of consciousness exists. Extra-mental things thus do not differ from dream contents or dream-objects. Just as in dream internal mental states are objectified and regarded as extra-mental reality so also are the objects of our waking experience. They are nothing but mental states falsely regarded as extra-mental reals. The Mādhyamikas are Śūnyavādī Buddhists or Buddhist Nihilists. They go beyond vijñānavāda and reduce the kṣaṇika vijñāna of the Yogācāras to the void or Śūnyatā. An awareness, according to the Mādhyamikas, which is not awareness of an object is not even awareness and can be described only as void or śūnya which does not admit of characterisation in terms of positive contents of knowledge.

The terms Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas, Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas are explained as follows: The follower or pupil of Buddha who wanted to know the last word (anta) about the sūtras, is called Sautrāntika. The follower again who questioned the correctness of the use of language (bhāṣā) denying the perceptibility of objects as being contrary to actual experience (pratīti viruddha) is called a Vaibhāṣika (non-perceptibility is pratīti viruddha bhāṣā). According to Buddhism, acceptance of the teachings of the preceptors is Yoga and raising objections to such teachings is Ācāra. A follower who accepted Buddha's teaching about the voidness of extra-mental objects but objected to his teachings as regards the voidness of mental states is thus called a Yogācāra.



A follower who accepted the voidness of everything, mental as well as extra-mental, is called Mādhyamika or Mediocre because having accepted the teachings of Buddha he cannot be called very low in spiritual status but also having raised no question about his teaching he cannot be placed very high in intelligence either. He is, therefore, called Mādhyamika or Mediocre. The Mādhyamika subscribes to voidness of everything, mental as well as extra-mental, the Yogācāra believes in momentary states of awareness and denies the reality of external objects. Both Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāśikas accept extra-mental objects besides the experience-moments of the Yogācāras, but these external objects also are, according to them, kṣaṇika or momentary. According to Sautrāntikas these momentary, external objects are known by inference and are not perceived while according to the Vaibhāśikas they are objects of perception, the talk of their non-perceptibility being viruddha bhāṣā or inconsistent language, i.e., language inconsistent with the actual deliverance of experience.

That all experience is pain and pain alone is a doctrine common to all the different schools, as otherwise they would not be teaching how to put a stop to it. All, therefore, according to the four schools, is pain and pain alone. If anybody should ask for an example in illustration of this thesis, the reply is no example can be given because all objects being momentary, there is no relation between one moment of existence and another so that there cannot be anything common to different moments. No moment is, therefore, like any other moment and cannot thus be used as an example illustrative of any other moment. If it follows that each moment is *sui generis*, i.e., is like unto itself and itself alone, then universals or common characters between different moments are figments of the imagination.

In like manner we must also hold that all is void and void alone. In rejecting an illusory content such as that of silver in a mother-of-pearl we must reject not merely the silver that is seen but also the mother-of-pearl in the locus of

which it is seen and also the act of seeing by which we see it, for the illusion is one integral whole and we cannot reject one part of it and retain another. Nor can we say that the content of an illusion is something of an intermediate nature, i.e., an intermixture of existence and non-existence, for such supposition is absurd on the face of it. Hence the Mādhyamikas very rightly say that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a total void by a slow progression from the doctrine of a momentary flux through the negation of the illusory deliverances of experience as regards the reality of things. The ultimate principle is, therefore, *sūnyatā* or void not to be characterised as reality, unreality, both reality and unreality and neither reality nor unreality. If an object such as a jar were real, then the potter's work becomes superfluous. And if it were unreal, then the potter can never make it real and it cannot be both real and unreal, for that is self-contradictory. Nor can it be neither real nor unreal for the self-same reason.

While the Mādhyamikas declare a void in respect of both the external reals and internal conscious states as the ultimate truth certain other Buddhists, styled Yogācāras (*Vijñānavādins*), declare a void of external things only recognising internal conscious states or momentary cognitions to be the stuff of reality. Unless the existence of cognitions are allowed, they urge, the whole universe will be blind (*jagatāndhatva*). An external real is not an object of perception. The idea of an external perceptible leads, according to them, to the following dilemma. If there were an external real as an object of cognition, it must be either an effect of a cause or no such effect. If it had no origination, it could not exist. If it originated from a cause, then in so far as the cause is antecedent to the effect, the object of the cognition arises from a cause existing in a moment antecedent to it. Therefore, since nothing exists beyond one moment, when the object cognised is or exists, the cause of the object has ceased to exist. This shows that the object of cognition is not the same as the cause of the cognition, from



which it follows that what we cognise as object of cognition is no outside real existing independently of the cognition. Further, if the object of the cognition were an outside real, then a past object could not be cognised, as in memory, as a present object. The past object has ceased to be, while the object in memory is a present object and is cognised as such. This also shows that what we cognise as object of cognition is no independent real existing outside cognition. Further, is the so-called external object of cognition a simple atom or a compound resulting from the combination of several atoms? If it were a simple atom, then it could not be an object of perception. Nor can it be a combination of several atoms, for an atom, combined with other atoms, must have at least six different sides, one side to combine with another atom on the right, another side to combine with another atom on the left, a third side to combine with an atom in front, a fourth to combine with an atom behind it, a fifth to combine with an atom above it and a sixth to combine with an atom below it. But how can an infinitesimal atom without magnitude have six different sides? Further, if the union of one atom with another be complete fusion, the resulting compound will be atomic in dimension like the component atoms and in that case will not be an object of perception even as a compound. It follows, therefore, that cognition having no other perceptible but itself, the cognition and the object of the cognition are the same and that cognition in revealing itself reveals its own self as its object.

As regards an interval between the object and subject-consciousness this is only an illusion just as is the illusion of two moons when there is only one. This illusion is due to beginningless nescience. Just as in dreams the dream object is no external real but is only a form of the dream-experience itself so also is it in waking experience. When, on account of Mahodaya, the grand exaltation, through meditation on the Great Truth, the illusion of difference between cognition and object of cognition melts away, there arises the realisation of the identity of cognition and object of cognition.

Other Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas, join issue with the Vijñānavādins or Yogācāras and hold that the position that there is no external world is without valid evidence. If the object of the cognition be regarded as nothing but the cognition itself on the ground of their simultaneity, then when I cognise blue the experience should be in the form, 'I am blue', and not in the form 'I perceive blue'. If it be contended that the object is nothing but subjective idea and that the distinction between the two is an illusion so that when we have the cognition of something external it is the internal cognition that manifests itself as if it were external, the answer is that if there be no external objects, the illusion, 'as if it were external', would be impossible. Again if the identity of subject and object be proved by the illusoriness of their duality and illusoriness of duality be proved by the assertion of identity, then there is an obvious vicious circle. The Sautrāntikas, therefore, contend that the cognitions cognise external objects and not merely internal mental states. As a matter of fact the natural attitude of mind is towards objects external to the mind and not to its own internal states. If it be argued that an external object synchronous with an internal cognition is inadmissible, the answer is that the subject imposes its own form of consciousness on the cognition caused by the external object and the object is inferred from the form thus imposed. That consciousness of the cognition cannot be the object of the cognition is proved by the further fact that consciousness is the same everywhere and that therefore unless external objects are admitted the difference between different conscious states, e.g., between the consciousness of 'blue' and the consciousness of 'red' cannot be explained.

Hence it follows, the Sautrāntikas say, that the universe consists of not merely the subjective world of mental states but also data or objects presented in these internal states. In other words, we have not merely mind and its modifications entitled, (i) the sensational, (ii) the perceptual, (iii) the affectional, (iv) the verbal, (v) the impressional, but



also the sensible world consisting of the sense organs and their objects.

Other Buddhists called the Vaibhāśikas hold that there are not merely sensations and objects which are inferred from sensations but also objects perceived and not merely inferred. How can an external object, they contend, be inferred from sensations unless we have direct access to external objects? Therefore the Vaibhāśikas contend that objects are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these, sensible objects are immediately apprehended, but, as so apprehended, they remain mere indeterminate sensa. Cognition which is discriminative and determinate is a matter of construction and is thus not apprehension of reality in the strict sense. Thus we have sensation which is apprehension without knowledge, and knowledge or cognition which is not apprehension of reality and has therefore only phenomenal truth.

THE BUDDHIST CRITIQUE OF THE NYĀYA VIEW OF SATTĀ OR EXISTENCE

ACCORDING to the Buddhists, to exist is to exercise causal efficiency, i.e., to produce effect, and since the momentary alone can exercise causal efficiency, whatever exists is momentary. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, mean by existence participation in the universal of existence or 'sattā' which is eternal. Thus, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, to exist means to be a particular instance of the universal of existence, and the relation between the particular instance as an existent to the universal which is 'sattā' or Being in general is the relation of samavāya or inherence.

The Buddhists reject the Nyāya view of existence or Being on the following grounds:—

(I) Since, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, there are no universals of universals, therefore Being or existence as a universal is itself no instance of a higher universal of Being and is therefore devoid of Being. How can Being which



itself has no being be a source of being to the particular instances which are subsumed under it as a universal? Further, a Being itself devoid of being is an obvious absurdity.

(II) Nor can it be said that universals, inherence and ultimate differentials have a different kind of being, a svarūpa-sattva or intrinsic being which is equivalent to their svarūpa or distinctive content. Such a hypothesis postulating different kinds of being for different categories of objects will mean 'confusion worse confounded'.

(III) Further, is Being as a universal present everywhere, or only in its particular instances? If it were present everywhere different things of experience would be confounded together. If, however, the universal be present in its proper subject only, then the question arises: Does the universal inhering in a particular thing such as a jar get attached to it when the jar is made, or not attached? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the universal must be supposed to have moved from the already existing jar to the newly made jar which will mean that the universal is a moving thing and therefore a substance. If, however, the answer be in the negative, then the universal cannot move to the newly made jar, and therefore the latter is non-existent. Again when the jar is broken to pieces and ceases to exist, does the universal survive it, or cease to be, or move to another place? On the first supposition, it will be a universal without a particular instance; on the second, the universal will cease to be eternal; on the third, it will be a substance as a substance of motion which is contrary to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

Rightly has it been said—

"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one place, engages without moving from that place in producing itself in another place.

"This entity (universality) is not connected with that wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies that place: great is this miracle.

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"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series of difficulties ! "

How, then, are we to explain our experience of one in the many? According to the Buddhists, such experience of one common character appearing to pervade different particulars is nothing but sārūpya or similarity amongst the different particulars in respect of exclusion of the other (anya apoha). Thus when each of x^1 , x^2 , x^3 , etc., excludes y^1 , y^2 , y^3 , etc., and also z^1 , z^2 , z^3 , etc., we imagine a common form 'x' underlying x^1 , x^2 , x^3 , etc., because of their similarity as excluding the same particulars.

INDIAN THEORIES OF CAUSALITY

THERE are four Indian theories of the relation between cause and effect, viz.,

I. The Buddhist theory called asatkāraṇavāda, according to which the effect arises out of the destruction or negation of the cause.

II. The Nyāya theory called asatkāryavāda (also called ārambhavāda), according to which the effect is non-existent before the operation of the cause and comes into being through the action of the existent cause.

III. The Sāṅkhya theory called satkāryavāda (also called pariṇāmavāda), according to which the effect is pre-existent in the causal ground and comes not into being but only into manifestation through kāraṇavyāpāra or operation of the cause.

IV. The Advaita theory called vivartavāda, according to which the effect is an indescribable false appearance of the existent cause, not describable either as existent or as non-existent.

According to the Buddhists, the effect arises when the cause has ceased to be. Therefore, the Buddhists contend, the effect arises out of the cessation or negation of the cause. For example, when the sprout (*aṅkura*) arises out of the seed (*vīja*), the seed has ceased to be. Therefore the sprout comes out of the destruction of the seed as its cause, i.e., the existent effect comes out of a non-existent cause. Against this view the objection is that if non-existent is the cause of an existent effect, then inasmuch as non-existence is the same everywhere and one non-existence as non-existence is indistinguishable from another, there will be no bar to every effect arising everywhere. The Buddhist forgets that when the sprout springs from the seed, it is not the cessation of the seed as non-existent that is the cause of the sprout but the existent constituents of the seed into which the seed is resolved when the sprout springs out of it that are the real cause of the sprout.

The Naiyāyika who considers the effect to be non-existent before its effectuation and to come into existence through the action of the existent cause does not also fare much better than the Buddhist. Let us consider the case of the production of a jar (*ghata*) out of a lump of clay (*mṛtpiṇḍa*) from the Nyāya point of view. The jar is the effect according to Nyāya and the lump of clay is the cause. According to the Naiyāyika, the effect, 'jar' is non-existent in the lump of clay before the causal process (*kāraṇa-vyāpāra*) and it acquires the character of existence, i.e., comes into being, after the operation of the cause. Therefore, the effect, 'jar', is the substrate of the two characters of non-existence and existence, of non-existence before effectuation and of existence after effectuation. But the jar does not exist before effectuation. How then can it be the substrate of the character of non-existence? The Naiyāyika must therefore conceive of the existence of the jar even before its effectuation if the jar is to properly discharge the function of a substrate (*dharmī*). That is to say, the Naiyāyika must admit the potential or subtle existence of the effect in the causal ground before the



process of effectuation—a potential existence that becomes kinetic or actual through the causal process. For example, oil potentially contained in the tila seed becomes actual or manifest through the process of pressing, the grain of rice potentially contained in the paddy-seed comes to manifestation through the process of husking, milk potentially contained in the udder of the cow comes out through the process of milking. The transition therefore from the causal state to the effect-state is not a transition from non-existence to existence but from subtle or non-manifest existence to manifest existence.

The Sāṅkhya philosophers therefore repudiate the Nyāya view of non-existence of the effect in the cause before the process of effectuation and hold instead that effectuation is only transformation or change of form and no new beginning. For example, physical energy may be transformed into chemical energy, chemical energy into energy of life or vital energy, and energy of life into energy of mind. In all these there is no real creation anywhere but only appearance of new forms in the self-same original material through redistribution and rearrangement of its constituent reals. The Sāṅkhya thus subscribes to what is called pariṇāmavāda or the doctrine of transformation as distinguished from the Nyāya doctrine of new beginnings or ārambhavāda. Causation, according to Sāṅkhya, is abhivyakti or manifestation as distinguished from utpatti or origination. The form (e.g., chemical energy) which is held in arrest in one arrangement regarded as the cause (e.g., physical energy) is liberated in another arrangement of the same reals called the effect (e.g., chemical energy) resulting in the manifestation of properties contained potentially in the former. In support of their position of satkāryavāda, i.e., pre-existence or potential existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāṅkhya argues as follows : That the effect pre-exists in the cause follows from the fact that there are fixed relations between certain effects and certain causes, i.e., special laws of cause and effect besides the general law of causality. One who wants oil,

does not seek milk out of which to get oil but seeks tila and other seeds which alone are competent to yield the oil he wants. All this shows that effects are related to their causes by certain fixed relations. A relation is possible only between two or more relata. In the present case the fixed relation holds between certain special causes and certain special effects. But if one of the two related objects, namely, the cause is existent in a fixed relation like the above, and the other, namely, the effect is non-existent, how can the relation function at all? Nor can we say that the cause produces its non-existent effect even in absence of any relation to the latter. If the cause were to produce the non-existent effect without any relation to the latter, then since the absence of such relation holds not merely in respect of the particular effect it produces but also in respect of all other effects to which it is equally unrelated, it should produce not merely the effect in question but also all other effects. This will land us into the absurdity that every cause may produce every effect which is against the deliverance of experience. A further reason urged by the Sāṅkhya in support of its position is that the effect, e.g., the jar, is consubstantial with the cause and is non-different from it so that as the cause is existent the effect must also be existent. In proof of the non-difference of the effect from the cause the Sāṅkhya urges the following considerations. A cloth is non-different from the threads of yarn, for it is perceived as contained in the threads of yarn as its substrate. If a thing is different from another thing, it is not perceived as contained in the other thing as its substrate. For example, a cow which is different from a horse is never perceived as contained in the horse as its substrate. Besides, between the threads of yarn and the cloth there holds the relation of a material cause and its effect. Therefore they are not different objects. Between different objects such as a cow and a buffalo no relation of material cause and effect holds. Thirdly, that the threads of yarn and the cloth are non-different is also proved by the fact of the absence of the

relation of conjunction and disjunction between them. Between different things such as the milk and the cup both the relations of conjunction and disjunction are possible. But the cloth is not capable of either conjunction with, or disjunction from, the threads of yarn of which it is made. Lastly, a further proof of the non-difference of the cloth and the threads of yarn is that the two exactly equal in weight, the weight of the cloth being exactly equal to that of the threads of yarn of which it is made.

Against the above proof of non-difference of effect from cause the Naiyāyika urges the following objections. If the effect (e.g., cloth) were the same as the cause (e.g., threads of yarn), how can we talk of the cause producing the effect? For then, the cause, being the same as the effect, will be producing itself. And the same consideration will apply to the destruction or resolution of the effect into cause. That will tantamount to the cause destroying itself. Further, there is arthakriyābheda between the cause and the effect, i.e., different purposes are served respectively by the cause and the effect. The threads of yarn, e.g., subserve the purpose of sewing while the cloth serves as an āvarana or cover of the body. All this is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the non-difference of cause and effect. In answer to their objections the Sāṅkhya philosophers observe that the reasons given above do not establish difference between cause and effect. They at best show that in certain arrangements the effect becomes tirohita or non-manifest while in other arrangements it comes to manifestation. When the tortoise withdraws its head into its shell we do not say that the head has ceased to be but only that it has ceased to be manifest, and when it protrudes its head out of its shell we do not say that its head comes into being but only that it comes into view. In the same way in the arrangement which we call the casual state, e.g., threads of yarn, the purpose served by the cloth namely, that of a body-cover, remains non-manifest and comes to manifestation in the new arrangement of the same reals which we call a cloth. This consideration also

effectively disposes of the objection of self-causation and self-destruction. For the cause causes by its operation the appearance of a form which remains hidden and non-manifest in the causal state.

The Naiyāyikas, however, point out that if causation is to be conceived as manifestation of a non-manifest form, this manifestation has to be conceived either as sat, existent, or asat, non-existent, before effectuation. In the former alternative, manifestation being existent before the effectuation, a further manifestation of the existent manifestation becomes superfluous. If, however, the manifestation was non-existent before the effectuation and comes into existence through the operation of the cause, then the origination of the asat or non-existent by the causal process is conceded and the Sāṅkhya stand on satkāryavāda is undermined.

Unable to refute the Naiyāyika objection, the Sāṅkhya raises an almost similar objection to the Nyāya doctrine of causation as origination or *utpatti*. What does *utpatti* or origination mean according to Naiyāyikas, asks the Sāṅkhya philosopher. Does it mean that the *utpatti* or origination is itself non-existent before the operation of the cause? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the origination itself has to be originated or brought into being by another origination before it can properly function, i.e., bring the effect into being. And so we shall be landed into a *regressus ad infinitum* of origination of origination of origination, etc. If, however, origination has to be taken as sat or existent, then in so far as, according to Nyāya, existence means either the samavāya (inherence) of sattājāti or Being as a universal in *utpatti* or origination as a particular instance of it, or samavāya (inherence) of the *utpatti* or origination (of the cloth) in its causal substrate, viz., the threads of yarn in which also Being as a universal inheres, we shall have to say that in the former case the *utpatti* or origination is sat or existent through the direct inherence of the universal of Being (sattājāti) in the origination as a particular instance of it and in the latter case the *utpatti* is mediately related to

the universal of being through co-inhering in the threads of yarn in which Being also as a universal inheres. In either case *utpatti* becomes related to *sattā* through the relation of inherence which, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, is eternal and one. But how can origination, a temporal process, be a case of the eternal relation of inherence?

It appears from the above that neither the *Sāṅkhya* nor the *Nyāya* nor the Buddhist theory has been able to give an intelligible account of the relation between cause and effect. The *Sāṅkhya* has not been able to refute the *Nyāya* objection to its doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in its material cause in a potential form. Nor has *Nyāya* been able to reply effectively to the *Sāṅkhya* objection to its theory of the effect as a new beginning without existence before the causal process. Nor is there much substance in the Buddhist view that the effect arises out of *Śūnya* as *Sāṅkhya* has shown. We may, therefore, conclude that the effect cannot be explained either as existent or as non-existent before the operation of the cause and that therefore both the causal operation as well as the effect coming out of it have to be acknowledged as indescribable in terms of being or non-being. This is the *Advaita* view which recognises Brahman as the only reality which falsely appears in our waking practical experience in the indescribable relation of cause and effect. The objection to the *Advaita* view that the rejection of the causal relation in the absence of a sublating experience is a gratuitous assumption without logic or reason in it does not bear strict examination. The *Advaitin* does not reject the causal relation as false in *vyavahārika* *daśā* but acknowledges its empirical reality for the conduct of life. What he denies is its intelligibility and its ultimate reality (*Pāramārthika sattā*), there being according to the *Advaitin*, sublation of the causal as well as all other relations in the *Pāramārthika* plane when there is realisation of the Absolute and the unrealisation of the world and its relations as eternally negated appearances.

NYĀYA DEFINITION OF CAUSE: DIFFERENT KINDS OF CAUSE ACCORDING TO NYĀYA

THE Naiyāyika defines a cause as the unconditional, invariable antecedent of the effect (*anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyatapūrvavartitā*). A cause, in other words, according to Naiyāyikas, is *pūrvavartī* or antecedent to the effect. Further, it must not only be *pūrvavartī* or antecedent to the effect but must also be *niyata* antecedent, i.e., invariably antecedent. Thirdly, it must be *anyathāsiddhiśūnya*, i.e., must not be due to any other condition. In this sense, the cause of a *ghata* or earthen jar consists of the *kapāladvayas* or two halves of the jar which are joined together by the potter who makes the jar out of clay. So also is the colour of the two halves which produces the colour of the jar itself and so also are the potter himself (*kulāla*), the potter's stick, the potter's wheel, etc., but not the potter's father, the colour of the stick, etc., the antecedence whereof to the jar is conditional. The Naiyāyika further distinguishes three kinds of cause, viz., *samavāyī kāraṇa*, i.e., the matter or stuff wherein the effect arises, *asamavāyī kāraṇa* which produces certain features of the effect by being related to the matter or stuff, and *nimitta kāraṇa* which, without entering into the effect, either as matter or stuff thereof or as producing any feature or character of the effect, yet contributes to the production of the effect. Thus, cause is either inherent or material cause (*samavāyī kāraṇa*), or non-inherent or non-material cause (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*), or efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*). Mill defines cause as the immediate, unconditional, invariable antecedent. The Naiyāyikas do not separately mention immediateness in their definition of cause as antecedent to the effect. According to the Naiyāyikas, immediateness is included in *anyathāsiddhiśūnyatva*, i.e., the absence of any other condition determining the antecedent. This is why, they argue, the potter's father (*kulālapitā*), who is an invariable antecedent of the potter, who is an invariable antecedent of the jar, cannot be regarded as the cause of jar. The

potter's father is an invariable antecedent of the jar through being invariable antecedent of the potter who is an invariable antecedent of the jar. The invariable antecedence of the potter's father is thus a case of mediated, conditional antecedence through the potter's antecedence, and is, therefore, anyathāsiddha and must as such be excluded from the enumeration of the causal conditions of the jar as an effect. In other words, all remote and mediated antecedents are conditional antecedents, so that only unconditional antecedents which exclude mediated antecedents are admissible as causal conditions. Thus, unconditionality includes immediacy or non-mediacy of the antecedent. As regards samavāyī kāraṇa, the Naiyāyikas recognise it only in the case of dravyas or substances. In other words, dravya or substance alone can be material or inherent cause. According to the Naiyāyika, non-inherent causality should be taken as belonging to guṇas and karmas, i.e., qualities and motions and whatever is other than an inherent or a non-inherent cause and yet determines the production of the effect is an efficient cause or nimitta kāraṇa. Thus, the stick is necessary for the production of the ghata and so also is the potter's wheel: the potter also must expend energy in producing the ghata. The potter, the wheel, the stick must, therefore, be included in nimitta kāraṇa. The wheel does not become any part of the effect, nor does the potter and his stick, and yet without them there would be no ghata. They are thus to be regarded as causal conditions of the ghata. They, however, differ from a non-inherent or an inherent cause. The inherent cause (viz., the two halves) is part and parcel of the effect (ghata), and the colour and other properties of the two halves also enter into the effect 'jar' and determine its colour, weight, etc. But these latter enter into the effect not as substantive elements of the ghata but only as qualities of its constituent elements and so determining the qualities of the product. These are, therefore, non-inherent causes of the jar, while the potter's stick, the potter himself, or the wheel, do not enter into the effect, either as substantive elements or

as qualities thereof, though contributing to the effect, jar. They are, therefore, efficient in the production of the effect without being part and parcel of the effect and are to be regarded as nimitta kāraṇa or efficient cause. The potter's father, as we have seen, is a conditional antecedent, so also is the colour of the stick or its size or the sound produced by the wheel when it revolves round the axis. All these are conditional antecedents. In so far as they are related to the stick or the wheel through the relation of inherence which stick or wheel is unconditional, invariable antecedent of the jar, are they also invariable antecedents of the jar. Their antecedence, is, therefore, mediated, conditional antecedence. And therefore, they are not to be regarded as causal conditions having anything to do with the production of the effect.

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF UNIVERSALS

THE Naiyāyika defines the universal as a character which is nitya (eternal) and aneka samaveta (inheres in many particular instances). Therefore, according to Naiyāyikas, the relation between a universal and its particular instance is the relation of inherence. Further, the universal is an eternal character inhering in more than one particular instance. Therefore, where there is only one instance of a thing, its distinguishing character is not a logical universal. E.g., according to the Naiyāyika, there is only one ākāśa or ether. Therefore etherness is just a distinguishing character and not a logical universal—an upādhi and not a jāti. Again when a character or feature which is related to the substrate which it characterises by some relation other than the relation of samavāya or inherence, it is no logical universal in the strict sense. E.g., negativity or abhāvatva is a common character of such particular abhāvas or negations as ghatābhāva, patābhāva, etc. But since the relation of samavāya holds only between positive objects of experience or bhāvapadārthas, and not between positive and negative objects,

nor between one negative object and another, the relation of samavāyatva does not hold between abhāvatva or negativity and the particular negatives in which it is found as a common character. Thus abhāvatva or negativity, as not admitting of the relation of samavāya, is not a logical universal. The Naiyāyika also rejects overlapping universals as not being logical universals in the strict sense. E.g., bhūtatva or the character of being an element is common to the five elements earth, water, air, fire and ether and mūrtatva or the character of moving is common to the five moving substances, viz., earth, water, air, fire and mind. Thus both these characters have earth, water, air and fire as their common substances, while 'the character of being an element' applies to ākāśa and not to mind, and 'the character of moving' applies to mind and not to ākāśa. Therefore, if 'the character of being an element' is conceived as a universal, it will apply to the four bhūtas—earth, water, air and fire which are moving things as well. And then the universal bhūtatva will coincide with the universal mūrtatva in respect of these four substances and ought therefore to apply to the other mūrtas, viz., mind though it does not. And the same objection will hold in respect of mūrtatva which should apply to ākāśa though it does not. Further, the four substances, earth, water, air and fire, will have to be regarded as instances of two different universals which is like saying that some animals are both cows and buffaloes which is absurd. This is why characters with partially overlapping denotation are not admitted by Naiyāyikas to be logical universals.

Another negative condition of a logical universal, according to the Naiyāyika, is *regressus ad infinitum*. Where the acceptance of a character as a universal will land one into an infinite regress, no logical universal is admissible according to the Naiyāyika. This is why the Naiyāyikas do not recognise universals of universals. E.g., 'horseness', 'cowness' and 'dogness' are three universals, and since each of these is a universal, universality is a character common to these universals. If universality is, therefore, to be regarded as

a fourth higher universal, and 'horseness', 'cowness' and 'dogness' as particular instances of it, then, in so far as this higher universal is a fourth universal, one must conceive a still higher universal of these four universals, namely, 'horseness', 'dogness', 'cowness' and 'universality'. In the same way we shall have to go from a fourth to a fifth universal, from a fifth to a sixth and so on *ad infinitum*.

The fifth negative condition of a logical universal, according to the Naiyāyika, is *rūpahāni*. By this the Naiyāyika means that where recognition of a character as universal contradicts the intrinsic nature or *rūpa* of a thing, it is not admissible as a logical universal. E.g., *antya viśeṣa*, the ultimate differential, is an individuating principle inherent in every eternal substance. Each eternal substance is a unique individual because of the presence in it of this ultimate differential or *viśeṣa*. Each eternal substance has thus a *viśeṣa* inhering in it which differentiates it from all other objects of experience. *Viśeṣatva* or differentiating character is thus a character common to different *viśeṣas* inhering in different eternal substances. Why not then, accept *viśeṣatva* as a universal, common character of the different *viśeṣas* of the innumerable eternal substances? The Naiyāyika answer is in the negative as the admission of *viśeṣatva* as a universal destroys the very nature of *viśeṣa* (*rūpahāni*). *Viśeṣa* is that which is unique, uncommon and if a common character of the uncommon be admitted it will destroy the very nature of the uncommon as uncommon.

A sixth negative condition also laid down by the Naiyāyikas is that no separate second universal can be admitted where the difference between two universals is a difference in name only, e.g., between *kalasatva* and *kumbhatva*.

It may be noted that while Naiyāyikas repudiate universals of universals, they yet recognise a gradation of universals into higher and lower reaching up to one highest universal (*parājāti*) which is *sattā* or being. Thus according to the Naiyāyika, the universal of 'being' or *sattā* is the most comprehensive universal (*parājāti*) applying to all particulars



while lower universals (*aparājāti*) apply to some particulars and do not apply to other particulars. E.g., *dravyatva*, substantiality, or substancefulness, is a character of every *dravya* or substance, but not of a *guṇa* (quality) or a *karma* (motion). Similarly *guṇatva* holds of every *guṇa* or quality, but not of any *karma* or *dravya*. Thus, *dravyatva* is both *anuvṛtti lakṣaṇa* and *vyāvṛtti lakṣaṇa*, both inclusive and exclusive. *Dravyatva*, e.g., is inclusive of *dravyas* and exclusive of *karmas* and *guṇas*. *Guṇatva* is inclusive of *guṇas* and exclusive of *dravyas* and *karmas*. But *sattā* or being is true of all *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*, i.e., it includes all and excludes nothing. In this sense *sattā* or 'being' is the highest universal or *parājāti* while other universals are lower in rank.

It is obvious from the above that what the *Naiyāyika* means by the gradation of universals into lower and higher reaching up to one *parājāti* or highest universal, viz., *sattā* is their grading in respect of extent or denotation, the higher being higher as possessing a wider or more extensive denotation and the lower being lower as possessing a narrower or less extensive denotation and the highest being highest as possessing the most extensive denotation of all. The *Naiyāyika* does not mean a connotative subsumption of one universal under another and that is why he repudiates universals of universals as leading to infinite regress.

The *Nyāya* theory of universals is not without its difficulties as both Buddhists and Advaitins have pointed out. If a universal is both eternal and an inherent character of its particular instances, then how does the *Naiyāyika* account for the appearance of a universal in a new born instance of it? And how does he account for its disappearance, when it ceases to be? When a new jug is made out of a lump of clay, does the eternal jugness (*ghaṭatva*) come suddenly into being in the newly made jug, or, when the jug is broken, does the eternal jugness cease to be so far as the broken jug is concerned? Suppose the species we call 'cow' becomes extinct in course of evolution so that not a single individual is anywhere left on the earth. Where will the eternal 'cow-

ness' go? Will it wander about like a floating adjective, an abstract universal without a particular locus? Further, when the universal inheres in a particular instance of it, does it inhere in it in its entirety, or does only a part of it inhere in the particular instance? If it inheres in its entirety, then nothing of it will be left to inhere in other particular instances, so that if there be one individual cow there will be no other cows. And if it inheres only partially in a particular instance of it, then we are landed in the absurdity that an individual cow is only partly a cow and partly some other animal such as a buffalo. It may be noted that the Buddhists repudiate the Nyāya view of universals and offer instead their own theory known as Apohavāda. According to them, the so-called positive common character is a myth. Universality is only anya vyāvṛtti. It is common exclusion rather than common inclusion that constitutes universality. When we say X is a cow we do not mean that it is one particular instance of the universal 'cowness' which X has in common with other cows as its inherent character. All that we mean is that it is not a horse, not a dog, not a man, etc. Further, according to Naiyāyikas, 'existence' (sattā) is the parājāti, highest universal and is an inherent common character of all dravyas, guṇas and karmas, substances, qualities and actions. Therefore, in so far as a cow or a horse or a chair or a table is a substance, it has existence or sattā as its inherent character. Therefore, the negative judgment 'a chair is not' or 'a table is not' or 'a horse is not' or 'a cow is not' amounts to a manifest self-contradiction, for this is the same as saying that the cow which is inherently existent does not exist. Contrariwise, when we say that the cow exists, our judgment becomes a tautology, for it amounts to saying that the inherently existent exists, or, that 'that to which existence belongs as an eternal inherent character exists'.

Further, if the universal, as the Naiyāyika says, be an inherent eternal character of its particular instances, then in so far as one and the same particular is an instance of two or more universals, e.g., in so far as a cow is an instance



of the universal of substance (dravyatva) and again an instance of the universal of sattā or being and also an instance of the universal 'cowness' (gotva) it becomes the seat of several universals, i.e., a case of overlapping universals or jāti saṅkara.

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF SAMAVĀYA

THE Naiyāyika recognises three different relations, namely, samyoga (conjunction), vibhāga (disjunction) and samavāya (inherence or intimate relation). Conjunction and disjunction, however, are regarded by Naiyāyikas as guṇas or qualities, and not specifically as relations. Further, conjunction and disjunction, according to Naiyāyikas, are possible only among substantives. 'Conjunction', e.g., is possible between one substance and another, or between several substances and so also is disjunction. But neither conjunction nor disjunction is possible between an adjective (viśeṣaṇa) and a substantive (viśeṣya). When the book is on the table, for example, the book and the table are substances and the relation between them is the relation of conjunction or contact. When the book is taken away from the table, the relation is disjunction. But the Naiyāyika will say that when the book is in contact with the table, the contact or conjunction is not a relation between the table and the book strictly speaking, but a quality that qualifies both the book and the table, and the same is the case with disjunction. But when we have a relation between an adjective and a substantive as, for example, between the brown colour of the table and the table itself which the brown colour qualifies, we have no quality but a relation in the true sense, and the relation in the case in question is



the relation of inherence. The Naiyāyika thus defines inherence as a relation of inseparableness between an adjective and a substantive, or between a contained and containing (ādhāra-ādheya). The inherence relation thus holds only when two conditions are fulfilled, namely, (1) when the relation is an inseparable one and (2) when it is a relation between a contained and a containing. E.g., the relation between one end of a pencil and the other is an inseparable one but it is not a relation between a contained and a containing, for one end is not contained in the other end. Therefore it is not a relation of inherence. Similarly the relation between milk and the cup in which it is contained is a relation of contained and containing but it is not an inseparable relation as one may spill the milk and so end this relation. Therefore it is also not a case of the relation of inherence. But the relation between an adjective and a substantive is an inseparable relation as between a contained and a containing, e.g., the relation between the brown colour of the table and the table which it qualifies is not only an inseparable relation but also a relation between a contained and a containing. Nobody can have brown without the table which it qualifies and further the brown is contained in the table as containing.

It is obvious from the above that the inherence relation holds only between objects which differ in their ontological status. An adjective is ontologically different from a substantive. A substantive may exist in itself but an adjective can exist only in a substantive. It is only between an adjective which has no self-existence strictly speaking and a substantive which is capable of self-existence that the inherence relation holds. Hence it does not hold between one substance and another. Further, the relation of contained and containing excludes inherence from all else excepting bhāva padārthas or positive objects of experience. Negation as emptiness can neither be containing nor contained.

For the sake of parsimony (lāghava) the Naiyāyika recognises only one eternal relation of samavāya which makes its appearance, or becomes manifest, in five different kinds

of situation, namely, (1) when a quality (*guṇa*) qualifies a dravya or substance, (2) when an action appears in the thing acting or moving, (3) when a universal or *jāti* appears as the common character of different particulars or *vyaktis*, (4) when an ultimate differential (*viśeṣa*) appears as the individuating character of an eternal substance, and (5) when a whole (*avayavī*) appears as the unity or synthesis of its parts (*avayava*). In other words, the one eternal relation of inherence functions in every case of a relation between (1) a *guṇa* and a dravya (quality-substance), (2) *kriyā* and dravya (action and thing acting), (3) *jāti* and *vyakti* (universal-particular), (4) *viśeṣa* and *nityā* dravya (ultimate differential and eternal substance) and (5) *avayavī* and *avayavas* (whole and its parts).

While the Naiyāyika insists on difference in ontological status between the relata in the relation of inherence, the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas do away with the relation of inherence altogether and propose *tādātyma* or identity in its place in the sense of *bheda-saḥiṣṇu-abheda*, identity admitting of difference. Thus the relation between a universal and its particular instances, according to Bhāṭṭas, is a relation of identity in difference, the universal being both one with, and different from, its particular instances. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, however, accept *samavāya* as a *padārtha* or irreducible object of experience. They, however, do away with the Nyāya view of one eternal inherence functioning in different situations, inherence being eternal, according to them, when it holds between relata which are themselves eternal, and being non-eternal when it holds between relata, one or other or both of which are non-eternal. Therefore, inherence, according to Prābhākaras, is both eternal and non-eternal and is many and not one as the Naiyāyika holds.

(A fourth relation, *svarūpasambandha*, is recognised by the Naiyāyikas. But as it is a relation in which one or other of the relata is itself the relation, it is, strictly speaking, no additional *padārtha* besides the seven irreducible *padārthas* or objects of experience recognised by the Naiyāyikas. E.g., the relation of knowing to its objects is a *svarūpa sambandha*,

knowing being nothing else than referring to the object and, therefore, is both relatum as knowing and relation as the act of reference. It is therefore just the padārtha of knowing in its svarūpa or essential nature.)

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF VIŚEṢA

THE Naiyāyika is a pluralist and believes in independent particulars having individual self-contained existence. The Nyāya view of viśeṣa or individuation thus occupies an important place in Nyāya metaphysics. Viśeṣa or ultimate differential is defined by the Naiyāyika as that which inheres in an eternal substance and inhering therein differentiates it from every other object. Viśeṣa is, therefore, what individuates an eternal substance making it a unique eternal substance different from all other substances, eternal and non-eternal, and also from qualities, actions and other padārthas or objects of experience. *Viśeṣa therefore is something that belongs to an eternal substance only*; it does not belong to a non-eternal substance, nor to qualities, actions and other padārthas. The reason is that every non-eternal dravya or substance results from the combination of its eternal constituent substances. A non-eternal substance may, therefore, be regarded as an adjective of its eternal constituents, and since the eternal constituents have each its individuality, the individualities of the constituting eternal substances will account for the individuality of the non-eternal whole which results from their combination and is an adjective of them. Therefore, for the sake of lāghava or parsimony, the Naiyāyika will not recognise an additional individuality of the constituted whole besides the individualities of the constituting eternal parts. For the same reason the Naiyāyika will not acknowledge individuality in respect of other adjectives such as qualities, actions, universals, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva. These



have no self-existence apart from particulars and require a particular locus either immediately as in the case of qualities, actions and viśeṣa or meditately as in case of some universals or sāmānyas such as 'brownness'. 'Brownness', e.g., inheres in every particular brown and every brown inheres in some substance, eternal or non-eternal. Therefore brownness presupposes a substantive locus meditately through inherence in the inherent. The same consideration of lāghava is resorted to by the Naiyāyika for denying viśesa to adjectives and acknowledging it only in the case of eternal substances. Linguistic usage also supports the Nyāya view. For communicating the individuality of a thing we usually use the demonstrative 'this' or 'that', but we do not use 'this' or 'that' usually in case of an adjective qualifying a substantive. We usually use it for individuating the substantive only, implying that the adjective qualifying the substantive being individuated by the individuality of its substrate, one individuality, namely, that of the substantive, will do duty for both the substantive and the adjective which qualifies the substantive. For example, we say, 'this chalk is white', but not, 'this chalk is this white'.

It may be also noted that the Naiyāyika considers every viśeṣa to be self-individuating and does not recognise one viśesa to be differentiated from another by a third viśeṣa, for that will lead to an intolerable infinite regress (anavasthā). Moreover, the Naiyāyikas do not recognise any universal viśesatva as a common character of different viśeṣas, every viśeṣa, according to the Naiyāyika, being unique and uncommon so that recognition of a common character of the uncommon will entail rūpahāni or contradict the very essence of viśeṣa unique and without parallel.

It is obvious that the Nyāya theory of viśesa is not without its difficulties. The Naiyāyika recognises Pr̥thakatva or separateness as a padārtha. Since this separateness can do duty for differentiating one eternal substance from another, why should the Naiyāyika throw away all considerations of parsimony and acknowledge an additional padārtha of ulti-

mate differential or viśeṣa? Further, when the Naiyāyikas acknowledge viśeṣa as being self-differentiating, why should they not acknowledge each eternal substance as self-differentiating and do away with the additional padārtha of viśesa altogether? While the Naiyāyika swallows a whole elephant of self-differentiating viśeṣas he strains at a gnat of a self-differentiating substance.

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF SELF

THE Self or Ātman is, according to the Naiyāyika, one amongst the nine different kinds of dravyas or substances. Further, the self, unlike earth, water, air, fire, is an eternal substance, a nitya dravya. An earth-substance, e.g., may be eternal or non-eternal, a compound of earth-atoms being non-eternal while its constituent atoms of earth are eternal. The self as a substance, however, is nitya or eternal. The self, moreover, according to the Naiyāyika, is an immaterial substance distinguished from other substances by nine specific qualities, viz., (1) cognition (*jñāna*), (2) pleasure (*sukha*), (3) pain (*duḥkha*), (4) desire or attraction (*rāga*), (5) aversion (*dveṣa*), (6) volition (*kṛti*) including will as selection (*pravṛtti*) and will as rejection (*nivṛtti*), (7) righteousness (*dharma*), (8) unrighteousness (*adharma*) and (9) certain psychic dispositions (*samskāra*). These nine are the viśeṣa guṇas or specific qualities of the self. They exist in a self and self alone and in no other substance. Besides these specific qualities, the self also possesses certain common qualities or sāmānya guṇas, i.e., the qualities which the self possesses in common with other substances, such as, number (*samkhyā*), magnitude (*parimāṇa*), etc. The self, e.g., is bibhu parimāṇa or infinite in magnitude while an atom (*paramāṇu*) is aṇu parimāṇa, i.e., of infinitesimal magnitude. The self, further, according to the Naiyāyika, is other than the sensibilities (*indriyas*) and other than a succession of conscious states. It is related to its specific qualities not by any necessary or insepar-



able relation but related to them only in the samsāra state, i.e. only during the empirical life when it comes into empirical relations with objects from a false sense of values and becomes a subject of happiness and unhappiness, of attraction and aversion and of righteous and unrighteous acts as a consequence. The self, therefore, is a substance, according to the Naiyāyika, which may be with or without consciousness, consciousness being only an accidental quality of it. In dreamless sleep, e.g., as also in the mokṣa state when the self becomes free from the toils of samsāra, it becomes a śuddha dravya or a pure substance devoid of any consciousness of the world and its joys and miseries. The relation of self to consciousness is the relation of a substance to its quality. But its relation to the quality of consciousness is an adventitious, inessential relation which ceases in the transcendental state of freedom from experience and its vicissitudes.

The self as a substance, according to the Naiyāyikas consists of two classes, Jivātman and Paramātman, individual self and supreme self. There are innumerable individual selves under the superintendence of one supreme self as the creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world.

It may be noted that the Nyāya theory of self has both similarities and dissimilarities with that of the Rāmānujists. Both according to the Naiyāyikas and Rāmānujists, the relation of self to consciousness is the relation of substance and attribute (dravya-guṇasambandha as the Naiyāyika says and viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇasambandha as the Rāmānujist says). But while, according to the Naiyāyika, the relation is adventitious or accidental, according to the Rāmānujist, it is an essential and inseparable relation. Further, while, according to the Naiyāyika, the substance-quality relation excludes, or is different from, the relation of the body as an organism to its members according to the Rāmānujist, the substance-attributer relation comprises not merely the relation of subject and object (viśayī and viśaya) but also that of whole and part (amśī and amśa), of organism and its organs (aṅgi and aṅga), etc.

It is obvious from the above that the Nyāya theory of self is not without very serious flaws. While the Naiyāyika distinguishes the self as an immaterial substance from other substances, he at the same time denies to it any essential relation to consciousness and other psychic states. How can a substance be called spiritual or immaterial which lacks consciousness or intelligence as an essential character? How can we distinguish such a substance from a material substance like a block of wood or a piece of brick? Rightly has the critic said that the life of a cow in Vrndāvana is much better than that of the mukta ātman, the liberated spirit, of the Naiyāyikas, for the cow has at least consciousness, while the mukta soul of Nyāya is unconscious like a dead material object.

NYĀYA PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

(*Based on the "Nyāyamañjari" of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*)

THE Naiyāyikas recognise four sources of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, śabda or verbal communication and comparison. In this respect they differ from the Vaiśeṣikas who recognise only two sources of knowledge, viz., perception and inference. While both Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas agree in respect of the proof of the existence of God by means of inference (*anumāna*) the Naiyāyikas, as distinguished from the Vaiśeṣikas, hold that the existence of God can also be established by śabda *pramāṇa*. All *pramāṇya* or validity being, according to the Naiyāyikas, *parataḥ* or extrinsic, śabda *pramāṇa* or verbal communication as a source of knowledge is a valid source of knowledge in regard to the existence of God only in an extrinsic reference. The Mīmāṃsakas consider the Vedas to possess intrinsic evidential authority or validity. According to them, the prescriptions embodied in the Vedas are laws without a law-giver, i.e., com-



mands without any personal source. Every communication in words, according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, is intrinsically informative and valid unless the communication is tainted by the faults of the speaker making the communication, i.e., such faults as ignorance, illusion, desire to deceive, incapacity of correctly reporting a situation, etc. In the case of Vedic prescriptions, however, no question of a speaker's fault distorting the communication arises, there being no speaker or personal source of the *Vedas* according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Therefore the *Vedas* have intrinsic, inherent validity as a code of injunctions and prohibitions (*vidhiniṣedha*).

The *Naiyāyikas*, however, join issue with the *Mīmāṃsakas* here. The mere absence of a *vaktā* or personal source does not validate the Vedic declarations according to the *Naiyāyikas*. Absence of a speaker may at best ensure the absence of a speaker's defects interfering with the truth of a declaration. But mere absence of defect does not confer positive truth or validity on such declarations. For this positive truth-conveying character the declaration must possess some positive special excellences besides the negative absence of *doṣas* or defects. Such special excellences can be derived only from a personal source of the *Vedas*. Vedic declarations are valid, in other words, only as personal prescriptions of a superior person, i.e., of a person who has knowledge of all that is and also all that is beneficial or harmful to finite beings. The validity of the *Vedas* is thus extrinsic, being derived, as a personal communication, from God as the source of the *Vedas*.

The anti-theists, however, amongst which may be included not merely the *Mīmāṃsakas* but also *Cārvākas*, Buddhists, etc., reject the *Nyāya* view on the ground that the idea of a creator of the world and the personal source of the *Vedas* does not bear logical scrutiny. The personal God of the *Naiyāyikas*, the anti-theists contend, cannot be proved by perception, inference or any other *pramāṇa*. God is not a colour, or a taste, or a smell, etc., and so is not an object of external perception, nor is He a pleasure, or a pain, and

therefore is not an object of internal perception. Nor is He an object of a seer's vision (*yogī pratyakṣa*), for no such seer or *yogī* is established by the facts of experience. Inference presupposes perception as its basis and perception of God being impossible as shown above, no inference of God on the basis of perception is possible. Inference is based on inductions from experience and such inductions are arrived at by means of observations of agreement in presence and agreement in absence together with non-observation of the contrary. But God being not an object of perception, observation of agreement in presence of God and any mark by which He is to be inferred is not possible. Nor is the inference of God by *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference possible, for there is no mark which can be observed as invariably related to a creator of the nature of God. Even if we start from the world consisting of the earth, the sea, etc., it does not serve to prove God as the creator of the world. For the effect-character of the world consisting of the earth, the sea, etc., is not itself an established truth. The arrangement of parts, e.g., which we observe in a hill, is essentially different from the arrangement of parts which we observe in an earthen jar made by a potter. Therefore, the effect-character of the hill, etc., constituting the earth, etc., does not prove an intelligent author in the same way as the effect-character of an earthen jar proves an intelligent maker such as a potter. Even if we grant the effect-character of the earth, etc., as being of the same nature as of a jar or a piece of cloth, it does not necessarily prove an intelligent author of the earth. For there is no invariable relation between effect-character and intelligent authorship, there being instances in experience of the presence of effect-character with absence of intelligent authorship as, e.g., in the case of the blade of grass which is an instance of spontaneous generation without an intelligent author. Effect-character, therefore, as the mark or *hetu* of intelligent authorship is *anaikāntika* or a too wide *hetu*, being found both where an intelligent author is as in the case of the jar and the intelligent potter and also where it is not as in the case



of the blade of grass where no intelligent author is. Just as in the case of the grass no intelligent author being observed, one is justified in concluding that there is no such author so as also in the case of the earth, the sea, etc., no intelligent author being perceived, one is justified in concluding that no such author exists. The mere fact of arrangement of parts (sanniveśa) of the earth, etc., thus no mere proves an intelligent creator thereof than does the too wide hetu puruṣatva or being a male proves that one is a Brahmin. (A male may be a Brahmin or a non-Brahmin.) Further, if an intelligent author is to be inferred in accordance with the vyāpti between 'effect-character' and 'intelligent authorship' as illustrated by the example of the earthen jar and the potter, then only a non-omniscient, embodied being who is subject to all the ills that flesh is heir to and works with effort towards the attainment of his ends, has to be inferred as the author of the earth etc., which will be contrary to our conception of God as creator. If, however, an omniscient creator is inferred from the vyāpti between 'being an effect' and 'being the effect of an intelligent cause', then the udāharana or illustration, viz., a jar, will be a sādhyahīna illustration, for the potter is not an omniscient being. Further, if God is to be inferred as a creator of the world on the ground of the kāryatva or effect-character of the world, then the question arises: Does God create the world as an embodied being, or as a disincarnate spirit? Further, if God creates with the help of his body, is the body of God, with which He creates, a kārya or an effect in time, or an eternal body without beginning or end in time? Nowhere is intelligent causality observed in the case of a being without a body and if God creates with a body, then that body being itself made of parts will be an effect and will require a kartā or intelligent author thereof. If the author of the divine body be God himself, then it is absurd on the face of it and will amount to God creating himself, and if the author is some being other than God, then we are landed into an endless

series of Gods, each creating the body of the next that follows.

What, then, is the objection to the idea of God as creator? The objection is absence of evidence of any kind. When even one God you cannot establish by valid evidence, you have the audacity of conceiving an endless series of Gods. Further, when you talk of God as creating the three worlds, do you suppose that He creates just like the potter by active manipulation of materials? Or, does He create by the simple fact of a desire to create (*icchāmātrena*)? If He were to create by the manipulation of materials, the creation would not be completed even in ages. Nor does the second alternative that God creates by a simple wish to create (by a simple fiat of the will without manipulation of materials) bear strict examination. For, why should non-intelligent atoms obey the divine wish and suddenly arrange themselves into an ordered world?

Again, what can be God's motive in creating the world, or does He create without any motive? The second alternative reduces God's behaviour in creation to that of a lunatic, for it is only lunatics that behave without rhyme or reason. Nor does the first alternative bear examination. For, God, who is the embodiment of all joy and bliss cannot be subject to attraction or aversion and therefore cannot have any motive actuating Him to create a world. Nor can compassion (*anukampā*) for finite individuals be God's motive of creation, for before creation Jivas or finite individuals are not subject to afflictions of any kind and are of the same nature as liberated individuals untouched by miseries and afflictions. They are thus not objects of compassion prior to the creation of a world. Even for an All-compassionate Being like God it is not possible to feel compassion for creatures who, like liberated persons, are completely free from the touch of suffering and misery. Nor can it be said that even God is not able to create a world of unmixed happiness, nor if He is able to create any such



world, can it last for a substantial period of time. This will be a denial of the omnipotence of God and His absolute autonomy and freedom to will and act according to His mere pleasure—a will and pleasure which all objects obey or conform to. Therefore the idea that anything is impossible for God is inconsistent with His absoluteness. Nor can it be said that God has to create the world in accordance with the moral deserts of individuals or Jivas, i.e., according to what individuals have earned for themselves in the way of happiness or suffering by their karma or good and bad deeds. The answer in this case is that karma or the deeds of individuals being the real creator of the world, why then have a God as a creator in addition to karma? If it be said that non-intelligent karma without the direction of an intelligent being is not able to encompass the task of creation, the answer is that as karma has the intelligent individual finite being as its agent, why have a director or superintendent of action other than the finite individual as the agent of action? Further, even if we grant an Īśvara or God as the director or superintendent of the actions of finite beings in the task of creation, then God loses his svātantrya or autonomy and has to act in accordance with the good and bad deeds of finite beings in the work of creation. As a king dependent upon his minister ceases to be a paramount ruler, so God, dependent upon the merits, or the opposite, of finite individuals, ceases to be an absolute ruler. If it is said that the creation of the world is nothing but the sport of the Lord, and He creates a mixed world of good and bad, not from any consciousness of imperfection or want, but for the sheer joy of creation itself as in sport or play, then in so far as God will be bereft of this joy at the time of dissolution of the universe, He cannot be called a Being of eternal Bliss of all kinds. Nor is such a creation entailing considerable exertion consistent with God's nature as all-merciful and all-compassionate, for it may be a sport to the Lord or God but is a source of suffering and misery to the creatures. It follows, therefore, that God is neither creator nor destroyer of the universe. So long as the merits of individuals are

not exhausted, God cannot bring about the dissolution of the universe. Nor can it be assumed that the merit, or the opposite, of individuals becomes suddenly exhausted simultaneously on the day prior to dissolution. If such were the case, then re-creation after a lapse of time would be impossible as no merits and demerits will be left to God for creating a diverse world once again after dissolution in accordance with the merits and demerits of the individuals. Nor can it be said that the dissolution takes place when after a lapse of one hundred ages the creator conceives a desire to dissolve the universe whereon the kārmika forces of merits and demerits of individuals become suddenly inactive and consequently dissolution takes place. Similarly, when after a hundred ages God conceives a desire to create again, the inactivated forces of merit and demerit become suddenly active again and start producing diverse effects. Such an assumption makes the will of God the real creator so that merit and demerit become really superfluous according to this view. If the Naiyāyikas say that it is the divine will that is the real creator, then in so far as this will creates a world of suffering and misery, it is not free from the charge of callousness and cruelty. Therefore, the divine will is either an omnipotent will, or a morally good will, but cannot be both. Further, since the divine will, according to this view, becomes the source of merit and demerit, i.e., the righteousness, or the opposite, of the actions of the individuals, an action is good or bad not because the Vedas enjoin or prohibit it but because the divine will wills it as such. Lastly, this view also is inconsistent with the idea of liberation for, according to it, the divine will may reunite a liberated soul with a body and make it participate thereby in the vicissitudes of the world it creates.

If follows, therefore, that there is no logical reason or hetu for inferring the existence of God as the creator of the world. Neither perception nor inference can, therefore, prove the existence of God. Nor is śabda or Vedic authority a valid proof of God's existence. Vedic authority is itself

derived from Īśvara or God as its source according to the Naiyāyikas and God again is proved by means of Vedic authority. There is thus a vicious circle from which there is no escape for the Naiyāyikas. Nor does God bear comparison with any other being so that comparison or upamāna also cannot prove God's existence. Lastly, presumption is also no proof of the existence of God as all the facts of the world can be explained satisfactorily independently of the idea of a world-creator. (This Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka argument is directed against the Advaitins who regard God as Māyā-Viśiṣṭa-Caitanya and as srsti-sthiti-laya-kartā in the sense of being both the material and efficient cause thereof and regard arthāpatti or presumption as a source of our knowledge of God.)

So far we have considered the anti-theist arguments against the theistic proof of God's existence. The objections of the anti-theist so far as the theistic inference is concerned, resolve, on analysis, into the following two, viz., (1) that the kāryatva or the effect-character of the world has not been conclusively proved by the theist, (2) nor has the theist proved beyond all doubt that every effect requires an intelligent cause. As regards objection (1) which challenges the effect-character of the world, the Naiyāyikas ask: who is the person who raises such an objection to the inference? Is he a Cārvāka or a Mīmāṃsaka or a Buddhist? (a) Certainly it does not consist with a Cārvāka to deny the effect-character of the world who goes so far as to deny the eternity of the Vedas (considers them to be the writings of deceitful priests). (b) Nor can a Mīmāṃsaka consistently deny the effect-character of the world. Even Śāvara himself admits that wherever we have a composite whole (such as a piece of cloth) resulting from the combination of parts (threads) we have a contingent whole that begins to be through the combination of parts and ceases when the combination ceases or the constituents themselves (threads) cease to be. (c) Nor can a Buddhist deny the effect-character of the world for whom whatever is, is momen-

tary and is an effect of the preceding momentary real. Therefore, the hetu, kāryatva or effect-character in respect of the earth, etc., is not asiddha or unestablished in respect of the subject of the inference.

Nor can we say that the combination of parts which we notice in a jar or a piece of cloth is quite different from the arrangement of parts in a hill or other objects of the earth, etc. For the smoke that rises from a fire kindled in an oven by gentle blowing is different from the smoke that rises in volumes from a fire in the hill that is set ablaze by a strong wind. Would we say that the smoke in the hill being different from the smoke in the oven does not prove fire in the hill though it proves fire in the kitchen? If it is said that smoke in general is connected with fire in general and therefore smoke proves fire (in the kitchen as well as the mountain) the reply is that combination of parts as such proves an intelligent agent irrespectively of any special kind which such a combination may be.

The Buddhists, however, join issue with the Naiyāyikas and say that the so-called combination as such, i.e., as a pure universal, does not exist in reality, it being nothing but a thought-construct and a name with a purely negative meaning. In the so-called inference of fire from smoke, the smoke as a universal means nothing but the exclusion of such objects as sky, time, etc., which are not smoke. Even this, however, does not improve matters for the Buddhist, for combination of parts as a universal with a negative meaning may be similarly used for the inference of an intelligent agent.

(2) It has been argued that the universal relation between effect-character as proved by composite structure (of earth, etc.) and intelligent authorship has not been indubitably established, there being many exceptions in experience to the general rule. There are, e.g., immovable objects like the hill, etc., and also trees, blades of grass, etc., which are of composite structure but have no observed intelligent author. In answer to this it may be pointed out that absence

of an observed author does not prove that there is no such in reality and, therefore, the so-called negative instances are not vipakṣas or dissimilar instances but are only cases where intelligent authorship is doubtful or uncertain, no intelligent author being observed in their case. They are thus included in the pakṣa or subject of inference, the uncertainty of intelligent authorship in respect of which is to be resolved by the inference. We can call them dissimilar instances only if after careful investigation we find that there cannot be any intelligent author, observed or unobserved, in any circumstances, in their case.

If the Mīmāṃsakas urge that instances of the hill, the blade of grass, etc., are dissimilar or contrary instances, though a creator thereof being not observed is only doubtful, then the Mīmāṃsaka inference of the auditory organ of sense required for the apprehension of sound may be similarly rejected. Every action requires an instrument just as the action of cutting wood requires an instrument such as an axe. The perception of sound is an action and therefore it must require an instrument by means of which such action is possible. Therefore, an auditory sense must be inferred as the instrument wherewith sounds are perceived. But since a sense is not itself capable of being sensed or sense-perceived, the auditory sense which we infer is supersensuous and cannot be observed. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the validity of this inference. But according to the objection which they raised against the theistic inference, the auditory sense which is inferred in the above instance may very well be cited as a dissimilar instance and sound-perception adduced as an example where the invariable relation between an action and an instrument of action fails (no instrument of sound-perception being an object of observation or perception). If the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the inference of an auditory sense in the case of sound-perception is an instance of sāmānyato drṣṭa inference based on an invariable relation observed in general between actions actually observed such as cutting and instruments actually

observed such as an axe and therefore cannot be rejected as invalid on the ground that in the case of vision, audition, etc., no instrument of action is actually observed and therefore such cases are dissimilar instances where the invariable relation fails, the Naiyāyikas may similarly reply that in the case of the earth, the hill, etc., the vyāpti or invariable relation between effect-character and intelligent causality cannot be taken as non-existing on the ground that no intelligent cause is observed in their case.

The Mīmāṃsakas may argue that the creator of the earth etc., is never perceived by anybody. The Naiyāyikas say in reply that an auditory or any other sense is also not perceived by anybody. If the Mīmāṃsakas say that the auditory and other senses are not perceived because they are supersensuous and not because they do not exist, the Naiyāyikas say in reply that the creator of the earth, etc., is also not perceived because He is not an incarnate spirit and not because He is non-existent. Further, if the Mīmāṃsakas argue that no action being possible without an instrument the auditory and other senses as instruments of perception are legitimate objects of inference, the Naiyāyikas say in reply that an effect cannot be proved without a creator and therefore a creator of the world as an effect is a legitimate inference from the nature of the world as an effect.

If in the case of the inference 'the world has a creator because it is an effect' the world is made a contrary example on the ground that no creator of the world is actually seen or observed, then even the stock example of the inference of fire in the mountain from the perception of smoke in the mountain may be treated as fallacious on the ground that no fire being actually perceived in the mountain from a distance the mountain is a case of a contrary example. If it be argued that the fire, though not visible from a distance, can, however, be actually seen when one reaches the mountain, or draws very near it, the reply is that it was not perceived at the time of the inference and it does not mend matters if

it is perceived later on. Further, if a person who infers fire in the mountain from the perception of smoke in the mountain does not verify his inference by drawing near the mountain and perceiving fire, does his inference become invalid thereby? Again another antitheistic objection is that though we observe an intelligent agent in the case of the jar and other things, the intelligent author that we observe in their case is quite different from the intelligent being that can be the creator of the three worlds. The jar, etc., are the handiwork of finite beings of limited intelligence while the creator of the universe can only be an infinite and absolute intelligent cause. Therefore, the hetu 'effect-character' (as illustrated in the case of the jar, etc.) is a viśeṣa-viruddha-hetu incompatible with a creator of infinite and absolute intelligence. The Naiyāyikas in reply point out that an objection of this kind will invalidate every kind of inference. Consider, e.g., the inference of the auditory sense. We find that action requires an instrument with which to act and our vyāpti or invariable relation is based on such instances as cutting wood with an axe, mending a pencil with a knife, etc. Now, the knife or the axe are metal objects with qualities of extension, hardness etc. If we infer an auditory sense on the basis of such observed instances, is it necessary that the supersensuous auditory sensibility should be hard, impenetrable and extended in space just as a knife or an axe is?

A viruddha hetu is one which instead of being related to the sādhya or thing to be proved, is related, to its contrary, to the absence of it. A hetu does not become viruddha or contradictory if it proves a probandum which is not exactly identical in character with that with which it is connected in the example. When smoke, e.g., proves fire in the mountain yonder, it proves a mountain fire which is not an exact replica of the fire in the oven with which it is found connected in the example, viz., the oven fire.

Nor can the hetu in the theistic inference above be cited as a kālātyaya-apadiṣṭa-hetu. A hetu is kālātyaya apadiṣṭa

only if it proves a probandum in the subject of an inference which is known from the other sources of knowledge not to belong to the subject in question. But it has not been proved by perception, verbal communication or any other source of knowledge that the earth and such other objects have no intelligent author.

Nor is the hetu in the above theistic inference countered by a counter-hetu proving an opposite conclusion. Therefore, it is not also a satpratipakṣa hetu.

It may be argued, however, that all that the inference proves is a bare creator of the world, but not a creator endowed with the attributes of God. The Naiyāyikas say in reply that the inference proves only a creator and the attributes of this creator are known from other sources of knowledge (the Vedas). The Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad says that God has eyes, faces, hands, etc., on all sides and that He connects Himself with merits and demerits and the five elements in order to create heaven and earth. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says that God moves and yet has no legs, holds objects and yet has no hands, sees but has no eyes, hears but has no ears, is all-knowing and yet nobody knows Him, and is unexcelled amongst souls. These passages prove that God is omniscient. The Mīmāṃsaka objection, that proving God by means of the Vedas and the validity of Vedas by means of God as their source is nothing but circular reasoning, is disposed of when we observe that the existence of God has been proved not by an appeal to the Vedas but by inference. The omniscience of God as distinguished from the ignorance of creatures arises from the absence of defects. God is not subject to love, hate and other defects as finite creatures are. These defects arise in creatures because of their attachment to objects due to illusion. Such attachment causes pleasant and unpleasant reactions in finite creatures, but God, being not subject to such attachment, is free from defects and is therefore of the essence of eternal joy and consciousness. The eternality of God's consciousness follows from the fact



that if it were to be suspended even for an infinitesimal instant of time the whole universe operating according to the merits and demerits of individuals under the intelligent guidance of God will come to a standstill. But why should God's consciousness continue during the period of dissolution? The answer is that at the time of dissolution there is nothing which can destroy His consciousness.

The Divine Consciousness is immediate and so far resembles perception. But unlike perception, it is not a generated event in time produced by sense-object contact. He is free from sorrow and hatred and as He has immediate knowledge of all objects, He has no impressions nor memory nor inferential knowledge. As He constantly wills the relief of suffering creatures, He is a subject of ever-increasing merit and is free from demerit.

If His will is eternal; then how is it that the world which He wills is not also eternal? And if He wills the undoing of His creation, how is it that Pralaya or world-destruction is also not eternal like His will? The objection misses an essential point. The Divine Will, though itself eternal, is determined by the nature of the object that It wills, so that when the Divine Will wills the creation of the universe, a world comes into being, and when It wills the destruction of the world, it ceases to be. It has been said in the Vedas that God is Satyakāmā, Satya-saṅkalpa etc., so that His will is never frustrated.

The objection already considered as regards God creating with a body or independently of it is answered as follows. God indeed is a disincarnate spirit, but this does not stand in the way of His creating the world. Just as the soul moves the body without requiring another body through which it can move it (the body) so does God create the world out of the atoms which are His body. Nor does the question of a motive of creation seem quite fair. God creates and destroys because it is His nature to create and destroy at fixed intervals even as it is the nature of the sun to rise in the east and set in the west. We may regard creation and destruction as

the sportive activity of God or we may say that God creates or destroys out of sheer compassion for creatures. As creatures even at the pralaya or dissolution stage do not become free from merit and demerit which only become inactive or potential at the time, God creates a world again so that creatures, through actual experience of happiness and the opposite, may exhaust their merit and demerit and become really liberated.

But what is it that proves that there is one, absolute creator of the world ? May there not be many creators, gods in the plural, who bring about this world by their creative activities ? The reply to this objection is that in the event of there being more than one God, the gods will be either working harmoniously for the common end of creation or working against one another. In the former event since one single God will suffice for the purpose of creation, the rest of the gods will be superfluous and will have nothing to do. In the latter event since the gods will be undoing the work of one another, there will be no creation nor any God having paramount authority. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa holds that since finite beings are the makers of their own merit and demerit, these finite individuals with their merits and demerits acting in cooperation will suffice for the purpose of creation. Even this hypothesis does not bear examination. When artisans like carpenters, masons, etc., work in cooperation in constructing a palace or any other building, they have to work under the direction of a superintending authority and, only as so directed, can they successfully finish the work. Similarly finite individuals are incapable of creating the world without the direction of a superintending all-knowing intelligence. Even in Kumārila's hypothesis the idea of a supreme intelligence as the directing authority has to be admitted.

NYĀYA AND SĀNKHYA REALISM

THE Naiyāyika is an out and out common-sense realist. While he believes in the priority of logic to metaphysics and will not subscribe to the reality of anything which is not established by valid evidence (*prameya saṃvit pramāṇat hi— objects are known only through pramāṇa or valid evidence*), he at the same time believes that it is reality that prescribes to knowledge. Hence while in the order of knowledge we have to start with the logic of knowing in order to ascertain the nature of reality, in the order of being it is reality that determines the nature of valid knowing. In fact, the Naiyāyika believes on the evidence of knowing not merely in the reality of objects but also in their independent reality. Knowing refers to, or reveals, according to Naiyāyikas, not merely objects other than our knowing but also objects as possessing reality independently of knowing. Further, such independent objects are not merely revealed in knowledge but are revealed as full-fledged complete objects, i.e., as objects in space and time and as possessing qualities such as colour, taste, smell, etc. Objects therefore, according to the Naiyāyikas, have existence, independently of our knowing *just as they are presented in our knowing.*

As distinguished from the unqualified realism of Nyāya we have a modified form of realism in Sāṅkhya which is a sort of half-way house to the idealism of Vedānta. Sāṅkhya accepts two ultimate independent principles underlying our world of experience—a transcendental subject or Puruṣa and an undifferentiated objective background, viz., Prakṛti. The undifferentiated or indeterminate background, lighted up by Puruṣa's consciousness, transforms or differentiates itself into our world of experience consisting of empirical subjects and a common world of objects. It may be noted here that Puruṣa or the transcendental subject in the singular means the conceptual class of many transcendental subjects which light up Prakṛti in different ways causing Prakṛti to break up into a multiverse or many different worlds of experience. It is

obvious that Sāṅkhya realism differs in many essentials from the realism of Nyāya. There is no finished independent object according to Sāṅkhya apart from the light of Puruṣa's consciousness or Caitanya but only an undifferentiated indeterminate back-ground of objectivity which is Prakṛti in the state of equipoise or sāmyāvasthā as the prius of our empirical world. It is thus this transcendental objective background which is independent of the transcendental subject or Puruṣa. Our known world of objects, i.e., the empirical world which we live and move in, is the joint product of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, of the transcendental subject and the independent objective background. In so far as Puruṣa lights up Prakṛti does Prakṛti's original equipoise give way to one of differentiation and integration causing the appearance of a diversified world of objects. Thus the so-called finished objects of experience have no reality independently of the subject as the Naiyāyika says but arise through the mediation of the latter.

THE SĀNKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Notable amongst the Hindu theories of cognition besides the Sāṅkhya are the Idealistic theory of the Vedāntist and the Realistic theory of the Nyāya schools. Sāṅkhya realism represents an intermediate position—a sort of half-way house between the uncompromising Vedānta Idealism of Pure Thought and the extreme realism of the Nyāya Philosophy. The Sāṅkhya theory is of peculiar interest in this respect. Attempting at a synthesis of the irreducible given with self-pointing, self-revealing thought, it combines in itself the weak points both of idealism and realism. But despite these inherent difficulties of its task, it tackles the knowledge-problem with a thoroughness and a conscious perception of the issues involved that will repay serious study even at the present day.



We shall preface our exposition of the Sāṅkhyā view with an account of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theories and incidentally we shall also refer to the Vedānta theory and some of the kindred western theories as throwing light on Sāṅkhyā realism proper.

According to the Naiyāyika, cognition is a quality (*guṇa*) of the self as substance (*dravya*), a quality that originates under certain special conditions and has the character of referring beyond itself. Hence cognition is a non-eternal quality of the self, a quality which the self may be with or without and which appears only as certain special conditions are fulfilled. Cognition according to Nyāya is thus an inessential attribute of self-substances; it belongs to souls or self-substances, and self-substances alone, but it does not constitute self-substances nor is otherwise essential to or inseparable from self-substances. As a matter of fact in the state of transcendental freedom (the Mokṣa state) the self becomes a pure substance (a śuddhadravya) and becomes free not merely from pleasure, pain and the miseries of life (*samsāra*) but also from all forms of experience including jñāna or cognition. And even in the empirical life there are states of pure unconsciousness when the self becomes a pure substance devoid of all forms of experience. Cognition is not a constituent of the self, nor is it an inseparable attribute of the self as such though in the supreme Self (the Paramātman) it abides as an eternal quality, a timeless intuition of all things that are or may be. Cognition thus, according to Nyāya, is not a relation but a quality and a quality only of self-substances. It is related to the self by the relation of inherence and is not itself a relation but a quality. But, as a quality inhering in the self, its nature is to transcend itself, to refer beyond itself, to reveal something other than itself. Thus cognition does not cognise itself but something different from itself; it reveals the viśaya or object and not itself. It is related to the viśaya or object by the relation of viśayitā,—the relation of objectifying or making an object of it. Thus it is subject

to a two-fold relation. It is related to the self by the relation of samavāya or inherence and it is related to the object by the relation of objectifying (viśayitā). The Nyāya view of cognition furnishes a contrast in this respect to that of the Rāmānujists who also conceive cognition to be an attribute of the self as substance. The Rāmānujists are idealists and regard intelligence as an essential quality of the self. (Cf. Śrībhāṣya Thibaut's English Tr., 1, 1, 1.) "Nor can it be said," says Rāmānuja, "that this 'T', the knowing subject, is dependent for its light on something else. It rather is self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. Analogously to the lamp, the self is essentially intelligent (cidrūpa), and has intelligence (caitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be self-luminous." (Ved. Sut., Thibaut's Eng. Tr., 1, 1, 1, pp. 58-60.) The conception of intelligence being essential to the self is however repugnant to the Naiyāyika realist according to whom reality is wider than thought, the latter being no more than an accident, an ephemeral quality or function of a section or part of reality. Rāmānujists contend that since the Absolute is an Omnipersonality, i.e., an Inclusive Self or Ātman of which intelligence is an essential quality, reality is essentially intelligent or self-revealing. But Naiyāyikas reject this idealistic conception of intelligence as constitutive of reality. Thought does not constitute reality, it is not even a constitutive or essential character of the self whose quality it is. As a matter of fact, there are states, both empirical and transcendental, in which the self lapses into pure unconsciousness, into the non-intelligent Being of a free self-substance. Naiyāyikas also repudiate the Rāmānujist conception of intelligence as svayamprakāśa or self-revealing. Rāmānujists hold that intelligence or consciousness is self-revealing in the sense that it reveals itself to its own substrate by means of its own activity. A stone, e.g., is not self-revealing as it does not reveal itself to its own substrate; it has being-for-another, no being-for-self. Not so however intelligence or conscious-



ness. It reveals itself to its own substrate by its own being; it has being-for-self in and through itself at the time of its appearance. Thus a past state may be revealed to its substrate, the self, by another state, but is not so revealed by itself at the present time. There is no consciousness without object, but this by itself does not deprive it of svayamprakāśatva in the above sense of being revealed to its substrate, the self, through its own being. Says the "Sribhāṣya", "The essential nature of consciousness — or knowledge—consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment" ("Thibaut's Tr., p. 48). And it adds "that knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connexion with the knowing 'I': it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else." Again (p. 63), "as the knowing self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the self is also eternal. Consciousness besides is an essential, and therefore eternal, quality of the self which is itself eternal, but knowledge in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion In the so-called kṣetrajña-condition of the self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karma), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to the work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting" (p. 63). Thus according to Rāmānujists, knowing supposes both the knowing subject and an object known. And the knowing reveals both itself and the object to its substrate, the knowing self or subject. Further it reveals the object as jada or non-intelligent datum while it reveals itself as ajada, i.e., as intelligent cognition of the non-intelligent datum. But it does not reveal itself to itself but only to its own substrate, the knowing subject or self which is also intelligent as knowing self as distinguished from the non-intelligent datum known. And further, according to



them; knowledge owes its character of self-revelation to its-substrate to its connection with the latter; it is owing to connexion with the self-revealing knower which reveals itself to itself that knowledge reveals itself to its substrate. The knower would not be knower without knowing itself as a knower of objects known, and the knower would not know itself as such without Intelligence. Intelligence is thus an essential quality of the self and is, like the self, eternal. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Rāmānujists only up to a certain point. Cognition is a quality of the self, but not, as Rāmānujists think, an essential and eternal quality of it. Nor does it necessarily reveal itself to its substrate in revealing an object different from itself. It reveals itself only in a secondary act of retrospection, and even then it *reveals itself as an object known and not as subjective knowing*. It is thus not generically distinct from other qualities as intelligent knowing (ajada) from non-intelligent data known as Rāmānujists think. On the contrary it is generically of the same nature as other qualities; it is objective like the rest of qualities, only specifically differing from them as revealing objects and qualifying the particular set of substances called self-substances. Rāmānujists distinguish between intelligence as an essential, eternal quality of the self and the temporal-spatial limitations of intelligence in the self in its kṣetrajña-condition. But no such essential eternal intelligence in the self as knower is admitted by the Naiyāyika realist according to whom cognition does not constitute, but only reveals reality. Further, as we have seen above Naiyāyikas admit non-intelligent conditions of the self, states of suspended intelligence or consciousness, when the self becomes free from the trammels of experience. Against this Naiyāyika view, however, it is urged by the opponent that such existence without consciousness is not removed very far from dead materiality. Nyāya realism is therefore no better than Cārvāka materialism. The Naiyāyika meets this objection by distinguishing between the self as spiritual substance and the atoms and their compounds which



are material substances. But since the Naiyāyika can justify this distinction of substances only by a differentiation of their respective functions, cognition as a function of self-substances must be allowed to constitute its proper substrate. This, however, the Naiyāyika as a realist is not prepared to admit.

Sankara-Vedāntism is the antithesis in this respect to Nyāya realism. The Naiyāyika makes cognition dependent on reality; cognition does not make reality, it only reveals it. The Sankara-Vedāntist, on the contrary, resolves reality to consciousness, to the illumination if reality. Take away illumination, and reality is engulfed in darkness, in a blank void. Reality is illumination of reality; being *is* prakāśa of being—or rather being is nothing but prakāśa which is the light that reveals. Reality as a pure datum, reality as object of cognition and therefore as other of cognition, is an illusory fiction, an unreal projection of Māyā (which is the principle of Cosmic Hallucination). The Self as knower is pure light of consciousness. The Self as knowing subject distinct from pure consciousness, the Self as a being that illumines as distinct from illumination as such is an unsubstantial fiction, an illusory projection of nescience. Reality is illumination and the Self is real only as pure self-luminous light. Self as anything else than the light that reveals, self as substance or subject or being distinct from pure consciousness, is the other of reality and therefore unreality or illusory appearance. Nothing therefore is real except Pure Intelligence, undifferenced self-shining Thought. The object of thought as the other of thought is self-contradictory and therefore indescribable. The subject likewise as distinct from thought as such is indescribable and inconceivable. What reveals itself in all thought is pure self-positing self-revealing thought. The world is the play of free self-positing Thought; it is the free Intelligence objectifying itself as a system of causally-linked appearances.

The Naiyāyika however repudiates the Sankara-Vedāntist equation of thought and reality. The so-called identity of

being and thought is, according to him, an idealistic delusion which the commonsense practical world of facts does not substantiate. The world of practice is based, according to the Naiyāyikas, on an essential distinction between thought and reality, between cognition and the object it reveals. Thought is neither reality nor coextensive with reality as one of its essential or inseparable aspects. It is an ephemeral quality or attribute of the self, an attribute that is generated under peculiar conditions. The self becomes conscious only when there is a special relation of contact between the self and the mind and between the mind and a particular cogitable content. Thought therefore is a function not of all substances but only of self-substances or souls and of these only as certain peculiar conditions are fulfilled. It is a matter of common experience that this is so, and experience proves it as conclusively as it disproves the Vedānta equation of reality and pure thought. Thought thus is thought of reality and is not itself reality. It is the very nature of thought to point beyond itself, to refer to that which is not itself. Without the viśaya, the external object to think of, thought is an unreal abstraction. Thought thus always looks beyond itself, refers to an object different from itself. Its nature as a quality of the self is to reveal not itself, but an object as the other of itself. Thought thus does not think itself, but only the object which is not itself. In this way subjective thought transcends itself and comprehends the external transcendent object.

How, then does thought know itself? Or does it never know itself? If thought knows only the object it thinks, is it anything entitatively different from its object? Is it other than the object, or just the object thought? If thought is the object thought, how does the object thought differ from the object-in-itself? If thought is not itself the object, if thought is thought of or thought about the object, how does it differ as *thought* from the object of which it is a thought? Further, how does the object-in-itself differ from the object thought of? What, in other words, does the object gain

by being revealed to, or apprehended by, thought ? The Naiyāyika answers these questions from the realistic stand-point. Thought is neither the object nor a phase or aspect of the object thought. Thought is thought *of* or thought *about* reality. Thought does not think itself, but only an other of itself, a viśaya or object from which it is distinguished as viśayin or thought of the object. The very nature of thought as viśayin is to comprehend not itself but an object other than itself as viśaya. Thought therefore is the subjective activity of apprehending an object as an object. To know it in its distinctive character of a subjective cognitive act it must itself be made the object of a secondary retrospective act. In other words, the primary act of apprehension of the object must itself be apprehended in a secondary act of retrospection. Introspection therefore is retrospection; it is only the holding of the primary knowing act as an object to a secondary cognition. In this way we know thought as subjective apprehension (viśayin) of an object (viśaya) which it apprehends but does not constitute. It follows that thought adds nothing to the object. The object-in-itself gains nothing in the process of being an object thought. The new relation to an apprehending knowing act (viśayin) makes no difference to the viśaya or object. The Naiyāyikas repudiate the Bhāṭṭa, conception (the Bhāṭṭas are followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a Mīmāṃsaka Philosopher) of an apprehendedness (*jñātata*) accruing to the object in consequence of its being known. The assumption of an *apprehendedness* being generated in the object in consequence of its being subjectively cognised in a cognitive act will make the cognition of the past and the future impossible. The past is no more and the future is not yet. They are thus alike non-existent. If therefore the cognition of the past or the future object should generate in either a new property of apprehendedness, even the non-existent must be supposed to acquire new properties as existent positive characters. But this is clearly absurd. Therefore there is no such thing as an apprehendedness

generated in the object in the process of being known. The object-in-itself is only the object out of relation to the knowing act. The object known is the object (*viṣaya*) of the subjective apprehension (*viṣayin*).

The Nyāya view of cognition as revealing not itself but the object is opposed to the doctrine of cognition as self-luminous, a doctrine which is common to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṅkhya and the Śaṅkara-Vedānta Schools. The doctrine that cognition reveals only that which is not itself is, according to the Naiyāyika, a necessary corollary of the realism that accords only a secondary place to cognition in the order of being. The Prābhākara here joins issue with the Naiyāyika and contends that realism does not necessarily commit one to any such view about the nature of cognition. In fact, the immediate evidence of consciousness establishes not merely a cognition of an other but also a simultaneous cognition of the cognition, an awareness of the awareness. An act of cognition may be said to be self-luminous in this sense. It points not merely to an object beyond itself but also, and in the same act, turns towards itself, apprehends itself as apprehending a beyond or other of itself. The Prābhākara develops this doctrine in connection with its particular theory of triune perception (*triputisaṃvitpratyakṣa*) which he opposes to the Nyāya theory. According to him, an act of perception is at once an awareness of the object perceived, of the subjective perceptive act and of the subject perceiving. The object is perceived as the apprehended, the act as subjective apprehension and the subject as the apprehending or cognising agent. Each thus is apprehended in its own proper form, the object as the apprehended, the act as subjective apprehension, and the subject as the apprehender or cogniser. The Naiyāyika, according to the Prābhākara, has allowed his realism to impugn the immediate evidence of consciousness. The realistic doctrine of cognition does not require a denial of the self-illumination of consciousness. Consciousness may know itself without forfeiting thereby its capacity to know simultaneously an external transcendent object.



The Nyāya and Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā views are the parallels in this respect to the doctrines of some of the European realists of the present day. The Nyāya view of cognition as looking beyond itself has its echo in contemporary thought in John Laird's realistic theory of cognition. In his contribution to the "Contemporary British Philosophers Series", Prof. Laird, in expounding his theory of cognition, observes, "Our cognitive processes are, in their usual exercise, the processes, *with* which (not *at* which) we look ; and none of them perhaps, can look at itself. It does not follow, however, that *another* (introspective) look cannot be directed towards this process of looking... Even 'awareness of awareness,' then is not impossible, and this conclusion is consoling, since if anything *seems* to occur, introspection does. What is there except observation to acquaint us with the difference between pleasure and pain, or between belief and repugnance." Prof. Laird, like the Indian Naiyāyika, thus holds to the conception of cognition as essentially self-transcendent, as always looking beyond itself. He repudiates the Bergsonian intuition of a neutral experience-flux 'wherein knowing coincides with the object known. The knowing act, according to him, necessarily points beyond itself to an other, to an object different from itself. The dualism of knowing and known cannot be resolved in a monistic experience-flux with which one may be said to be intuitively at one in the subliminal, infraintellectual processes of life. The distinction between cognition and its object is no pragmatic fiction born of practical need; it is essential to the very natures of cognition, an integral part of its make-up as subjective apprehension of an object different from itself. Hence we cannot be aware of our awareness in one and the same specious present. We can be aware of it only in retrospection, i.e., in a secondary cognitive act which makes the primary act the object of its observation. Cognition, therefore, cannot be itself cognised except in a numerically distinct cognitive act enduring in a separate specious present. This, as we have seen, is also the Nyāya view. The Naiyāyika, as a consistent realist, objectifies the subjective

cognition just as Prof. Laird does. Cognition can be cognised, but only as an object, as a datum presented to a secondary cognition. The Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā as we have seen joins issue here with Nyāya. Knowing cannot be unaware of itself in the act of being aware of the object. Therefore there is no cognition of an object which is not also a cognition of the cognition. But the essential distinction of knowing and known is not annulled thereby. Knowing knows itself as knowing (*samvit*), not as the known (*samvedya*). We do not know knowing as the known just as we do not know the object as subjective knowing. The Prābhākara distinction of the two kinds of knowing corresponds closely to Prof. S. Alexander's distinction of *enjoyed* and *contemplated* knowing. Like the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, Prof. Alexander subscribes to an awareness of awareness accompanying every act of awareness of object—an *enjoyed* awareness which goes with every awareness of an object contemplated. There is, however, in the Prābhākara conception of *self-illumination* an emphasis on the aspect of revelation in intelligence which we miss in Prof. Alexander's concept of enjoyment. Enjoyment is an inner sympathy, a one-ness in feeling as distinguished from contemplation from without. It thus does not import self-revelation in the Prābhākara sense of apprehension in intelligence.

When the Prābhākara speaks of a cognition of cognition as being involved in every act of cognition of an object, he does not mean any logical mediation of subject-cognition and object-cognition.? The triune character of cognition is, according to the Prābhākara, only a brute datum, a given fact of experience which we must accept at its face-value. The standpoint of the Prābhākara is empirical and a *posteriori*. We have to remain satisfied, according to him, with the given togetherness of the three different awarenesses in every single act of cognition. Beyond the bare togetherness we cannot go. We cannot say whether there is mutual logical implication besides the brute conjunction. It remains true at least, the Prābhākara argues, that the cogniser is not a self-luminous subject as is his cognition. As a matter of fact, the



cogniser has states of unconsciousness in which it remains steeped in darkness. The same is true of the object cognised. The object is not the cognition of the object and may very well be without being cognised at all. The inseparability therefore is not an inseparability of the subject, the object and the cognition of the latter by the former. It is merely an inseparability of the subject-cognition, the cognition of the cognition and the object-cognition if—the given togetherness of every cognition of an object with a cognition of the cognition and cognition of the cogniser. And this inseparability is a brute conjunction which proves nothing as regards any mutual logical implication.

The Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara agree in respect of their methods of approach. Both appeal to introspective evidence, to the immediate deliverance of consciousness, though they differ in their respective accounts of what consciousness really delivers. Cognition, according to both, is therefore to be taken at its face-value: it is what it presents itself as in actual experience. The realism of the Sāṅkhya stands contrasted in this respect with Nyāya and Prābhākara realism. The Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara arrive at realism on the way of psychology through analysis of the actual report of consciousness. Cognition, according to them, does not present itself except as dependent on and therefore externally related to the *cognitum*, to the transcendent external object. The very nature of cognition as revealed to introspective analysis thus points to an independent reality-in-itself. This is how, according to them, we are assured of independent realistic objects-in-themselves. The Sāṅkhya, however, follows a different method. From experience as given it argues to the not-given presuppositions of experience. Its method is thus meta-psychological and transcendental and differs from the psychological methods of Nyāya and Prābhākara-Mimāṃsā. Cognition, according to Sāṅkhya, can be understood fully only by going beyond and behind it to its transcendental presuppositions, its antecedent generative conditions. Empirical cognition, cognition as a mental event in time is a compound—a

composite psychic process that results from the illumination of the Primal Matter, which is Prakṛti as a pure datum, by the Transcendental Subject which is Puruṣa as pure light of consciousness. Cognition as a temporal event is thus a transformation of Prakṛti resulting from Puruṣa's illumination of the latter. It is the pure intelligence imprisoned as it were in a temporal mode of Prakṛti as empirical psychic process or mind-stuff referring beyond itself to corresponding matter-stuff. The correspondence and objective reference of the mental content points, according to Sāṅkhya, to a neutral matter of experience from which both the mental and the nonmental arise. This neutral experience-stuff is Buddhi which is a transformation of Prakṛti, the indeterminate transcendental object. This neutral experience-stuff or Buddhi is not given in experience: it is presupposed in experience and can be reached only by criticism and transcendental analysis. It may be presented also in a special intuition (cf. Pātañjala Sāṅkhya) but cannot be given in our practical, relational experience. But even Buddhi does not explain experience fully: a neutral experience-matter differentiating into conscious mind-stuff and intelligible matter-stuff implies a union of intelligence as self-revealing light and a non-intelligent datum as that which gets revealed by self-revealing intelligence. Hence as the preconditions of a world of experience we must assume two ultimate metempirical principles—Puruṣa, the Transcendental Subject and Prakṛti, the Transcendental Objective Background. Puruṣa is the self-luminous Intelligence that lights up experience—the light of Consciousness in which objects reveal themselves as significant contents of experience, Prakṛti is that which gets revealed by Puruṣa into a concrete world of experience—the indeterminate Object-in-itself in which things as objects of experience materialise and dematerialise in the light of Pure Intelligence which is Puruṣa.

Neither Puruṣa nor Prakṛti are objects of experience. They are the transcendental presuppositions of experience as a world of significant objects, the antecedent generative conditions of a world of experience. Hence they are not themselves

experienced facts, at least in the customary meaning of experience as the equivalent of our normal, practical consciousness of a world of objects subject to the relations of space, time and causality (cf. Savicārā prajñā which means cognition of objects as space-time-and-causality-determined—deśa-kāla-nimittāvacchinna). They are the not-given presuppositions of experience which we discover by analysis and criticism. The method of the Sāṅkhya in this respect has a close family likeness to Kant's transcendental critical method: from experience as the given it works back to its not-given presuppositions. But in one aspect of it the Sāṅkhya method is removed from the Kantian critical standpoint. Kant will not allow a positive knowledge of the transcendental principles that make experience possible. Any assumption of a positive knowledge of these is inconsistent with the critical standpoint proper and implies a capacity of non-sensuous intuition which we do not possess. We have thus only a negative knowledge of these transcendental principles: we know them only as not given in experience, we do not know them in themselves except as an unknowable X. Sāṅkhya however goes farther than Kant. Repudiating relational sensuous experience of these noumenal principles, Sāṅkhya yet claims for them an infra-empirical, metapsychological intuition in Yogika realisation—an intuition which is free from the forms and relations of normal, empirical consciousness. We have thus not merely a negative knowledge of these transcendental principles, we have also a positive knowledge of these in non-relational, non-sensuous intuition below the level of our normal, relational experience of things through sense-given data.

The Sāṅkhya conception of a non-relational, non-empirical intuition is an essential part of its theory of knowing as an empirical, temporal event. Empirical knowing according to Sāṅkhya is a composite effect, a transformation of Prakṛti shining by the light of Puruṣa which is Pure Intelligence. But the given union of Prakṛti-Purusa in experience does not affect either their logical contrariety of nature or their ontological independence and disjunction of essence. In fact, Yogika in-

tuition is a realisation of this essential disjunction and separation despite their actual commingling in experience—a de-realisation of the empirical connection involved in the realisation of their essential detachment and logical opposition. Empirical knowing, according to Sāṅkhya, is thus rooted in an original unreason. Involving as it does a union of logically opposed and distinct principles, it points to a beginningless non-discrimination (*aviveka*) as the source of the beginningless chain of experience which we call *samsāra*. It is this beginningless unreason that leads through *sānnidhya* or bare togetherness of Prakṛti and Puruṣa to that closer union (*samyoga*) which brings on a world of experience. *Sānnidhya* is a bare relation of presence which by itself does not explain the closer connection of Prakṛti-Puruṣa in experience. That connection involves a deeper unreason underlying it, a beginningless *aviveka* that causes Puruṣa's attachment to Prakṛti effecting the latter's transformation into a beginningless world of experience. Experience thus is grounded in unreason: aiming at the inherently impossible task of a complete resolution of the unrelated manifold to the pure unity of thought, of the indeterminate, non-intelligent Prakṛti to the significant unity of intelligence, it is destined for ever to move from form to form in ceaseless flow. And the Sāṅkhya thus posits, as the highest ideal, the consummation of the true freedom of Intelligence by a snapping of the cord that binds it in unholy union with Prakṛti. It is unreason, the original beginningless non-discrimination that starts the process of experience. To negate the unreason by true reason, to remove non-discrimination by the realisation of Puruṣa's essential detachment from Prakṛti is to strike at the root of experience and reverse the whole process. This is the way to realise freedom, to restore Puruṣa to its original purity as free self-revealing Intelligence. Experience is a transformation of the indeterminate Prakṛti, a transformation that results from Puruṣa's illumination of Prakṛti. Hence experience entails Puruṣa's bondage—the imprisonment of the pure intelligence in blind, non-intelligent matter. It is



Puruṣa's light that accomplishes the indeterminate Prakṛti into a world of experience. The union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti in experience is however incomplete and artificial. The formless Prakṛti, the indeterminate given manifold cannot be completely transformed into the free unity of thought. Nor can the self-revealing intelligence truly find itself in the shifting forms of non-intelligent Prakṛti. The given, the merely real, in other words, cannot be completely resolved into pure self-revealing truth. Intelligence is pure self-revealing truth, and given reality cannot be merged into pure truth without a remainder. Hence arise the contradictions of experience, the miseries and sorrows of life, the disappointments and baffled hopes that darken mundane existence. Rooted in unreason it can produce only irrational longings, futile hopes, desires that can never attain their objects. To negate experience by negating the basal unreason is to recover Puruṣa's lost status as eternally self-accomplished Intelligence, to be free from the dominion of matter, to conquer material hunger.

The Sāṅkhya theory of knowledge, it will be seen, rests on a distinction between Pure Intelligence and empirical knowing. Puruṣa is Pure Intelligence, eternally self-revealing light of consciousness. As the light that reveals experience, it is itself eternally self-revealing. As the Intelligence that accomplishes non-intelligent Prakṛti into a world of intelligible objects, it is eternally self-accomplished. Puruṣa is thus the eternally self-accomplished truth that shines forth in experience, the self-positing Intelligence that reveals all things. Pure Intelligence reflecting itself into Prakṛti effects the so-called empirical cognitions of our temporal lives. An empirical cognition is a temporal mode of Prakṛti shining by the light of Pure Intelligence which is timeless and eternal. Empirical cognitions appear and disappear in temporal succession in accordance with causal laws and in relation to their respective objects. Pure Intelligence is unaffected by the process: it does not become with the becoming of its temporal ectypes. The eternally self-accomplished Intelligence is not itself accomplished in the history of a world which it causes

to appear. There is thus, according to Sāṅkhya, cognition not merely as a temporal event with a concrete empirical mould conformally to the shape of a corresponding empirical object, but also, and as the presupposition of the temporal knowing act, pure timeless Intelligence as that which illumines both itself and its temporal unfolding in experience. Puruṣa is this timeless Intelligence. As accomplisher of all things, it is accomplished in itself independently of Prakṛti. It is thus unlike its temporal ectype not merely as timeless and eternal but also as free self-accomplished truth. Empirical cognition is object-mediated cognition and is true only as corresponding in nature and form to the essence of the object. Not so Pure Intelligence which is the presupposition of empirical cognition. As accomplishing Prakṛti it is inherently self-accomplished, self-revealing light. It is thus eternally true in itself independently of the mediation of Prakṛti. Hence it is contradictorily related to its temporal double. The latter requires the mediation of an object both in being and in being made valid or true. But Pure Intelligence is self-positing, self-validating truth and does not require the mediation of an other.

As transcendental presuppositions of experience Sāṅkhya thus posits Puruṣa as free self-shining Intelligence and Prakṛti as the indeterminate primal matter revealed by Intelligence. The parallelism here with the main results of the Kantian *Critique* are too obvious to deserve special notice. But despite the close parallelism, however, there are important differences that must not be overlooked in a comparative estimate of the two theories. In Sāṅkhya, e.g., we have nothing corresponding to the agnostic conclusions of the Kantian *Critique*. Sāṅkhya does not confess to a bankruptcy of the reason in its application to the transcendental principles, to a final despair of knowledge in respect of the ultimate presuppositions of experience. Puruṣa, e.g., is not known merely as the logical implication of our experience of a world of objects. It is also cognised as its ontological prius in non-relational meta-psychological intuition. Nor is Prakṛti shut out from know-

ledge by an unsurmountable barrier as are the Kantian things-in-themselves. A rational world of experience is Prakṛti affiliating itself, as it were, to the free, self-positing Intelligence. Through its affiliation to the self-revealing Intelligence, the non-intelligent Prakṛti, the brute datum, becomes an intelligible world of experience. The ordered world, in other words, is the indeterminate manifold reflecting into itself the unity of pure thought, the blind Prakṛti shining by the light of Puruṣa's Intelligence. The givenness of experience as a relational system points, according to Sāṅkhya, to an original affiliation of the given plurality to the not-given unity of pure truth, a beginningless illumination of Prakṛti by Puruṣa. Prakṛti-in-itself, Prakṛti without relation to Puruṣa's Illumination is an unrelated manifold, an indeterminate plurality. Prakṛti as a determinate world is the indeterminate manifold affiliating itself to the self-determination of pure reason, to the self-accomplished light of Intelligence. The becoming of Prakṛti, the transformation of the indefinitely given manifold into the definitely known order of a significant world is no phenomenal appearance separating Prakṛti-in-itself from Prakṛti-in-experience by an unbridgeable gulf. The transformation is a real transformation of Prakṛti, an ontological becoming of the given plurality into the unity-in-plurality of an empirical world. It is out of the indeterminate, formless Prakṛti that Puruṣa calls forth a world of experience. Worlds are thus made and unmade in Prakṛti; they are the diverse manifestations of Prakṛti in relation to Puruṣa. They are not appearances, distorted reflections of Prakṛti in Puruṣa's Intelligence. Neither are they the projections of the free Intelligence, fictitious creations of self-shining, self-positing thought. Sāṅkhya pariṇāma-vāda as a doctrine of cosmic evolution is negatively related not merely to monistic Vedānta Idealism but also to Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena. The manifested world, according to Sāṅkhya, is a transformation of the primal matter and is held within the bosom of the latter. The dualism of appearance and reality, of a known

world of phenomena and an unknowable noumenal reality that escapes phenomenal determination is not admitted by the Sāṅkhya. While agreeing with Kant in the main about the fundamental presuppositions of experience and their logical opposition Sāṅkhya yet allows a real transformation of Prakṛti as a consequence of its illumination by Puruṣa. The judgment of experience is thus, according to Sāṅkhya, a description of the given reality. The real subject of our causal, temporal and spatial judgments is Prakṛti manifesting itself in experience, the definitely given world as consubstantial with and held within the indefinitely given manifold. The judgment of experience, according to Kant, has valid application only in the domain of phenomena. The subject of the empirical judgment is, according to him, the phenomenal world which is only the appearance of the noumenal reality through the antecedent generative conditions of knowledge. The forms of phenomena supply no clue to a valid knowledge of their noumenal antecedents. The categories, Kant tells us, cannot be employed except in reference to sense-intuited data. "(In the absence of sensibility) their whole employment, and indeed all their meaning ceases." Therefore we cannot claim to have a knowledge of noumena except only in a negative sense. A knowledge of them in the positive sense, a knowledge of noumena as objects of a positive non-sensuous intuition would require a faculty of non-sensuous intuition which we do not possess. Noumena, according to Kant, can therefore be known only negatively as merely limiting concepts, i.e., as what cannot be objects of a sensuous intuition and therefore cannot possibly be the subjects of our empirical judgments involving the application of the categories to sense-intuited data. They cannot be known positively as objects of a non-sensuous intuition for such intuition we do not have. Kant thus is led to insist on the existence of noumenal principles while yet denying all experience of them through the application of the categories to sense-given data. He fails to show, however, how if things-in-themselves must be postulated as



existing, they can yet be beyond the reach of the categories which includes the notions of existence and reality. The Sāṅkhya theory however is free from these inherent inconsistencies of the Kantian phenomenalism. Phenomena, according to Sāṅkhya, are the noumenal realities shining by the light of Intelligence. The phenomenal world is thus the noumenal Prakṛti, transformed into a system of intelligible objects. The metamorphosis, the transformation which results from Puruṣa's illumination of Prakṛti, entails no absolute dualism of the manifested world and its generative antecedents. The world evolves in Prakṛti and is ontologically non-distinct from it. As its antecedent generative conditions it presupposes not merely Puruṣa's Illumination but also the primal formless Prakṛti of which it is a transformation. It is through Puruṣa's Illumination that the indeterminate formless Prakṛti becomes determined as a world of forms.

The Sāṅkhya theory of cosmogenesis thus answers more nearly to the Aristotelian dualism of God and world than to the Kantian distinction of appearance and unknowable things-in-themselves. The world is the transformation of an original, primal stuff—a passage from potentiality to actuality or form. The transformation, the transition of potentiality to actuality presupposes a *mateira prima*, a formless primal matter, viz., Prakṛti, which comes to form in the process. But the temporal unfolding of Prakṛti presupposes a timeless final cause, an unmoved mover. Puruṣa is this unmoved mover, the final cause that imparts meaning to the process and makes it empirically significant. And yet the free Puruṣa remains ontologically distinct from Prakṛti. It is Prakṛti that moves, unfolds itself in time. Puruṣa as self-revealing Intelligence reveals, accomplishes Prakṛti as a world of objects. It is not itself enriched in the process, accomplished in the accomplishment of Prakṛti into a world of experience. To accomplish experience it must itself be eternally self-accomplished. Hence Puruṣa is timeless, self-revealing, self-accomplished truth. Prakṛti is the given manifold temporally accomplishing itself in experience. Puruṣa is eternally free Intelligence.

Prakṛti is the non-intelligent datum, the given indefinite that gets defined into a significant world through Puruṣa's illumination. Puruṣa is thus the logical opposite of Prakṛti. Being its logical opposite it is also ontologically distinct from the latter. Both Puruṣa and Prakṛti are presupposed in experience. Experience is not a self-explaining, self-justifying whole. It is a temporal process that points beyond itself to a non-empirical unity and an equally non-empirical diversity or plurality. The bare plurality is not by itself significant even as a plurality; as an unrelated plurality, a pure manifold, it is indeterminate and formless. It is only through the unity of Intelligence that the formless manifold becomes a significant plurality, a related system of objects of experience. The becoming is a becoming of the plurality, the bare plurality becoming a unity-in-plurality by self-affiliation to the Unitary Intelligence. The becoming conceived as a becoming of the timeless Intelligence would render time itself meaningless and illusory. That experience involves the irreducible, the irrational surd that cannot be logically resolved into pure thought is what the Sāṅkhya stresses in its conception of Prakṛti as the formless objective background. The concept of Prakṛti is, according to Sāṅkhya, a conceptual formulation of the given indefinite, of the logically irreducible. It is presupposed in experience as a synthesis of *given* distincts, as the unifying of irreducibles. But the unity, the synthesis is not given in the plurality: it is the not-given unity of the pure Intelligence reflecting itself into the manifold that makes it into a unity-in-plurality, into the determinate plurality of an empirical world. Hence experience is a transformation of the given plurality, a transformation which is mediated by the not-given unity of pure Intelligence. The Sāṅkhya here agrees with Kant in the main outlines of his teachings in the Critique of Pure Reason. But the Sāṅkhya repudiates Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena approaching in this respect the Aristotelian conception of a monistic becoming of an original primal matter. The Sāṅkhya theory in fact is metaphysics and epistemology in



one, a theory of cosmogenesis which is also an account of the genesis of experience. The different stages of the becoming of Prakṛti represent, according to Sāṅkhya, the successive stages of a world coming into being. They are thus the generative antecedents of a cosmos and our experience of it, the stages of the transition of Prakṛti from metempirical formlessness to the form of a world of experience. The becoming of Prakṛti is thus a real, ontological becoming which also may be said to be the becoming of experience. It is not a becoming in experience, mere phenomenal becoming as Kant would say, it is the becoming of Prakṛti itself, Prakṛti's descent into empiricity and manifestation. Nor are the noumenal presuppositions of an empirical world beyond our reach as Kant contends. They are objects of a metapsychological, metempirical intuition even if they be inaccessible to the relational sense-determined intuitions of the empirical life. We have thus a positive realisation of them in Yogika vision besides a negative knowledge of them as limiting concepts. Yoga is the ascending movement of Prakṛti corresponding to its descending movement into empiricity. It is Prakṛti dematerialising itself into initial formlessness, the empirical individual and his world dissolving back into the transcendental, noumenal background. Yogika realisation is thus both positive and negative. It is a realisation of the transcendental principles of experience by the transcending of experience, by the resolution of it into its original pre-conditions. It is, in fact, both objective and subjective, cosmic and individual. It is the world melting back into its original formlessness in the experience of an individual, experience negating itself, as it were, into its transcendental presuppositions. It thus culminates in a positive non-empirical intuition, a realisation of the transcendental principles together with a corresponding derealisation of their empirical transformations. A positive knowledge of noumena, according to Kant, is a Transcendental Illusion. A positive realisation of them, according to Sāṅkhya, is no illusory fiction, but actually within the reach of Yoga.

Even the Sāṅkhya, however, admits a Transcendental Illusion of the Unity of Intelligence—an illusory realisation of the empirical unity of the primal manifold as the fulfilment of the Transcendental Unity which reflects itself into it. This is, e.g., the idea that underlies Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of a double reflection and *pratibimbasarūpabhogā*, i.e., of bhoga or experience as a reflection of the manifested Prakṛti back into the unity of Puruṣa. (cf. *Pravacanabhāṣya I*, 87). Vijñānabhikṣu urges this against the rival commentator Vācaspati Miśra who will not allow this double reflection of Puruṣa into Prakṛti and of Prakṛti back into Puruṣa. Vijñānabhikṣu contends that experience as a unity-plurality becomes intelligible only as Puruṣa's realisation of its reflected unity in the given plurality of Prakṛti. This realisation is the true meaning of bhoga or experience. Bhoga is jñāna or knowledge and knowledge is realisation in Intelligence. Hence experience or bhoga involves Transcendental realisation in Puruṣa's Intelligence. And yet timeless Intelligence as the logical presupposition of temporal becoming cannot itself become in time in the strict sense. Hence we can speak only of an illusory realisation in the Transcendental Intelligence, an illusion of bhoga or fulfilment which does not entail Puruṣa's actual accomplishment in time. Bhoga as an illusory fruition in Puruṣa, an hallucination of bhoga involving an element of projection as in an echo (*pratidhvani*) or reflection, is in other words, a necessary implication of Prakṛti in evolution and transformation. It is this illusion of bhoga or realisation in Intelligence that gives meaning to the empirical unity of Prakṛti as an accomplished fact. To be sure, Vijñānabhikṣu argues, there are the Naiyāyikas who would repudiate an experience of experience, a knowing of knowing. Knowing according to these Naiyāyikas, is a knowing of an object. Cognition is essentially self-transcendent and thinking regarded as a thinking of thinking, i.e., as a thinking of the subjective activity of defining out an object to itself, is an absurdity. Even the Naiyāyika, however,



Vijñānabhikṣu points out, indirectly confesses to a common form of knowing thereby admitting a knowing of knowing as different from the object known. How otherwise can the Naiyāyika account for the practice of designating widely different knowing acts (such as the knowing of a jar, a piece of cloth, etc.) as instances of knowing? The Naiyāyika has thus to admit not merely a common form of knowing but also a knowledge of this common essence or form of the different knowing acts. Hence an experience of experience, a transcendental illusion of an empirical world in Puruṣa's Intelligence, is neither impossible nor absurd. It is, in fact, a necessary implication of experience as a transformation of the primal manifold through the reflected unity of the Pure Intelligence. Puruṣa's bhoga, in other words, is the last term in the process, that in which experience culminates as a significant temporal process in Prakṛti. But it is only pratibimbasvarūpabhoga, a transcendental illusion or appearance of fruition which cannot really affect the eternally self-accomplished spirit.

The conception of the Transcendental Puruṣa as many and as inducing a pluralistic transformation of Prakṛti into many different worlds in relation to the many Puruṣas is also another cardinal point of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of knowledge which marks it off from Kant's theory. Kant never tries of emphasising the essential difference between the phenomenism of his Critical Philosophy and the subjectivism involved in Cartesian realism and the sensationalism of Hume and Berkeley. That the subjective or mental is itself phenomenal and presupposes as its antecedent generative condition an affection of the transcendental self-in-itself by the noumenal things-in-themselves is what Kant urges against every interpretation of his teaching as a revival of the older subjectivism under a new name. Kant is thus drawn into the conception of a double affection—a noumenal affection of the noumenal self by noumenal things-in-themselves generating a noumenal manifold which appears through the interpretation of the synthetic activities of thought as a common world of

experience and an empirical affection of the empirical individual by empirical objects generating the subjective private world of mental states. And the problem with which Kant is faced is to account for the appearance of this subjective private world which is the possession of a single individual mind i.e., to explain the possibility of a class of objects which while originating through the conditions of empirical objectivity in general, should yet be restricted to one single individual mind. Sāṅkhya, however, with its conception of many Puruṣas as the necessary presupposition of empirical diversity, is not faced with the inherent difficulties of the Kantian philosophy. It is Prakṛti that evolves into a world of experience according to Sāṅkhya, and the transformation of the non-manifest noumenal Prakṛti into the manifested world is an eventuality which is determined by puruṣa's illumination of Prakṛti. But as there are many Puruṣas we must suppose a pluralistic illumination of Prakṛti by the many numerically distinct Puruṣas, an illumination that calls forth not a single common world or universe, but a multiverse or *pluriverse*. By the world in the singular is meant thus the conceptual class of the many different worlds that appear in Prakṛti's bosom, the empirical multiverse that blossoms forth in the noumenal Prakṛti through the illumination of the many Purusas. In its conception of a multiverse as following on a pluralistic illumination of the noumenal primal matter, Sāṅkhya is thus able to provide for the individual, the personal aspect of experience without denying to it its impersonal, purely objective side. Kant, it may be noted, in stating the knowledge-problem, is led, under the influence of his mathematico-physical preconceptions, to overemphasise the objective and impersonal factors to the detriment of its purely personal aspects. According to Kant, the problem of knowledge is virtually the problem of the possibility of self-transcendence in the subjective knowing act. "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" "How can the object be determined in advance in



accordance with the forms and conditions of the thinking activity?" are Kant's manner of stating the knowledge-question with reference to its generative presuppositions. Kant is thus led to overestimate the universal and common aspects of experience neglecting the unique, the purely individual character that also distinguishes it. Starting however with a fuller, more adequate conception of experience as the overindividual in relation to an individual, Sāṅkhya is able to tackle the knowledge-problem more successfully without being committed to the Kantian makeshift of a double affection. According to Sāṅkhya every world is an owned, personal world related uniquely to an individual empirical self. This svatvasvāmitvasambandha, this unique relation of ownership is what makes experience what it is, viz., the experience of a particular individual. There is, in fact, no purely objective, impersonal experience, no dehumanised overindividual world which is nobody's world and is not related uniquely to some individual's mental continuum. 'Myself and my world,' 'yourself and your world,' this is the law of experience, the common form of an empirical world and our experience of it. This one-one ordering of experience, this universal dichotomy of life is the problem of knowledge proper. How is knowing as this one-one ordering of a world of experience possible? is thus the question which the theory of knowledge must tackle, according to Sāṅkhya. Every bit of experience is a personally owned experience. The pleasure of one is not the pleasure of all and one man's unhappiness is not every man's unhappiness. Within an apparently common world every man lives in a world of his own, in his own uniquely determined individual world. How is this individual, objective world possible? How is this personal, private relation to an objective over-individual world possible? These are the epistemological questions proper, according to Sāṅkhya —questions for a theory of knowledge to attack and solve. Kant was too much engrossed in the objective and the

common to allow sufficient weight to the individual aspect of experience. Sāṅkhya building on a broader empirical foundation is not driven to any of the Kantian expedients to fit the facts of experience into the structure of a preconceived theory. Experience, according to Sāṅkhya, is the objective in relation to an empirical subject, a personally owned and individuated objective world. Thus experience points beyond itself not merely to a noumenal objective manifold but also to an Individual Transcendental Subject. The individuality of experience, its personal and individual character, in other words, points to a beginningless relation of ownership between every individual Puruṣa and the noumenal Prakṛti. A pluralistic noumenal illumination is thus a necessary presupposition of experience as this one-one relation between an empirical individual and his particular world.

There are obvious difficulties in the Sāṅkhya theory that call for criticism. The Sāṅkhya theory does not account for the individuality of a Transcendental Subject or Puruṣa. It does not tell us how one Puruṣa is distinguished from another even though each is nothing but pure, self-shining Intelligence. The individuality of a Puruṣa as pure Intelligence is thus a brute datum that contradicts its very nature as self-luminous light. Nor is Sāṅkhya more successful in explaining the fact of a socially shared, common world of experience. Experience as the over-individual in the individual, the objective in relation to an empirical subject does not necessarily connote a shared common world which is a precondition of social life. Even Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of a samaṣṭi-Buddhi, a common or overindividual Buddhi as the precondition of cosmogenesis or sṛṣṭi (cf., Pravacanabhbāṣya 1. 63) does not account for a mutually shared, intersubjective, independent world. Since every individual is cut off, according to Sāṅkhya, from every other by an unsurmountable barrier he may transcend himself so as to embrace the objective independent world in himself, but



cannot possibly enter the experience of another and share it in common with the latter. The impossibility of a common, mutually owned world is thus a necessary corollary of the Sāṅkhya conception of the individual as exclusive and absolutely isolated. Despite, however, these obvious defects of the Sāṅkhya theory, it cannot be denied that the Sāṅkhya statement of the knowledge-problem has the merit of a fullness that we miss alike in the Kantian and the Pragmatist formulations of it. The problem, as Kant states it, has the advantage of an objectivity which is secured only at the cost of the individual and personal side of experience. The defect of the Kantian starting-point comes out never so clearly as in the Idealistic development of it in Hegel's system wherein the individual including the unique and the contingent is sought to be deduced out of the Absolute Idea by necessary logical process. Nor do the usual pragmatist formulations of the problem fare better than the Kantian statement in this respect. They represent the other extreme, emphasizing the individual and personal in experience to the prejudice of its necessary and universal side. Compared with either of these, the more carefully-guarded Sāṅkhya formulation of the problem is certainly more adequate and much nearer the actual facts of the case. One need not accept the Sāṅkhya answer to this all-important question of philosophy. It need not be supposed either that Sāṅkhya has said the last word on the subject. But it remains true that Sāṅkhya has at least smoothed the way to a right answer by a fuller statement of the problem and the issues that require to be tackled in a theory of knowledge proper.

SĀNKHYA CONCEPTION OF PRAKRTI

THE Sāṅkhyā arrives at its conception of Prakṛti as the material and efficient cause of the world as follows:—

Just as jars, dishes and other products, says Sāṅkhyā, which possess in common the quality of consisting of clay are seen to have clay in general for their cause, so one must suppose all the outward and inward effects, which are either of the nature of pleasure, pain or dullness, or are pleasure-producing, pain-producing or dullness-causing, must have for their common material cause something answering to pleasure, pain or dullness. Thus we must posit Pradhāna or Prakṛti as the ultimate material cause consisting of the three gunas, sattva, rajas, and tamas, characterised by pleasure, pain and dullness respectively. Thus Pradhāna is the objective background of our world of experience, i.e., of the empirical world consisting of objects of experience and our subjective experiences of the objects. Pradhāna is non-intelligent and evolves spontaneously its various forms in order to subserve the purposes (enjoyment and final liberation) of the intelligent transcendental Subject, viz., Puruṣa. The existence of Pradhāna or Prakṛti as the material cause is also to be inferred from the further circumstance that effects, i.e., empirical objects, are of limited magnitude and therefore require a multi-natured cause such as Prakṛti consisting of the three gunas, through the conjunction of whose constituents the limited objects arise. The original state of Prakṛti, prior to its transformation into an empirical world, is a state of equipoise of the three gunas (sāmyāvasthā), a state of uniform diffusion of the three reals. When the equipoise ends, there is unequal distribution of the reals resulting in subordination and superordination of the reals relatively to one another at different centres. This is how the original uniformity gives way to differentiation and integration resulting in the appearance of different forms and differentiated objects at different centres in place of the original uniformity or formlessness. In reply to the question,



why the original uniformity should end and the processes of differentiation and integration should supervene thereon the Sāṅkhya answers, because Prakṛti or Pradhāna, though non-intelligent, moves or acts for the benefit of Puruṣa and is therefore essentially teleological, though unconscious, in its activities. As non-sentient milk flows of its own nature from the udder of the cow for the nourishment of the calf and as non-sentient water flows of its own nature for the benefit of mankind so does Pradhāna also, although non-intelligent, moves of its own nature for the purpose of subserving the end of Puruṣa. Puruṣa is inactive but is witnessing intelligence and Prakṛti is blind but essentially active. The bare relation of proximity or presence (*sānnidhya*) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti rouses Prakṛti to unconscious teleological activity. This is how a differentiated world of objects springs forth in Prakṛti out of its pre-empirical equipoise and uniformity. The Sāṅkhya illustrates this cosmogenesis by the simile of the co-operative activity of a lame man and a blind man. Just as a lame man by himself is incapable of the activity of moving, while a blind man, though capable of moving, is incapable of finding his way to his destination, but the two together by their co-operation, the lame man directing the way and the blind man using legs as so directed, can easily reach their destination, so do the active, non-intelligent Prakṛti and the intelligent, inactive Puruṣa by their co-operation, bring about a differentiated world of objects in Prakṛti for the sake of Puruṣa's *bhoga* and *apavarga*.

In reply to the objection that Puruṣa cannot move Prakṛti into evolution and transformation, being essentially inactive, the Sāṅkhya answers that Puruṣa is the unmoved mover of Prakṛti and activates Prakṛti by sheer proximity. Even as the magnet is the unmoved mover of iron filings or iron dust and draws them to itself by sheer proximity so does Puruṣa move Prakṛti by sheer proximity without any internal disturbance or motion inside itself.

SĀNKHYA THEORY OF PURUṢA

THAT there is a Puruṣa or subject other than Prakṛti and its modes constituted of the three guṇas is proved by the Sāṅkhya as follows:—

Prakṛti is made up of three guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and so also are all the products of Prakṛti, i.e., the objects of experience. Therefore all objects as well as their primodial cause, viz., Prakṛti, are composite wholes made of parts, saṃhata padārtha as the Sāṅkhya says. But a saṃhata padārtha has no being-for-itself, it has being only for another. E.g., a bed is a saṃhata padārtha or composite whole and it serves the purpose of another to lie down on and so also chairs, benches, etc. Therefore there must be an asaṃhata or non-composite, undifferenced subject other than the composite Prakṛti and its modes for the sake of which the composite Prakṛti and its products exist. This proves Puruṣa, the Intelligent Subject, as the other of the non-intelligent Prakṛti and its modes. It cannot be said that one composite object exists for the sake of another composite object and the argument does not prove a non-composite intelligent subject as the opposite of Prakṛti. The bed, the chair, e.g., as composite wholes cannot be said to exist for the rest of the composite body, for the body being itself a composite whole will be for some other composite whole and that also will be for another such whole and thus we shall be landed into an infinite regress of composite wholes. The law of parsimony (lāghava) does not allow the supposition of an infinite number of composite wholes where the supposition of one non-composite subject will meet the requirements of the case. An infinite regress is legitimate only where experience testifies to it as in the case of the seed and the tree. Here, however, there is no evidence in support of the supposition of an infinite number of composite wholes. Further, the relation of the hetu, 'composite whole', in the above inference, holds only with parārthatva or 'being-

for-another' and not with a composite 'para' or composite another. Therefore the objection does not bear examination. Thus is proved a subject other than, and the opposite of, the non-intelligent, triple-natured, Prakṛti. Hence as Prakṛti is triple-natured, non-intelligent, objective, active, etc., Puruṣa, as the opposite of it, must be non-composite, i.e., simple and without parts, intelligent, unobjective, in-active, etc. The fact that individuals seek liberation from experience and its sufferings also proves a subject other than Prakṛti. How can one be liberated from suffering if one is a mode of Prakṛti consisting of sukha, duḥkha and moha? The fact of mokṣa-prayāsa or effort after liberation from duḥkha thus proves that the individual believes himself to be other than the duḥkhātmikā Prakṛti. This also proves Puruṣa as other than Prakṛti. Further, Prakṛti and its modes consists of sukha, duḥkha and moha. Sukha and duḥkha, as bhogya or objects of fruition or frustration imply a Bhoktā or experient other than the bhogya or objects. Therefore there must be a subject, Puruṣa that is agreeably or disagreeably affected by the sukha and duḥkha in Prakṛti.

SĀNKHYA THEORY OF PURUṢABAHUTVA

SĀNKHYA proves Puruṣa-bahutva, the existence of many puruṣas, as follows:—

Puruṣa, the non-composite, intelligent subject, is other than, and the opposite of, the non-intelligent, composite Prakṛti and its products. The birth or empirical existence of a Puruṣa consists in its association with a body which is a composite product of the composite Prakṛti, just as death is its dissociation therewith. If there were one Puruṣa, and not many, then the birth of one empirical individual will mean the birth of all other individuals and the same will

hold in respect of death. But this is contrary to experience. Therefore the one and one relation that holds between individuals and their births and deaths proves that there are many Puruṣas, and not one. The same one and one relation holds between individuals and their respective organs of sense so that one individual becoming deaf or blind all other individuals do not become deaf or blind with him. This also proves that there are many Puruṣas and not one. The same vyavasthā or one and one ordering holds between individuals and their happiness and unhappiness and also as regards their bondage and release (bandha-mokṣa). The happiness of one individual is not the happiness of every other individual. Nor does every other individual become unhappy when one becomes unhappy. If there were only one Puruṣa this would not be case. Similarly when one individual caught in the toils of samsāra every other individual is not necessarily involved in similar disaster, nor does one individual realising his freedom from experience and its toils every other individual becomes similarly liberated. All these prove that there are many Puruṣas and not one.

SĀNKHYA THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND NYĀYA COSMOGENESIS

THE Sāṅkhya theory of evolution is a corollary of its theory of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. Cause, according to Sāṅkhya, must take after the effect which it produces and must contain the latter and its distinguishing features in a subtle or potential form within itself. The world of objects must have for its cause a primodial Prakṛti which must contain in itself the fundamental characters of the objects of the world of experience. An object of experience, says Sāṅkhya, reveals the following characters or



features. In the first place, it is an object of experience and therefore an experience-content. Therefore there must be something in the object answering to its nature as experience-content. This is the sattva element in the object, i.e., that element in the object which makes it capable of being an experience-content, i.e., enables it to manifest itself as a content of consciousness. The sattva element is therefore the intelligence-stuff in the object with the capacity of manifestation or prakāśa. Sattva therefore is characterised by the quality of prakāśa or manifestation and as prakāśa has no weight (gurutva) it must also be described as being devoid of weight, i.e., as being characterised by laghutva or lightness. Besides, the content character, an object of experience has the further characteristic of intermittent manifestation in experience which shows that there must be something in the object which acts as a principle of retardation and prevents the sattva element from revealing itself continuously in experience. This is the tamas element in the object, the element of mass or inertia which prevents sattva from revealing itself always without intermission. Tamas is thus characterised by the quality of āvarakatva or retardation and gurutva or weight. The fact, however, that no object remains always in darkness or hidden from experience proves that there is a third element in every object, viz., rajas or energy, which overcomes the resistance of tamas and enables sattva to reveal itself in experience. The third element therefore must possess the character of activation (upaṣṭambhakatva) and motion (calatva). As these three elements or guṇas constitute every object of the world they must also be constituents of the primodial cause of the world, viz., Prakṛti. Since these elements or guṇas are themselves substrates of qualities (sattva of laghutva and prakāśa, tamas of gurutva and āvarakatva and rajas of calatva and upaṣṭambhakatva) they are not guṇas or qualities in the Vaiśeṣika sense of the term, guṇa, but are substantive reals though not independent reals as no one of the three is found without

the other two. The three guṇas in their interdependence constitute Prakṛti which is, as it were, the rope (guṇa) that binds Puruṣa to samsāra or the world of objects.

Prakṛti consisting of the three guṇas is, according to Sāṅkhya, in the sāmyāvasthā or the state of equipoise in the pre-empirical state before there is a world of experience. In this state the reals or gunas constituting Prakṛti are uniformly diffused as a consequence of which uniformity it has the same form everywhere and so no distinguishable form anywhere. It is therefore a state of formlessness of which no experience is possible. Through an original alogism, an Anādi Aviveka, or beginningless non-detachment, the bare relation of proximity or presence (sānnidhya), between Puruṣa, the transcendental subject and Prakṛti, the formless background of objects, is transformed into a samyoga or attachment, as a consequence of which there is an end of the state of uniform diffusion or equipoise and a consequent process of differentiation and integration in Prakṛti, the primordial cause. The process is thus one of resolution of like to unlike, giving rise to unequal distribution of the reals at different centres and so causing the appearance of different forms. Where, e.g., we have an aggregate with the sattva-reals preponderating over the mass- and energy-reals we have a conscious being reflecting the Puruṣa's consciousness in itself. Where, again, we have energy-centres preponderating over the mass-particles and sattva-reals, we have a moving object. Lastly, where we have the mass preponderating over sattva and energy we have a material object at rest. The total of tamas and rajas in Prakṛti being constant, there is neither increase nor diminution of the total quantity of mass and energy in the world. Through the process of differentiation and integration energy may pass from one form to another, but the total quantity of energy and mass remains always the same. Thus physical energy in one arrangement may become chemical energy and chemical energy may become energy of life and energy



of life may become energy of mind but the total quantity of energy remains always constant and unchanged. The Sāṅkhya holds, in other words, that evolution is no addition in any way to the sum total of energy and mass in Prakṛti, no real creation strictly speaking, but only transformation or change of form. The forms which are held in abeyance or arrest in one arrangement or distribution of the guṇas or reals become released or liberated as it were in a new distribution or rearrangement of the same reals. The evolution process is thus the process of manifestation of the non-manifest, of liberation of arrested forms. Thus what is matter-stuff in one arrangement becomes life-stuff in another arrangement and what is life-stuff in one arrangement becomes mind-stuff in a further rearrangement.

The law according to which Prakṛti evolves is, Sāṅkhya holds, Saṃsrṣṭa Viveka, differentiation in the integrated. Hence, according to Sāṅkhya, differentiation and integration are not two separate moments of the process of evolution but two aspects of one and the same process, to be more differentiated being, according to Sāṅkhya, is also to be more integrated at the same time. Evolution, therefore, proceeds not, as in the Spencerian scheme, through three successive stages of homogeneity, differentiation and integration, but from a less differentiated, less integrated whole to a more differentiated, more integrated whole, i.e., from whole to whole and not from whole to parts and thereafter to more integrated whole.

While visadṛśa pariṇāma as resolution of like to unlike is one form of evolution resulting in differentiation and integration and appearance of new forms, there goes on along with it another form of evolution in Prakṛti which is its diametrical opposite. This is evolution as sadṛśa pariṇāma or resolution of like to like. Both these forms are going on simultaneously in Prakṛti, sometimes the one and sometimes the other preponderating. Thus when dissimilation, differentiation and integration preponderate over assimilation or

resolution of like to like we have a more and more differentiated and integrated world corresponding to creation. When, however, assimilation preponderates over dissimilation the world disintegrates more and more tending to a relapse into the original uniformity.

It is obvious that the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution presents a strong contrast to the Nyāya theory of creation of the world by the will of the Īśvara out of pre-existent atoms. There is no place for a directive intelligent will in the Sāṅkhya theory of cosmogenesis. Prakṛti evolves of its own inherent energy or Rajas through the relation of bare proximity to Puruṣa as the Subject by a sort of unconscious teleology. Puruṣa is nothing but the motionless inactive witness of the drama of evolution, Prakṛti evolving of itself for an end or purpose that lies outside itself. But the Īśvara of Nyāya is not merely the final cause but also the formal and efficient cause of the world.

The evolution process, according to Sāṅkhya, is transition from potentiality to actuality, i.e., a process whereby a form which remains potential in one arrangement becomes kinetic or actual in another arrangement. And just as in Aristotle God as pure actuality without potentiality moves the world towards the actualisation of its potentialities without Himself moving, so also Puruṣa, the eternally real and complete, moves Prakṛti and starts it on its career of evolution and transformation of energy without itself moving.

The stages of the evolution of Prakṛti into a world are, according to Sāṅkhya, as follows:—

Prakṛti the non-manifest background becomes, in the first instance, manifest as Buddhi or neutral matter of experience, neither subjective nor objective. Prakṛti as Buddhi thereafter bifurcates into Ahaṃkāra or the abstract ego as apperceiving unity on the subjective side and through the mediation of Ahaṃkāra into the five kinds of potential energy, i.e., the five Tanmātras (sound-potential, colour po-



tential, taste-potential, etc.) on the objective side. Thereafter Prakṛti as Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra on the subjective side further transforms itself into the eleven different sensibilities (the five 'sense-organs of knowledge and the five organs of action and the common sensible or mind) just as Prakṛti as the five kinds of potential energy on the objective side transforms itself into the five Mahābhūtas, i.e., the five great elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air, etc., with actual physical and chemical characters.

The krama or order of the evolution of the successive stage is, according to Sāṅkhya, fixed, so that there is never any change in the order of appearance of the different stages.

THE JAINA THEORY OF SYĀDVĀDA OR SAPTABHAÑGĪ NAYA

THE Jaina believes that every subject as an existent admits of being affirmed or denied in seven different predications. The assertion even of a single predicate in respect of a subject, the Jaina says, may be in seven different forms. In fact, reality is never exclusively this or that, but is of different modes or forms so that while in respect of reality in one mode we can say that it *is*, we can also say that it *is not* in another mode and also both *is* and *is not* in a third and so on. Thus when we say of a pen that it *is* as a pen we also mean thereby that it *is not* as a pencil. When we say it *is here*, we also imply that it *is not there*. When we say it *is now* or exists in the present time, we also imply that as existing in the present time it is also not existing in the past or the future. In fact, of every real in this sense we can say—

- (1) that it exists in one mode,
- (2) that it does not exist in another mode,

- (3) that it is, therefore, successively existent and non-existent in the same mode,
- (4) therefore, it is unspeakable or indeterminate (avaktavya) as both existent and non-existent, and
- (5) that as this indeterminate real it exists (as indeterminate) and therefore
- (6) that it does not exist as other than the indeterminate and therefore
- (7) that, as indeterminate, it exists as well as does not exist successively.

An eighth mode is not possible because it brings us back to the indeterminate again. This is known as the saptabhaṅgī naya or the doctrine of seven-fold predication of the Jainas. It is a corollary of their anekāntavāda or the doctrine that reality is manifold in character. It may be noted that the Jaina doctrine of seven-fold predication is a rejection, from the realistic standpoint, of the doctrine of the void of the Mādhyamika Buddhists. According to the Mādhyamika Buddhists the ultimate principle is Śūnyatā or a void which cannot be characterised either as reality, or as unreality, or as both reality and unreality, or again as neither reality nor unreality. The Mādhyamikas argue that if reality belonged to an object like a jar, then the activity of the potter who makes it would be superfluous, and if the jar were unreal, no potter could make it real. Nor can it be both real and unreal as it involves a contradiction. For the same reason it cannot also be neither real nor unreal. The Saptabhaṅgī Naya is a refutation of the Mādhyamika doctrine of the void by an appeal to the deliverance of experience. Experience itself points to anekāntavāda as distinguished from ekāntavāda, i.e., to a reality that cannot be characterised by one simple mode (ekānta) but only as one of multiple or manifold nature (anekānta) so that everything that we experience can be described as existent from one point of view, non-existent from another, both existent and non-existent in succession, as the indeterminate unity of existent and non-existent and so on. Since experience



itself reveals reality as being of a manifold nature, the doctrine of the void which is a denial of reality as revealed in experience has no valid ground to stand upon.

THE RĀMĀNUJIST SYSTEM

THE system of Rāmānuja rejects the Jaina doctrine of Anekāntavāda and its theory of sevenfold predication. According to Rāmānuja there being only one principle really existent, the co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. If it be said that while existence and non-existence being contradictory cannot co-exist in one and the same thing, yet it may be capable of alternate existence and non-existence, the answer is that alternate existence and non-existence can be possible only in action and not in a substantive real. If it be contended that the whole universe is multiform like the figure of the elephant-headed deity Ganeśa or that of Viṣṇu as part man and part lion (*nṛsimha*) the answer is that the elephantine or the leonine forms do not exist in the same part along with the human form so that as the human form and the animal form belong to two different parts of the same figure there is no contradiction. When existence and non-existence are both predicated of the same real they are not predicated in respect of its different parts and there is thus no possible escape from the contradiction involved. If it be urged that existence belongs in one form and non-existence in another form and thus there is no contradiction, the answer is that contradiction could have been avoided if we had predicated existence and non-existence at different times. Nor can it be contended that the multiformity of reality is like the length and shortness which belong to the same thing in different relations, for in such length and shortness which arise through different relations in one and the same real there is no contradiction as they arise from contrast with different objects. Therefore,

for want of proof, the Saptabhṅgī-naya predinating both existence and non-existence in respect of the same real must be rejected as involving contradiction. Again, it may be asked, is this doctrine of sevenfold predication itself uniform (*ekānta* as excluding one contradictory), or multiform (*anekānta* as conciliating many contradictories) ? If it is uniform, there will emerge a contradiction to the Jaina thesis that all things are multiform. If again it is multiform, the Jaina has failed to prove his thesis, for a multiform statement as both existent and non-existent proves nothing.

According to the Jainas, the soul has an extension equal to that of its body so that while the soul of an ant pervades the body of the ant and is a very small soul the soul of an elephant pervades the body of an elephant and is a very large soul. But several absurdities follow from such a theory of the soul. If transmigration be accepted as true (as it is by the Jainas) then if a man, after death, is reborn an elephant or a smaller animal such as a bird, his soul of the size of the human body will be unable, after transmigration into the elephant form, to fill the entire body of the elephant, and if it transmigrates into the body of a small bird it would be impossible for it to be confined within the size of the bird body. Nor will it be possible for a yogin or an ascetic to assume different bodies at the same time and thereby exhaust his moral desert. If it be said that the soul is capable of contraction and expansion like the light of a lamp then it will follow that the soul is susceptible of modification and is non-eternal, which will strike at the very root of the law of Karma so that merit will go unrewarded and demerit unpunished. The Jaina theory, therefore, both in respect of its doctrine of sevenfold predication and its conception of a contracting and expanding soul is incompatible with the teachings of the infallible Vedas. Rāmānuja, therefore, rejecting the Jaina theory, expounds the Upaniṣadic teaching as follows :

There are three principles—*cit*, the conscious soul, *acit*, the non-intelligent world and *Iśvara* or the Lord as the unity



of the two. Thus it has been said, "Lord, soul and non-soul are the three principles: Hari (Viṣṇu) is Lord, individual spirits are souls and the perceived world is non-soul."

Śankarācārya gives a different account of the Upaniṣadic teachings. According to him pure undifferenced Intelligence is Brahman, the ultimate reality. Thus the Absolute or Brahman which is eternal, pure, intelligent and free and the identity whereof with the Jīva or individual spirit is learnt from reference to the same subject in such Upaniṣadic texts as "That thou art", undergoes bondage and emancipation. The universe of differences consisting of knower, knowing and known is an illusory superimposition on the undifferenced pure Intelligence which is Brahman or the Absolute Reality. Maintaining the identity of the individual soul and Brahman and acknowledging the possibility of a cancellation of the beginningless illusion that causes the appearance of difference by the realisation of the unity of the individual spirit and Brahman, the Śankarites reject the division of the ultimate Reality into soul, non-soul and the Lord as the Rāmānujists do.

The Śankarites attribute the appearance of difference to a beginningless illusion which is nothing but a form of positive ignorance (*bhāvarūpa ajñāna*). In proof of ignorance as a positivity as distinguished from mere negative absence of knowledge the Śankarites cite such perceptions as 'I am ignorant', 'I know not myself and other things'. Such self-conscious ignorance, the Śankarites contend, is not mere absence of knowledge. Neither Prabhākaras nor the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa can consistently explain self-conscious ignorance as absence of knowledge. The Prabhākaras do not recognise absence as a padārthā or knowable and therefore, according to Prabhākaras, the experience of ignorance is no experience of absence. Nor can a Bhaṭṭa consistently say that we perceive or have immediate experience of the absence of knowledge. Knowledge, according to Bhaṭṭas, is never an object of perception but is known by inference from the mark of knownness which it generates in

the object known. Since knowledge itself cannot be known immediately but only mediately by inference, the absence of knowledge cannot also be known immediately, for any immediate knowledge of the absence of knowledge will entail not merely an immediate experience of the absence but also an immediate experience of the knowledge the absence whereof is immediately apprehended. Thus, neither according to the Prābhākaras, nor according to the Bhāṭṭas, can one's perceived ignorance be explained as an immediate experience of the absence of knowledge. The difficulties in respect of self-conscious ignorance can be avoided only if the ignorance experienced be explained as a positive kind of ajñāna or ignorance, i. e., an experienced positivity which can be contradicted or cancelled by knowledge. Self-conscious ignorance thus furnishes an actual example of a positivity contradictorily related to knowledge, i. e., a positivity which ends or terminates on the appearance of knowledge or realisation. The māyā or the cosmic nescience which causes the appearance of a world of difference consisting of knower, knowing and known in the undifferenced essence of Pure, Presentative Consciousness which is Brahman or Absolute Reality is also a beginningless entitative or positive ignorance of the type of self-conscious ignorance and is terminated or cancelled by the realisation of Brahman's undifferenced essence.

Rāmānuja points out that Śankara's view of knowledge as pure, undifferenced consciousness is a myth without support in experience. Pure objectless knowing, knowing which is not the knowing of anything whatsoever, is nowhere found in experience. All knowing is knowing of an object other than knowing and is the property of the subject that knows. This is how knowing is revealed in experience. Knowing is known immediately by the knower and is svaprakāśa or self-revealing in this sense, i. e., as immediately revealing itself as knowing to its own substrate, the knower, through its own activity. It is also svavyatirkaprakāśaka, i. e., self-transcendent as revealing an object other than itself. Every act of



knowing thus immediately reveals both itself and an object other than itself. It reveals itself immediately to the subject or self whose property it is and it so reveals itself as revealing an object other than itself. Hence we know our own knowing immediately through the act of knowing. In respect of the knowing of other persons, however, we have only an inferential or mediate knowledge. Likewise, in respect of the recollection of our past experiences we have no direct or immediate consciousness of the experience that is past through itself or its own activity but through a present act of memory other than the past experience which is dead. Thus in the case of other people's knowing as also in respect of knowing of past knowing, there is no direct knowing of knowing through itself but only indirect knowing either by inference from marks or by the activity of a present recollection. In these cases, therefore, knowing is not known through itself and is therefore not self-luminous or self-revealing.

Though knowing is known both mediately and immediately and is thus an object of knowledge, yet it is not on a par with object in general. An object other than knowing reveals itself to a subject other than itself and it so reveals itself not through its own activity but through the subject's act of knowing that apprehends it. But knowing reveals itself by its own activity to its substrate, viz., the subject that knows. In this sense an object is *jaḍa*, non-intelligent, being-for-another, while knowing is *ajada*, non-objective and is spiritual.

Knowledge being knowledge of objects and such knowledge being the *product* of different sources of knowledge, it follows that all knowledge as product has a beginning and an end. Further as knowledge is knowledge as revealing objects and as objects are both eternal and non-eternal and differ from one another, it follows that knowledge, as revealing different objects, is different in different instances. Hence the Advaita view that timeless Intelligence is the presupposition of all mental modes in time and is the ultimate undifferenced reality of which ordinary knowledge is only a

false appearance must be rejected as being inconsistent with the deliverance of experience. There is no objectless pure knowledge as Advaitins say, nor is sleep a proof of such knowledge. In sleep the object of knowledge is the 'I' or the self as the substratum of knowledge. This explains the recollection 'I slept comfortably' after the sleep is over. In short, while in sleep the 'I' is the object of knowledge, in the waking state knowing also reveals an object other than the knower.

Since each knower knows his own knowing immediately and knows the knowing of other persons mediately by inference it follows that each knower knows his own cognitive states as different from the cognitive series of other knowers. This explains the distinction between 'I', 'you' and 'he'. That each knowing has an object different from that of another knowing also shows that cognitive acts are also different from one another and that there is no truth in the Advaita view that particular cognitive acts are only false appearances of an indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*) essence of Pure knowing. Nor does the Advaita view that knower and objects known are also false appearances of pure undifferenced Intelligence square with the facts of experience. Knowing reveals objects and is knowing only as object-revealing. Therefore, there must be a knower to whom knowing reveals its objects.

That the knower cannot be identical in essence with knowing as such is also proved by the following considerations. The knower is known as persisting in spite of the lapse of time as is evidenced by the experience of recognition. When I say, "I am the self-same 'I' who saw this house a year ago", I recognise myself as a permanent self persisting from past to present. I thus cognise myself as enduring as against the act of recognition which I cognise as a present act with a beginning and an end. This shows that I have an immediate experience of myself as permanent, of my cognitive act as impermanent and of myself therefore as different from my act of cognition. The Advaitins' view



thus contradicts the evidence of immediate experience.

The Advaitins' contention that what we know as 'I' is a false appearance generated by adhyāsa or superimposition of Pure Intelligence on the non-intelligent Avidyā is also untenable for the following reasons. When we have a false appearance such as that of a snake in a rope, the illusion is of the form, "This is a snake". In the self-luminous experience in which the 'I' is revealed, the 'I' is revealed as the knower and knowledge is revealed as the property of the 'I'. This is obvious from such judgments as "I know", "I have knowledge of such and such objects", etc. In the instance of the snake-rope illusion the illusory appearance, viz., 'the snake' appears as one with the 'This', viz., the locus of the illusion, and not as a property of the 'This'. We say, 'This is a snake' and not 'This has a snake as its property'. Hence 'I' as knower cannot be the same as the act of knowing. Advaita regards the antaḥkaraṇa, or the inner instrument of experience, as the knower but this view is obviously untenable for the simple reason that the antaḥkaraṇa being non-intelligent cannot be the 'I' or the subject of knowing. Knowing derives its character of revelation from the self-revealing 'I', it is the 'I' that imparts to knowing its power of revelation and the 'I' must therefore be essentially self-luminous and intelligent and unlike the non-intelligent antaḥkaraṇa.

Nor is the Advaita view that Ātman is akhaṇḍa and therefore not relative to any other thing tenable. Ātman can be akhaṇḍa, i.e., undifferenced, only as distinguished from that which is sakhaṇḍa or susceptible of differences and is thus necessarily related to the latter. Nor is the Ātman akhaṇḍa or indivisible in the sense of being devoid of properties, for the very description of Ātman as indivisible or akhaṇḍa ascribes to it the character of indivisibility. Further Ātman as knower is related to knowing as its property and through the property of knowing to the object known.

Ātman as 'I', though related to the object known, is, however, not a generated event and endures even in deep

sleep. That the 'I' endures in deep sleep is evidenced by the recollection after sleep, viz., 'I had a sound sleep'. If the 'I' did not reveal itself in sound sleep there would be no recollection in the form 'I had a sound sleep', but only as "There was no 'I' at the time of sleep". In short, the object of knowing in sound sleep was the 'I' and no external object. When I say on waking, 'I slept soundly, I knew nothing' I mean that 'I knew only myself and no object other than myself'. In fact, the absence of objects which I recall in waking is just the bare self as the object of my experience during sleep, the absence being nothing but the location of absence, i.e., a simple presence (as Prābhākaras say).

The Advaitins cite self-conscious ignorance as evidence of a positive nescience. When I say 'I know not myself and other things', I am conscious of an ignorance that is not mere absence of knowledge, says the Advaitin. But this view does not bear examination. In self-conscious ignorance the positive ignorance is in respect of the self as the object of ignorance and also has the self as its subject or substrate that is ignorant. The question thus arises, at the time of the consciousness of the ignorance, is there any consciousness of the self as pure undifferenced consciousness, or is there no such consciousness? If the answer is in the affirmative, then, in so far as such consciousness of self cancels ignorance, there is no room for the co-existence of ignorance, positive or otherwise, with the realisation of the self as Pure Intelligence. If, however, the answer is in the negative, then, in the absence of any knowledge of the object of the ignorance, viz., the self as Pure consciousness and also of the subject of the ignorance, i.e., of the self as that which is ignorant, there cannot be any consciousness of the ignorance.

Further, the Advaitin view that Brahman which is Pure, Non-dual Intelligence appears falsely as the triad of knower, knowing and the known through the adjunct of Māyā or Nescience, is also not tenable. For how does this Nescience function and thereby cause the appearance of the world of difference? It cannot have the individual self as its substrate,

for the *jīva* or the individual self is itself the product of Nescience. Nor can Nescience have Brahman as its substrate, for Brahman is Pure, Self-luminous Intelligence and any Nescience in Brahman is inconsistent with the nature of Brahman as Pure, Self-shining Intelligence.

The Advaitin contends that the relation between Brahman and Nescience is a false appearance (*mithyā*) in the sense of being not describable either as real or as unreal (*sadasadvilakṣana*). But the Advaita view is untenable for the following reasons. If a thing is real, it is not unreal ; and if a thing is unreal, it is not real. There is no room for a third, or fourth alternative in the sense of being 'both real and unreal', or 'neither real nor unreal'. The Advaitins' belief in a category of *mithyā* or false in the sense of being 'neither real nor unreal' thus does not bear critical examination.

In the stock example of illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, there is no indescribable silver in the sense of a silver which is neither real nor unreal. On the contrary, the silver perceived is real silver, though the proportion of silver in the mother-of-pearl being very small compared to its other elements, the silver perceived is negligible and cannot be turned to practical use. This is why the perception is called an illusion. In fact, the illusion of silver in the mother-of-pearl would not be possible if there were no similarity between silver and mother-of-pearl. So the object perceived is both silver and mother-of-pearl, and the similarity, on analysis, resolves into the presence of silver in the mother-of-pearl. So the object perceived is both silver and mother-of-pearl, but the element of silver is so small that the object can be used only as mother-of-pearl and not as silver.

Hence, though all knowledge is of that which *is* and, strictly considered, there is no difference between knowledge and illusion, yet from the practical stand-point, knowledge is either practically useful and therefore valid knowledge or *pramā*, or of no practical value and therefore non-valid knowledge or *apramā*. *Apromā* is either (a) *samśaya* or doubt wherein for practical purposes incompatible characters



are apprehended in the same object leading to mental uncertainty and indecision, (b) bhrama wherein an object is apprehended in a character opposed (*viparita*) in nature to its practically useful properties, (c) where an object is apprehended in the character of another (*anyathā*) object, and not in the character in which it can be turned to practical use. As distinguished from *apramā*, *pramā* or valid knowledge (as *vyavahāra anuguṇa*) conforms to the requirements of practice. Such knowledge is either perceptual, inferential or verbal relatively to its proximate cause or source, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* or *śabda*. Comparison, presumption, etc., of the Advaitins are not additional sources of knowledge, but only disguised forms of the above three. Comparison and presumption, e. g., are nothing but inference and *anupalabdhi* is only the perception of the bare locus.

As neither perception, nor inference, nor *śabda* or verbal knowledge delivers a non-relational content, the Advaita doctrine of a Pure Non-relational Essence of Consciousness as the one Ultimate Reality lacks the support of valid evidence in any form. *Nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* reveals a relational object and *savikalpa pratyakṣa* reveals it as related to other relational objects. *Śabda* also as communication through propositions predicating a character of a subject also conveys only relational contents. The same is true of inference also as inference proves only what can be perceived or communicated by language.

It follows that as all the sources of valid knowledge convey only relational facts, the non-relational Brahman of the Advaitin is a myth without valid evidence. None of the *pramāṇas*, in fact, proves a *nirviśeṣa* object. If the Pure Distinctionless Knowledge of the Advaitin were a reality it would be indistinguishable from anything else and therefore could not be distinguished even as knowledge. Knowledge is always the property of a knower and is of an object known, so that knowing is never known except as distinguished from the knower and the known.

Since the *pramāṇas* prove only *viśiṣṭa* objects, it follows

that all knowing is in the form of a judgment predicating an attribute of a substance. The substance-attribute relation thus characterises both knowledge and the reality known. To know anything, in other words, is to know it as a substance distinguished by an attribute. In knowing a cow, e.g., we know it as a particular cow, i.e., as a substance possessing the character of 'cowness'. The 'cowness' may be observed in other particulars, i. e., in other cows, and in this respect may be called a different cowness. But in so far as there is a striking similarity of sausādṛśya between the cowness of one cow and that of another cow, we may also call it the same (cf., the Buddhist view of universal).

The substance-attribute relation which characterises reality also explains the relation between Brahman as the Lord or Īśvara and the world of intelligent souls (cit) and non-intelligent things (acit). But the substance-attribute relation, it may be noted, is a comprehensive relation comprising within it the relation of soul (śarīrī) and body (śarīra), of whole (amśi) and part (amśa), of subject (viṣayī) and object (viṣaya), of organism (aṅgi) and organs (aṅga), etc. Hence Brahman as Īśvara or the Lord is not merely substance in relation to the world of sentient beings (cit) and inanimate objects (acit) as its attribute, but is whole in relation to the latter as its parts, is soul in relation to it as its body, is subject in relation to the world as object, etc. This may be explained as follows. Just as the body does not live but dies and decomposes when the soul leaves it, so does the world of cit and acit evolve from the subtle or causal state to the manifest or effect state in so far as Brahman informs and sustains it. The identity of Brahman and the world of cit and acit is thus the identity of a substance and its attributes. The relation of Brahman and the world may thus be described as one of qualified identity or viśiṣṭādvaita. According to Vidwan H. N. Rāghavendrāchāra (Studies in Philosophy No. 1—University of Mysore) viśiṣṭādvaita is a compound of two terms and can be construed as (i) viśiṣṭayoh advaita, meaning advaita, or identity, of two viśiṣṭas, or qualified entities; and

also (ii) *vिशेषाय अद्वैता*, i.e., identity, or *advaita*, of a *विशेषा*, or qualified reality. With reference to the first sense the term stands for three ideas, viz., (i) the identity of the evolved *cidacit* with the subtle or non-evolved *cidacit* without which the former cannot exist, (ii) the identity of Brahman qualified by reality or *sattā* as the material cause with Brahman qualified by knowledge and bliss (*jñāna* and *ānanda*) as the efficient cause and (iii) the identity of Brahman as the ground of the entire universe with the latter as that which is grounded in, or sustained by, Brahman, both being qualified.

From the above it follows that the Advaita view of Brahman in itself as the ultimate non-relational Reality consisting of the essence of Undifferenced Eternal Intelligence, and of a *saguṇa* or relational Brahman as a false appearance of the former as creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world, cannot be maintained. In fact, when the Vedas speak of *nirguṇa* Brahman, all that they mean is that Brahman is devoid of all qualities that import defect, imperfection, want, etc., Brahman being characterised by all the *kalyāṇaguṇas* or auspicious qualities importing excellence and the good of creatures. Brahman is thus throughout a relational Absolute, being in incessant relation to creatures, cancelling their imperfections and assisting them in finding out and attaining what is really beneficial and good for themselves. An examination of these *kalyāṇaguṇas*, or auspicious qualities of Brahman, clearly brings out the inherently relational character of Brahman. Consider, e.g., the qualities of knowledge (*jñāna*), might (*śakti*), forgiveness (*kṣamā*), straightforwardness (*ārjava*), etc., in Brahman. Of what use is knowledge to the all-knowing Brahman unless it be for the enlightenment of creatures who are ignorant of their own good? Of what use is might to the Almighty Lord unless it be for assisting weak, helpless creatures in attaining their real good and avoiding what is harmful? Of what use, again, is forgiveness as a quality in the Lord unless it be for reclaiming sinful creatures who wander from



the right path and are lost in the wilderness of the world? Similarly, of what use is straightforwardness in the Lord unless there are crooked creatures who have to be won back to honesty and straight-living? Thus each and every one of the kalyāṇaguṇas is what it is because of the Lord's relation to creatures. Cut out finite beings, consider the Lord to be an undifferenced Absolute as the Advaitins consider Brahman to be, and all these auspicious qualities in the Lord lose their reason for existence. The Lord, therefore, is a mediated Absolute, an Omnipersonality that is what it is in and through its relation to finite persons limited by the world of inanimate objects.

Creation is defined as jīvānām ujjīvanam or inbreathing of life into finite spirits, just as sthitī or maintenance is anupraveśa, indwelling, of the Lord in His created world. What is called pralaya or dissolution of the world is explained as the inactivating of the creature, i.e., putting him into chains, as it were, so that he may not do further harm to himself allured by the blandishments of sense. Thus the purpose of creation is the good of creatures, so that when the creature forgetting his real good misuses his chance and does more and more harm to himself, the Lord, as the loving Father, puts him into chains and deprives him of the power of doing further injury to himself.

The created world of cit and acit consists of two categories of objects, viz., dravya or substance and adravya or non-substance. Since substance alone can be the substrate of changing states, it is only objects that are of the nature of substance that can be upādāna kāraṇa or material cause. There are six kinds of substance, viz., Iśvara or the Lord, jīva or individual soul, dharmabhūtajñāna, i.e., knowledge of the jīva which, though a property, is also substrate of changing states, śuddhasatta or nityavibhūti (as distinguished from sattva mixed with rajas and tamas), prakṛti or the ground of the world of nature and kāla or time. Of these, the last two have objectivity or being-for-another (jāda) while the first four are ajāda or non-objective. Prakṛti

consisting of miśra-sattva, i.e., sattva mixed with rajas and tamas, is jaḍa, non-sentient, objective, while śuddhasatta is ajaḍa, non-objective though not cit or conscious like dharma-bhūtajñāna which is both dharma or property of the knower and is substance as the substrate of changing states. Time (kāla) is also jaḍa, i.e., an objective substance. Adravya, non-substance includes sound, touch, taste, smell, odour, sattva, rajas, tamas, samyoga and power. Sattva, rajas and tamas in their intermixture constitute prakṛti, the ground of physical nature. In the state prior to creation, they are in a state of equipoise and at the will of the Lord they differentiate and integrate in unequal proportion and thus start the process of creation. Sattva, however, is distinguished from raja and tamas in this that while the latter two are the cause of bondage, sattva liberates the individual from the toils of samsāra.

The Nyāya view that jñāna, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, pravṛtti, dharma, adharma and samskāra are the nine specific qualities of the self offends against the rule of parsimony. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and will are all modes of jñāna or cognition and dharma or merit is God's Grace just as adharma or demerit is its absence. What is called samskāra is also nothing but a form of samyoga.

Since Īśvara or the Lord is the ultimate Reality or Soul of which the world of cit and acit are the body, realisation by the individual of its essential dependence on the Lord as His body is liberation, while ignorance of it leading to a mistaken idea of oneself as having independent reality and to consequent self-assertion and self-will against the Lord's will and purpose is bondage entailing suffering and misery.

Realisation of one's real status as dependent comes through:—

(a) A course of karmayoga consisting of disinterested performance of one's unconditional duties and the eschewing of all interested actions from empirical motives leading to—

(b) Jñānayoga or the realisation of one's essential dependence on the Lord as the śarīrī or soul of whom the indivi-



dual is the body, culminating in—

(c) Bhaktiyoga or the practice of devotion through the *astāṅgayoga* as its auxiliary conditions consisting of the practice of *yama* or restraints and *niyama* or rules, etc., and through (1) *viveka* or practice of discrimination between the right and the wrong sort, (2) *vimoka* or eschewing of desires, (3) *abhyāsa* or repeated practice, (4) *kriyā* or due discharge of one's duties, (5) *kalyāṇa* or practising truthfulness, kindness, right attitude, *ahimsā* or harmlessness and charity, (6) *anavasāda* or non-depression at misfortune and (7) *anudhārṣa* or non-elation at good fortune.

Devotion so practised, according to the above conditions, brings on realisation at the end and is essentially of the nature of an intellectual intuition in which the representation of the ultimate truth becomes a presentation or intuition of the reality as it were.

Such realisation comes from the grace of God, according to the school of *Lokāchārya*, and does not require any special qualifying for it by the discipline of karma. According to the school of *Venkatesa*, however, the individual must qualify for Divine Grace by the discipline of karma before Divine Grace can liberate him.

(d) After Bhaktiyoga and the consequent intellectual intuition of one's essential dependence on the Lord comes *prapatti*, *śaranāgati* or self-surrender so that the individual relinquishes all self-will and conceit and considers himself to be an instrument worked by the Divine Will in the fulfilment of Divine purpose. With *prapatti* comes liberation from the bondage of *samsāra*.

ADVAITA—THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANKARA-CHĀRYA AND HIS SCHOOL

According to Rāmānuja and his school neither reality nor our knowledge of it is indeterminate, both reality and knowledge, according to them, being characterised by the relation of substance and attribute. The Advaitin points out that this view of reality and knowledge leads to insuperable

difficulties. Consider, e.g., the Rāmānujist analysis of an act of knowing such as 'the lotus is blue' (*nīla utpala*). According to the Rāmānujist, this is a judgment which predicates a particular 'blue' as an instance of the universal of 'blueness' (*nīlatva viśiṣṭa nīla*) of a particular lotus as an instance of the universal of lotusness (*utpalatva viśiṣṭa utpala*). For the Rāmānujist therefore the predicate as well as the subject of a judgment are qualified substances (substantives qualified by adjectives). But how can one *viśiṣṭa* be predicated of another *viśiṣṭa*? How can one qualified substance be the predicate of another qualified substance? How, in other words, can a substance be qualified by another substance, and an attribute be the attribute of another attribute? If substances could be attributes of other substances, and qualities could be attributes of other qualities, the distinction between substance and quality will cease to exist. Qualities are qualities of substances and not of other qualities, and substances are substrates of qualities and not themselves qualities of other substances. The Rāmānujist analysis of the act of cognition will, in other words, obliterate the distinction between the different padārthas, the different categories of objects.

It follows from the above that no judgment asserts the unity of one qualified substance with another. What a judgment such as 'S is P' really affirms is the affirmative consciousness as the undifferenced reality cancelling both S and P as mutually incompatible. E.g., in the judgment 'The lotus is blue', the 'lotus' is different from 'blue' and 'blue' i.e. different from the 'lotus' so that they are reciprocal negatives of each other. When the judgment brings these two incompatibles together, 'lotus' and 'blue' as reciprocal negatives cancel each other. The reality which survives in the judgment is the Pure Affirming Consciousness. Cognition as judgment thus proves undifferenced Consciousness as the Reality falsely appearing as relations of contents.

The Rāmānujist view that we have immediate experience of the self as the permanent knower or 'I' and of



knowledge as a property of the 'I' having a beginning and an end in time also does not bear examination. How can the self know itself as a permanent 'I' distinct from its knowledge which has a beginning and an end except by a consciousness that has neither beginning nor end? Nor can the necessity of such a consciousness be dispensed with since prameyas or objects asserted without proof or evidence are only dogmatic assertions inconsistent with systematic logical thinking. If it be contended that proof consists in facts and not in the testimony of consciousness, the answer is that facts as experienced, i.e., as consciousness of facts constitute the real evidence in all cases. Hence, as all evidence, in the last analysis, is the evidence of consciousness, it follows that only a timeless consciousness can prove knowledge having a beginning and an end in time. Consider, e.g., an act of cognition in time such as the knowledge of a jar. Now, its being in time means that it has a beginning and an end in time, and this again means that it was absent for all the time prior to its beginning to be and will be absent for all the time after it will cease to be. Thus its antecedent and emergent absence comprise the whole of time *minus* the limited period of its existence as a temporal cognitive act. Such absence, antecedent and emergent, as also presence for the limited period of its existence can be certified only by a consciousness that comprises the whole of time. In other words, it is only an eternal intelligence that can certify mental events in time.

Rāmānujists say that the self knows itself as a permanent 'I' different from its property of knowing which is a temporal cognitive act. Hence, according to Rāmānujists, the self knows itself as a substance or substrate of which knowledge is an attribute. It thus knows itself as a substantive object different from its act of knowing which it knows as a property or an attribute of itself. But how can an object of one kind be known as different from an object of another kind except by a consciousness which comprehends both categories of objects and also their objective difference as substance and

attribute ? If it be contended that the consciousness which comprehends the difference is itself an object, i.e., a third category of object different from self and its property of knowing, then to prove this third object we must posit a fourth consciousness which comprehends 'self', 'knowing', and the 'comprehending consciousness' and also their objective differences. And thus an endless series of consciousness of consciousness etc., will be inevitable—a consequence which can be avoided only if the certifying consciousness be regarded as self-certifying and unobjective.

Further, Rāmānujists say, 'I', 'knowing' and the 'object known' are immediately presented as different from one another and their difference is as much a fact of immediate experience as the three entities which differ. But being a fact of experience no more proves the reality of difference than the illusory snake (in the rope-snake illusion) being a fact of experience proves it to be an intelligible real snake. For consider the following in regard to the idea of difference. When one thing is said to differ from another, is the difference between the two things itself different from the things that differ, or is it non-different from them ? If the first alternative be accepted, then the difference between the two things being different from the things themselves, we shall have two more differences, one between difference and one of the two differents and another between difference and the second different. And as the same problem will recur in regard to these two differences which, as two, must themselves differ, we shall be landed into an endless series of differences to explain one single difference. If, however, the second alternative be accepted and difference be conceived as being non-different from the things that differ, then the question arises, is the difference between two things, A and B, one unitary difference, so that the difference between A and B is the same as the difference between B and A, or are there two different differences. 'A's difference from B' being one difference and 'B's difference from A' being another difference ? If the latter alternative be accepted, then as

the two differences themselves differ, there will be two more differences to explain the difference between the two differences and thus we shall be landed into an endless series of differences which are yet non-different from the differences which differ. If, however, the former alternative be accepted, then since the difference between A and B (a cow and a horse) is non-different from A and B, we may as well say 'a cow' simply when we want to say 'a cow is different from a horse' or 'different from a horse' when we mean to say 'a cow'. Thus the judgment 'The cow is black' will be the same as 'difference from a horse is black', which is obviously absurd. Moreover, if difference between two things be the same as the things that differ, and if further such difference be one single difference between the two things and not two differences, then as one and the same difference is non-different from, or identical with, the things that differ, the things themselves, as identical with one and the same difference, should be identical with one another. Hence, if A and B differ and their difference is non-different from, or identical with, A and B, then in so far as this difference is the same as A itself, it is A and also in so far as it is the same as B itself, it is B. Thus A and B being identical with the same thing are identical with each other. It follows, therefore, that difference, though an experienced fact, admits of no intelligible explanation and must therefore be regarded as an indescribable appearance. This disposes of the Rāmānujists view that 'knower', 'knowing' and 'known' being given in experience as different, their respective differences must be regarded as intelligible and ultimately real.

The following conclusions follow from the preceding discussion of the Rāmānujist position :—

1. That a temporal cognition is significant as temporal only in the light of an Eternal Intelligence which comprises both itself and all that lies outside it ;
2. That this Eternal Consciousness which is a necessary presupposition of all objects in time is not itself an object among other objects ;

3. That though not an object either to itself or anything other than itself, it yet always is self-certified in the sense that so far as it is concerned ‘being’ and ‘being known’ are the same thing;

4. That just because it never remains unknown and is yet not known as an object distinct from other objects, it is indivisible and undifferenced (*akhaṇḍa*).

The third point noted above requires further elucidation. That consciousness certifies itself is shown by the fact that while a non-intelligent object such as a jar may *be* without *being known*, it is otherwise with consciousness which never *is* without also *being known* as such. But while consciousness is thus self-consciousness in the sense of being consciousness of consciousness it never is consciousness of consciousness as an object. The Nyāya view, therefore, that a primary cognition is itself the *object* of a secondary retrospective act numerically distinct from it must be rejected as untenable. If a primary cognition be certified by a secondary retrospection, the latter will have to be itself certified by a tertiary cognition and that again by another and so on without end, unless we concede that a cognition which is itself uncertified can certify a cognition numerically distinct from it. For similar reasons the Bhāṭṭa view that cognition is cognised as an *object*, not immediately, but only mediately by inference from the mark of knownness it generates in the object cognised must also be rejected. For if the knownness in the cognised object is the mark from which we infer the cognition as the act that has generated the knownness, then this knownness must itself be a known knownness and so must itself have another knownness qualifying it and the latter again another and so on endlessly before it can be used as a mark in the inference of cognition as an object. Nor is the Prābhākara view that in every cognitive act we cognise ‘knower’, ‘knowing’ and the ‘object known’, each in its own distinctive form (which is also the Rāmānujist view) more reasonable than the Nyāya or the Bhāṭṭa conceptions, for the Prābhākaras fail to see that a temporal cognition cannot know itself as temporal



except in the light of an eternal consciousness that both includes and goes beyond it.

From the reasons set forth above it is clear that an undifferenced, unobjective, eternal consciousness is the necessary presupposition of all empirical objects in time and that whatever significance empirical objects possess is derived from the self-certifying consciousness in the light of which they appear. Pure, Undifferenced Consciousness as certifying both itself and objects of experience is thus the Ultimate Truth and Reality that makes objects of experience appear real and true. Since difference, as we have seen, is an inexplicable appearance, Consciousness as the Ultimate Self-luminous Truth and Reality must be devoid of differences of all kinds, internal and external. Thus Consciousness has no *vijātiya bheda*, i.e., no *vijātiya* or heterogeneous other of itself such as a *Prakṛti*, e.g., as a real principle of nature different from *Puruṣa*, the subject, as *Sāṅkhya* philosophers say. Nor has Consciousness a *sajātiya* other of itself, i.e., a homogeneous other such as a plurality of experience-moments (*vijñāna kṣaṇas*), as *Vijñānavādī* Buddhists say. Nor is there any room for any *svagata bheda* or internal differences within Consciousness as the Ultimate Reality as *Rāmānujists*, *Vallabhites* and followers of *Nimbārka* hold. The Ultimate Reality as Consciousness being thus undifferenced, self-certifying, pure and eternal, the question arises, why should there be a world of difference appearing in time in a non-temporal undifferenced absolute reality? It is obvious that as no objective world can appear except as revealed by Consciousness and as Consciousness is never itself an object among other objects, the world of practice can be explained only on the supposition of some sort of false identification of Consciousness as the unobjective reality with a principle of objectivity other than Consciousness. It is, in other words, only on the hypothesis of a reciprocal superimposition of Consciousness on something other than Consciousness and of this latter on Consciousness that experience as consisting of the world of mind and nature can

be satisfactorily explained. [The idea of false identification of self and not-self may be illustrated as follows. If the self is immortal as it is taken to be and if of the soul it cannot be said that it returns to dust when the body dies and turns to dust, then the soul cannot be the same as the body. And yet statements such as 'I am dark', 'I am fair', 'I am well', 'I am ill', falsely identify the soul with the body and ascribe the dark or fair complexion of the latter or its health or ill-health to the soul. Similarly one identifies one's clothes, one's dwelling-place, one's property etc., with one's self as when any damage of the latter is felt as an injury to oneself. Also one's family, community, nation, etc., appear as part and parcel of oneself so that the good or the opposite of the former is regarded as one's own good or the reverse. All this is explained as a consequence of adhyāsa or superimposition of self on not-self by the Advaitin.]

Nor does the hypothesis of a principle other than Consciousness as the cause of the appearance of the world contradict the Advaita view-point that pure, self-certifying Consciousness is the only Ultimate Reality and Truth. A principle which is the other of Consciousness as Reality is also other than reality and not a second reality over against Consciousness as the Ultimate Reality. As the other of reality, however, it cannot be regarded as an absolute nought or nothing, for it causes the appearance of a world of objects. It is therefore sadasadvilakṣaṇa, other than reality as well as unreality, a principle, in other words, which, as the other of the Self-luminous Intelligence, must be Non-intelligence, Nescience or Ajñāna though not Ajñāna in a purely negative sense as mere absence of Intelligence, but rather a positive Nescience—a bhāvarūpa ajñāna—that projects the appearance of a world of mind and things on a Reality that is nothing but undifferenced Consciousness. Only as we invest this principle of Nescience both with an āvaraṇa śakti or power of obscuration of the true nature of Reality and also a vikṣepa śakti or power of projecting the appearance of



objects, can we explain the appearance of difference in the undifferenced reality of Pure Consciousness.

Ajñāna as a positive Nescience is thus the cause of the world of objects—not however Ajñāna as such but Ajñāna as superimposed on Cit or Consciousness which is the ultimate Truth and Reality. Cit or Consciousness, however, is not superimposed on Ajñāna in the same sense as Ajñāna is superimposed on Cit. Cit being Reality itself and Ajñāna the other of Reality the superimposition of Cit on Ajñāna is a relation to what is mithyā or false and therefore a relation that does not affect Cit. Hence while Ajñāna superimposed on Cit becomes transformed into a world of objects, Cit itself as adhiṣṭhāna of Ajñāna is not really transformed into a world. Thus it follows that while the world is a pariṇāma of Ajñāna in the sense of being a material or substantial modification of it, in regard to Cit as the Ultimate Reality or Brahman it is only a vivarta or apparent modification that does not affect Brahman's intrinsic nature.

In the 'Siddhāntaleśa' the distinction between a vivarta or apparent modification and pariṇāma or substantial modification is explained from three points of view:—

1. According to one view, a vivarta or unsubstantial modification is distinguished from a pariṇāma or material modification as follows. A material modification is a changed condition of the material cause and possesses the same grade of reality as its material cause. An apparent modification, however, entails no change of its material cause and possesses an inferior grade of reality comparatively to its material cause. Thus the jar which is made out of the lump of clay is a substantial modification of the lump of clay and has the same grade of reality (i. e., the same empirical reality) as the lump of clay. But the snake that is falsely perceived in the rope is an unsubstantial or apparent modification of the rope—the snake-appearance does not alter the substance of the rope into a snake. Moreover the snake that appears in the locus of the rope is an apparent snake, i.e., its reality is apparent reality and lasts as long as the

illusion lasts. But the rope is not an apparent rope, i.e., it has empirical and not merely apparent reality, and lasts beyond the experience of a subject perceiving it. In this sense, the objective world, according to Advaita, is a *parināma* or substantial modification of Nescience and a *vivarta* or apparent modification of Brahman. In other words, the world is a changed condition of Nescience and possesses the same grade of reality as Nescience does. But it is not a changed condition of Brahman nor does it possess the same grade of reality as Brahman. As the illusory snake does not change the rope into a snake, so also the world-appearance does not change Brahman into the world, and further as the snake is no real snake compared to the empirical reality of the rope, so is the world no real world compared to the absolute reality of Brahman.

2. According to a second view a material modification is a changed condition that possesses the *same nature* as its material cause, while an apparent modification is one that possesses a *nature different* from that of its material cause. In this second view the three kinds of being or *sattā*, viz., apparent (*prātibhāsika*), empirical (*vyavahārika*) and ultimate (*pāramārthika*) are done away with and we have instead a distinction of *nature* between reality and other than reality. Thus, according to this definition, the world is an apparent modification of Brahman in the sense that it is an unreal appearance of which Brahman is the real substrate in the same sense as the snake is an unreal appearance superimposed on Brahman as limited by the form of the empirically real rope. In other words, according to this view, both *vyavahārika* or empirical reality and *prātibhāsika* or apparent reality are on a par as being false appearances of the absolute or *pāramārthika* reality.

3. According to a third view, a substantial modification is one that is identical with its material cause, while an apparent modification is one which, though not identical with its material cause, is yet one that does not admit of being defined as anything else than its material cause. Thus



the jar as a substantial modification of the lump of clay is identical with the lump of clay of which it is made, but the snake, as an apparent modification of the rope, is not identical with the rope and is yet not definable as anything else than the rope.

In the first definition, an apparent modification is defined in terms of the kind of being it possesses. In other words, it is defined as an object possessing being or existence, though an inferior kind of existence comparatively to the being or existence of its material cause. In the second definition, the conception of being is done away with and the apparent is defined as an *object* lacking reality, i.e., as an unreal objectivity or objective unreality. In the third definition, the conception of objectivity is also done away with and the apparent is defined as indescribable either as Brahman (subjectivity) or as other than Brahman. According to the third definition, therefore, the world is an apparent modification of Brahman in the sense that, though not Brahman itself, it is yet not definable as anything else than Brahman. This highest point of view thus discards all duality and reduces the world-appearance to an ultimate inexplicability that neither *is*, nor *is not*, Reality in the strict sense.

Brahman is thus the unchanging reality in which Nescience causes the appearance of a changing world. In other words, Brahman is the fixed stage, as it were, on which the world-drama is enacted, or is like the permanent canvas in a cinema show on which Nescience projects the shifting scenes of world-history. And yet Brahman is much more than the fixed stage on the canvas for it is the light of Brahman as Consciousness or Intelligence that makes all changes significant and real. Hence in so far as the world derives both its significance or truth and its reality from Brahman as self-certifying Intelligence, Brahman is the ultimate ground of the world. But since the world is a world of change, difference and of objective contents while Brahman is unchanging, undifferenced and unobjective, it is not

Brahman as such but Brahman superimposed on Nescience that is the cause of world-appearance. In this aspect, i.e. as related to Nescience and as the cause of the world, Brahman is called *Saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara* as the creator, main-trainer and destroyer of the world. It follows that Brahman as *Īśvara* must be all-knowing as well as omnipotent as without the knowledge of all that is and without the power of creating all things, both ordinary and other than ordinary, *Īśvara* cannot be the creator of the world. It also follows that, as creator, *Īśvara* must also be immanent in all His creations as it is the *sattā* or reality of Brahman that invests creation with reality. Thus while the reality of His creations is derived from the *sat* or reality-aspect of Brahman as *Īśvara*, the intelligibility or meaning of His creations is derived from His aspect as *Cit* or Self-luminous Intelligence. Moreover, since Brahman as eternally accomplished reality is also of the nature of fulfilment, joy or *ānanda*, the values of things (i.e., their attraction or agreeableness) are a reflex of the *ānanda* or joy-aspect of Brahman. Brahman as *Īśvara*, in its triple aspect of Being, Intelligence and Joy, is thus both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The *Nyāya* view that *Īśvara* is only the efficient cause of the world, a mere world-architect and not its material cause, must therefore be rejected. Atoms cannot be the material cause of the world for the simple reason that whatever meaning and reality atoms possess are derivatives of the intelligence and reality of Brahman. Nor is the *Yoga* view of *Īśvara* as only the highest among individual *puruṣas* a more satisfactory conception. A highest so conceived need not necessarily be the creator of the world and so the *Īśvara* of *Yoga* will not explain the appearance of a world of objects. Further, a highest may be quite as much the highest in goodness as the highest in wickedness, and so the *Yoga* argument will cut both ways proving not merely a benevolent Lord but also a wicked Devil who excels in mischief and evil-doing.

Since the *Jīva* is unlike *Īśvara* as being neither all-



knowing nor omnipotent, nor as being the immanent reality in all things and beings, it follows that the Nescience which makes Brahman appear as world-creator or Īśvara is a more inclusive Nescience than that which causes Brahman to appear as individual finite beings of limited intelligence and power. In its pervasive collective aspect in which Nescience causes the appearance of a world in Brahman, it is called Māyā, while in its distributive, individual aspect in which it causes Brahman to appear as finite beings, it is called Avidyā. Thus while Brahman in relation to Māyā is Īśvara or the world-creator, possessing omnipotence, omniscience, etc., Brahman in relation to Avidyā, in its mode of antaḥkaraṇa, is an empirical self or Jīva of limited knowledge and power. Both Māyā and Avidyā are forms of Ajñāna or Nescience, but while Māyā is the cosmic Nescience that causes a world to appear in the undifferenced reality of Brahman, Avidyā is Nescience particularised as it were that causes Brahman to appear as a finite being limited by the created world.

Just as the Jīva is Intelligence appearing in the form of the antaḥkaraṇa or internal organ so is the knowledge of the Jīva a vṛtti or function of the antaḥkaraṇa. It is jñāna as an antaḥkaraṇavṛtti that distinguishes the Jīva's knowledge as a temporal mental event from Brahman which is non-temporal Intelligence. While the latter is knowledge in its svarūpa or intrinsic nature and is timeless, the knowledge of the Jīva, as a vṛttijñāna, is a mental event in time that reveals objects. In other words, the knowledge of the Jīva is the timeless Intelligence appearing through a temporal antaḥkaraṇavṛtti, a mental mode in time. The role of vṛttijñāna in the experience of the finite individual will be clear if we consider its function in relation to the states of waking experience, dream and dreamless sleep. That consciousness does not lapse altogether even in sleep is proved by the recollection one has on waking that one had a sound sleep. Such recollection in the form 'I slept soundly, I knew nothing' would not be possible if there were no awareness

during the sleep. And yet, unlike waking experience and dream, it was not awareness of any object. This means that in sound sleep there was neither any antaḥkaraṇavṛtti nor any distinct object revealed by it. Hence the experience in sound sleep was an avidyāvṛtti that revealed ajñāna as such, not modified yet into any objective mode, i.e., ajñāna as a potentiality of objective forms as distinguished from actual full-formed objects. In other words, while in dream and waking, knowing is an antaḥkaraṇavṛtti revealing objects, in sound sleep knowing is an avidyāvṛtti revealing bare ajñāna as the potentiality of objective forms.

Since Iśvara as creator of the world is Brahman itself appearing through Māyā or Nescience and Jīva is Brahman appearing through the limit of antaḥkaraṇa which is also Nescience in its non-pervasive, individual aspect, and since further the Jīva's experience is only antaḥkaraṇavṛtti revealing objects, it follows that the Jīva is intrinsically Brahman itself and that what we call Jīva's participation in the world is only a false appearance in Brahman. Hence the Jīva's bondage, i.e., its participation in samsāra or the empirical life and its vicissitudes, is illusory and unreal, its intrinsic unity with Brahman being the reality and its separation from it an unreal appearance. Hence the Jīva's freedom as identity with Brahman is eternally real—an accomplished truth which, under the influence of Nescience, appears as something to be accomplished or achieved. Liberation, therefore, as escape from the ills of the empirical life, is only the cancelling of what is false, the negating of what never is, just as freedom is only self-finding or rediscovering, and no doing or achieving in the strict sense. In other words, liberation is intuition rather than action, knowing rather than doing. Hence in a scheme of spiritual discipline, works (karma) as a process of achieving has no place, the really essential element in it being jñāna, intuition or realisation of one's identity with Brahman which alone can undo the illusion of separation. If any preparation is required for such intuition, it is the discrimination between



the eternal and the non-eternal, between the empirical and the transcendental, etc., such as is embodied in the sādhana catuṣṭaya, and also learning the real truth (śravana), interpreting its real meaning by the logical reason (manana) and meditating on the conclusion arrived at (nididhyāsana).

METAPHYSICS OF FALSE APPEARANCE—I

When we perceive a rope as a snake, or a mother-of-pearl as a piece of silver, we say we have perceived wrongly and we reject our cognition as a false apprehension. The question therefore arises, what is it that constitutes the falsity of the false apprehension? Is the epithet 'false' to be attributed to the apprehension itself, or to the content apprehended, or to both the apprehending and the apprehended? The present essay will deal with the principal Indian views of the question, and the enquiry will be confined to an exposition of the different views without any critical estimate which is reserved for a second essay to follow.

Since the false apprehending takes its character as false from the nature of the content apprehended, and since further the correction which follows is a rejection of the content and is never a denial of the psychic facthood of the apprehension, the nature of the false appearance relates primarily to the objective content rather than the subjective apprehending. Hence controversies in Indian philosophy, called the khyātivādas, centre round the nature of the false content, i. e., the status of the content which appears false rather than of the subjective fact of the apprehension itself.

There are six principal theories about the nature of the false appearance called respectively Asatkhyātivāda, Ātmakhyātivāda, Akhyātivāda, Anyathākhyātivāda, Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda and Satkhyātivāda. We shall consider these theories serially, explaining each view as clearly as possible and reserving a critical estimate of each for a second essay.

The Asatkhyāti view is professed by Śūnyavādi Buddhists

or *nihilists* who maintain the *voidness* or absolute nothingness of all experiences and their contents. Error, according to the nihilistic Buddhists, is the cognition of the *asat*, of the absolute nought. When the rope is cognised as a snake, the snake which is falsely cognised is *asat* (non-existent), an absolute nought. We must distinguish between an absolute *asat* and a relative *asat*, between absolute non-existence and relative non-existence. An absolute nought nowhere exists : it is without attachment to reality anywhere. A relative negation is only partially excluded from reality : it is non-existent in one place but exists in some other place.

A jar may be non-existent relatively, i.e., it may be non-existent in one place, but may exist in another place; or it may be non-existent at one time but may exist at some other time. But an absolute nought does not exist anywhere, or at any time, i. e., it is excluded from the whole of reality. A sky-flower is an absolute non-existent in this sense. So is a horned hare. A sky-flower exists nowhere and nowhen, and so does a horned hare. They are fictions of the imagination, absurd combinations suggested by the trickery of language—*alika* or imaginary, without any attachment to reality anywhere. Of such imaginary fictions (*vikalpas*), we may distinguish two grades, viz., (1) the factually non-existent, and (2) the logical impossible. Thus the horned hare is an absolute nought of the first type : it nowhere exists as a fact, but we do not perceive anything absurd in its existing. We may even suppose that nature may bring forth a horned hare in course of evolution, though till now it has no attachment to reality. A barren mother however illustrates the absolute nought of the second type : it not only is not existent but cannot but be so, contradicting as it does the very conditions of its attachment to reality. Now when the cogniser is in error, he cognises, according to the Buddhist nihilist, an absolute nought in one or other of the above two senses, for what he cognises is a combination of incompatibles which is without its parallel in experience. For example, when the cogniser perceives the rope as a snake,



what he perceives is not a snake only, but a rope that has appropriated to itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he perceives not a snake as such, but the rope-snake, a snake which is a rope as well—an evident absurdity. He thus perceives what nowhere exists: the snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

There is another Buddhist view, the Ātmakhyāti view of the Vijñānavādins, which rejects the nihilistic view of error as a contentless cognition that cognises nothing. The Vijñānavādins as subjective idealists repudiate the conception of cognition as the cognition of nothing. Such cognition, being cognition of nothing, must also be itself nothing. An error, they contend, which is itself indistinguishable from nothingness, must itself be nothing, i. e., must be not even error. Hence they accuse nihilists of denying the self-evident cognitive fact. Error is not the cognition of an absolute nought : it does not apprehend a non-existent blank. It cognises the cognitive fact itself, i.e., it cognises the psychic fact as a transcognitive object. Error thus arises from cognising the mental as an extramental real. Blue is the cognition of the blue, but the erring mind cognises it as the extramental blue. The psychic fact is thus mistaken for a transcendent meaning. What is cognised is only the subjective image, but this is wrongly taken to be the cognition of an external object. The Ātmakhyāti, i.e., the self-cognition of the psychic fact, is imagined to be the cognition of an objective trans-psychic reality. Hence error is not asatkhyāti, the cognition of a sheer nought, but is the cognition of the subjective state as an objective fact.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas who advocate the view known as Akhyāti repudiate both the Asatkhyāti and the Ātmakhyāti views of the Buddhists. They contend that error always involves a given element, the error arising, according to them, from a confusion of what is so given with the memory-image it calls forth. Hence error involves both representation and presentation—something

given or presented and some representation or image which the presentation calls forth. The error consists in the failure to distinguish between the perceived fact and the memory-image, in the non-distinguishing (*akhyāti*) between the presentation and the representation. In the stock example of the rope-snake illusion, there is a given element, viz., the presentation of the 'rope' as a generic 'this'. The generically given rope calls forth the image of the snake. The illusion consists in the non-distinction of the presented 'this' and the represented 'snake'. The non-distinction entails confusion and leads to the false judgment, 'this is a snake'. The two facts, the percept and the image, are thus confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as a consequence which practical experience negatives. The error is thus a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and numerical duality. Hence error is no positive experience: it is only negative non-distinction. Correction is the negation of this non-distinction: it is the assertion of the distinction through the cancellation of the confused non-distinction. As a matter of fact, there is no positive falsity in error anywhere. The cognition of the rope in its general outline as a 'this' is a fact, and is not sublated. The recollection of the 'snake' is also a fact, and correction does not deny its facthood. The objects of these experiences are also facts, and are not cancelled. The rope is not cancelled as a fact, nor is the reality of the elsewhere and elsewhen snake which is recalled negated. What is rejected is the non-distinction, the negative non-distinguishing between the perceiving and the remembering, or between the perceived and the remembered facts.

The Prābhākaras thus insist on a *given* or objective starting-point of all false cognitions and in this respect go beyond the subjectivism of the Ātmakhyātivādins who reduce the false cognition to a mere subjective fact illegitimately objectified. They however refuse to recognise any positive element in error, error being, according to them,



only negative non-distinguishing between the presented object and the represented image.

The Naiyāyikas who profess the Anyathākhyāti view here join issue with the Prābhākaras. The Naiyāyikas urge, as against the Prābhākaras, the intrinsic positivity of error as distinct from negative non-distinguishing or akhyāti. Every error, the Naiyāyikas point out, is a *single* complex experience, not two psychoses falsely confused and merely non-distinguished as Prābhākaras say. In the 'snake-rope' illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived 'this' appearing to be a 'snake'. Nor does correction cancel a negative non-distinction of two confused experiences. It rejects the single, composite experience in its entirety, the 'this snake' that was falsely perceived through the influence of the defects (of sense, media, etc.). The illusion is thus a unitary composite presentation of a this 'snake,' the 'this' being presented through the natural (laukika) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the 'snake' being also *presented* through the non-natural (alaukika) contact of the visual sense with the elsewhere-elsewhen perceived 'snake'. The resulting experience is thus a mispresentation of the snake-form in the locus of the presented 'this': a mispresentation of the 'this' externally presented in the form or character of the 'snake' extraordinarily presented. It is an error as being a unitary presentative experience of a presented 'this' in the form of an extraordinarily perceived 'snake' with which it is objectively unconnected. The snake is perceived as a real snake, and the snake-character or feature perceived in it inheres in an elsewhere snake, i.e., not in the locus of the 'this' which is presented to the eye by natural contact but in the 'snake' that exists elsewhere (e.g., in the jungle). The mistake or error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extraordinarily seen snake-character of the jungle-snake as inhering in the 'this' that is seen by the external sense, viz., the eye, by natural contact of sense and object.

The Nyāya Anyathākhyāti view thus differs from the Akhyāti view in the following respects:

(1) According to the Akhyāti view, an error is equivalent to two cognitions, while according to Nyāya, an error is a single composite experience.

(2) According to the Akhyāti view, the two cognitions involved in error are different in nature. One is a presentation, while the other is a representation with its memory-character lapsed or suppressed. According to Nyāya, however, these two are only predisposing conditions of the resulting cognition which is a single, composite, presentative cognition. Further these predisposing factors are themselves both presentative, one of these being the laukika or natural presentation of the 'this' through the ordinary, natural contact of the eye and the 'rope' that lies before it, and the other being the alaukika, non-natural, complicated presentation or vision of the snake through a non-natural contact of the eye with the elsewhere and elsewhen perceived 'snake'.

(3) Lastly, according to Akhyāti, error is no positive experience but is only negative non-distinguishing between two cognitions which are not in themselves false. According to Nyāya, however, error is a positive experience being a positive false unification of two experiences, one of which is an extraordinary perception of a past and distant object and the other an ordinary perception of a present and proximate object.

Hence error according to the Naiyāyikas involves a positive, false element, the false element in error consisting in a false relation between the otherwise real presentative contents themselves which are wrongly related.

We shall now consider the Śankara-Vedānta view of Anirvacanīyakhyāti which repudiates the Nyāya Anyathākhyāti view though admitting the positivity of error. Error, according to Śankarites, involves more than the experience of a false relation: it is the experience of a unitary false

content, not the experience of a false relation between real contents. The Naiyāyika's mistake consists, according to the Śankarite, in making error consist in the apprehension of a false relation only. But the relation is one with the relata it relates: the 'this snake' is an indivisible unity of 'this' and 'snake', a unitary whole which the Naiyāyika falsely splits into a 'this,' a 'snake-character' and 'a relation between the two.' We are not actually aware of any such plurality in the illusory cognition itself. Nor does the deliverance of the correcting experience point to any rejection of a false relation only. When we correct the illusion we reject the entire content, the 'this snake' in its indivisible unity, as a falsely perceived content. In other words, just as the illusion is the experience of a 'here and now' snake and not of 'an elsewhere, jungle' snake, so is the correction which follows on the discovery of the truth a rejection of the 'here and now' snake falsely perceived and not of a false connection only between a 'jungle' snake and the 'here and now' rope perceived as a 'this.' And the Śankarites thus conclude that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer nought as Asatkhyātivādins say, nor a cognition of an elsewhere reality as Naiyāyikas say. It is a positive experience and therefore is the experience of a positive content. A 'sheer nought', the absolute asat cannot be the content of a positive experience, while every error is a positive experience. But it is also not the experience of an elsewhere reality, for an elsewhere reality has attachment to reality, while the erroneous content is excluded from reality altogether as the deliverance of correction shows. When I correct the error I reject the snake absolutely and unconditionally. I say that the rope that I perceived to be a snake, *never was, never is and never will be* the 'this snake' I took it to be, that, in other words, it was not even a 'this snake' when I perceived it as such. Correction is thus a traikālika niṣedha, a rejection for all the three periods of time. It amounts, in other words, to an absolute denial or negation, i.e., the absolute exclusion of the perceived content

from reality. Correction thus brings out the real character of the illusory experience: it shows forth the illusion as the cognition of an unreal object, of an objective unreality. The cognition would be no cognition without an object cognised (for surely the cognition does not cognise itself). And yet the cognition is further revealed (in the correction) as the cognition of an object without a location in reality anywhere. The illusory cognition is thus the experience of a logical indefinable, i.e., of an objective or positive content which yet has no attachment to reality. Verily we may say that its *esse* is, and also is not, its *percipi*: as object of cognition it is other than the cognition which cognises it as object, and yet as cancelled and rejected it is revealed as lacking in any substantiality other than that of the cognition which reveals it. Here then we have something which is indescribable, which is positive and yet unreal, and which is neither the subjective experience itself nor definable as anything different from it.

We shall now conclude with an analysis of the Rāmānujist Satkhyātī view which rejects the Anirvacanīyakhyātī of the Sankarites and regards error as consisting in the apprehension of a partial truth as the whole truth. According to the Satkhyātivādins, error is neither the apprehension of sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object: it is simply the cognition of a partial feature as the only and the exclusive feature of an object. Thus when the rope is cognised as a snake, or a mother-of-pearl is taken to be a piece of silver, the cogniser perceives a real snake-feature in the rope lying before him or a real silver-character in the mother-of-pearl that shines before his eyes. He thus does not perceive nothing, nor does he perceive any elsewhere snake-character or silver-character, nor again any indescribable snake or indescribable silver. On the contrary, he perceives a real 'here and now' snake-character, or a real 'here and now' silver-feature, in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or unreal, but in considering the snake or



silver-character to be the only characteristic of the object lying before him and ignoring its other and more important aspects. This is why the cognition does not work in life and why the cogniser acting on the suggestion of such imperfect knowledge comes to grief in the practical affairs of life.

Comparing the above six views we note that while the Asatkhyātivādin makes error consist in the cognition of an absolute non-existent and the Naiyāyika makes it consist in that of the relatively non-existent, the Śankara-Vedāntin makes it consist in the experience of a logical indefinable which is neither existent nor non-existent. Further we find that according to Akhyāti and Satkhyāti views, error is no real experience in the strict sense: according to Akhyātivādins, error is only negative non-distinguishing of two positive and real experiences, while according to Satkhyātivādins, the so-called error cognises a real fact in the object and thus cognises no falsity in the strict sense. Besides, according to the four views, Asat-, Atma-, Anyatha-, and Anirvacanīya-khyāti error always involves a false content which is rejected. It may also be noted that both Satkhyātivādins and Anirvacanīyavādins make error consist in the cognition of a transcendent object. In other words, according to both, the 'snake' is other than the cognition of the 'snake'. But, according to Anirvacanīyavādins, the transcendent object has *apparent reality*: it lasts as long as the subjective cognition lasts and is generated along with the latter as its object of reference. According to Satkhyātivādins, however, the transcendent object has *empirical reality*; the snake-feature is generated in the rope along with the production of the rope and it continues even when the primary presentation merges into a fuller perception of the truth. In other words, the snake character does not disappear when the perceiver cognises the rope in its character as a rope.

METAPHYSICS OF FALSE APPEARANCE—II

(*A Critical Study*)

In the previous essay we have considered six different Indian Theories of False Appearance called *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda*, *Akhyātivāda*, *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Satkhyātivāda*, and *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*. Our treatment of these theories has so far been descriptive and explanatory. We propose in the present essay to discuss the first five theories critically from the standpoint of *Anirvacanīyakhyāti* which is the Sankarite view of the nature of a false appearance. We may say at the outset that we consider the Sankarite view to be the least unsatisfactory of the six different theories and that no account of false appearance can avoid the concept of the indescribable as the essence of a rejected content.

We have seen that the *Asatkhyātivādin* equates the false content to the simply unreal or *asat*. The false is what is not, what never, nowhere is. As the simply unreal, it is an absolute nought. A snake is or may be, but a snake which also is a rope is purely imaginary, an absurdity like a barren mother. It is thus not a fact at all, neither a subjective nor an objective fact, neither positive nor negative. The snake and its negation are facts, but the rope-snake is not even a negative fact. To err is to cognise this no-fact, to cognise what is not. Error is thus a cognition without content—a cognition that cognises nothing.

The obvious objection to this view is that it does not agree with the deliverance of experience. The false appears and as such is a content of experience. But an absolute nought cannot be an experienced content. To say that language effects the miracle of a contentless experience is to deceive oneself with mere words. The absurd may be suggested by the trickery of language, but a suggestion to think is not a completed thought. The false appears and appears as a completed content. How can an absolute



nought be a full-fledged content with a definite suggestion to the will ? The snake is not a nebulous appearance, an appearance in the making. It is complete in itself and suggests a course of action. How can a complete content be yet something nothing ? Further, the false content has causal efficiency. It produces effects on the cogniser. But a sheer nought cannot produce effects. Nor does correction lend support to the theory that the false is an absolute nought. A sheer nought can neither be affirmed nor denied, neither accepted nor rejected or negated. But the false is false in so far as corrected, i.e., negated and rejected. But a mere nothing cannot be rejected. Rejection is rejection of a positive content. To reject a nothing is like striking the empty air with a sword.

But how, it may be asked, may a rejected appearance be anything else than a mere nothing? Rejection is rejection for all time. When the snake is rejected, it is rejected for all time. We do not say that the rope was a snake, but now is no snake. We say on the contrary it never was and never can be a snake, that it was no snake even when it appeared as one. Therefore even when appearing, the rejected appearance is not. The appearance is the appearance of what is not. If the appearance proved any existent content, its rejection would not be unqualified and absolute. The content can not both be and be negated when appearing.

The Sankarites in reply point out that the objection rests on a confusion between positivity and reality. The appearance has positivity, but it lacks reality. The snake is a content of experience, it fills experience, but it is a content without reality, an unattached or floating appearance and as such indescribable. The unreality of the snake-appearance does not prove its absolute emptiness, its sheer nothingness. This is the puzzle of false appearance. It is a positivity without reality, an unreal objectivity, an unattached content. Without the concept of the indescribable, of unattached positivity, of a bhāvarūpamithyā false appearance is quite unintelligible. The Asatkhyātivādin's mistake



arises from his confounding the rejected appearance with the absolutely empty, with an absolute nought.

The Ātmakhyāti view, the Śankarite points out, is also equally unsatisfactory, even though free from the defects of the Asatkhyāti view. The Ātmakhyātivādin does not deny the content character of the false appearance, he merely rejects its objectivity, its extramentality. The false is not mere nothing. It is an experienced content, a cognitive fact. But it is a cognitive fact taken to be a transcognitive object, a mental event mistaken for an extramental reality.

The Śankarites point out that the Ātmakhyātivādin makes the same mistake as the Asatkhyātivādin, though in a different way. He is right in recognising the content character of the false appearance, but he contradicts the evidence of consciousness in denying to it extramentality or trans-subjectivity. The false does not appear as a mental content nor does rejection prove its subjectivity or internality. A pleasure or a pain appears as a subjective state and it appears as nothing else. But the false snake does not appear as a subjective state and it does not appear as anything else than a trans-subjective object. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the false cannot be treated as a psychic fact. As a matter of fact, the false snake appears as one with the external 'this'. How can an internal state appear as the external 'this snake'? The man who withdraws in fear avoids an external fact. He does not withdraw from a snake inside himself. Nor can it be said that rejection establishes the subjectivity of the false. Rejection cancels the snake as a false appearance. It does not posit it as a subjective fact. The identity of the snake and the presented 'this' being negated, the false snake is simply detached from the presented locus. But it is not thereby attached to the subject as its internal state. In fact, if the snake were an internal state it would not be overthrown by the cognition of the external rope. When we perceive the rope specifically as a rope, the snake-appearance is cancelled. But the rope is an objective fact.



How can the perception of an objective fact negate a non-objective, subjective state?

The Ātmakhyātivādin thus makes the same mistake as the Asatkhyātivādin. He propounds a theory that contradicts the deliverance of experience. The false is not a sheer nought, nor is it a mere subjective fact. It presents itself as trans-subjective and therefore must be taken as such. To deny the objectivity of the false appearance is to impugn the evidence of actual experience.

The Prabhākara-Mimāṃsaka theory of Akhyāti is also unsatisfactory according to the Śankarites. There is no evidence in consciousness that the false appearance is negative non-distinction. The Prabhākaras are right in recognising a presentative basis of the false appearance. The snake is no mere subjective image objectified and projected. It has a presented basis in the rope perceived generically as the 'this'. But the mistake of the Prabhākaras consists in ignoring the unity of the false appearance. According to them, the false is really two experiences non-distinguished and so confused as one unitary experience. We have not merely a presented 'this' but also a represented 'snake', but the two are not distinguished as two and the result is confusion. The error arises from a failure to distinguish, the failure to distinguish the perceiving from the remembering, the percept from the image. Hence error, according to the Prabhākaras, is no positive experience, it is only negative non-distinguishing. There is no real falsity anywhere. The presented 'this' is a fact and so also is the presentation. The represented 'snake' is also a fact and so also is the recollection of it. The error is a name for their non-distinction and confusion. This confusion leads to chaos in life and so the experience is rejected as false.

The Prabhākara view, the Śankarites point out, also runs counter to actual experience just as the two previous views. Actual experience does not show that the false appearance is mere negative non-distinguishing. Nor does experience bear out the Prabhākara contention that we have



two experiences instead of one experience. If the false appearance were merely negative, it would not induce a positive practical reaction such as withdrawing in fear. The merely negative cannot have a positive practical effect. Nor can the false appearance be anything else than a unitary specific content. A generic perceived 'this' could not produce a specific reaction like that of 'starting back.' If the specific reaction could be produced by a generic 'this', it could be produced by anything perceived as a mere 'this' such as a piece of wood or a stone. Nor can the specific reaction be explained by the recollection of the snake. The cogniser who starts back does not withdraw from a past snake. What he withdraws from is a snake cognised 'here and now', a snake cognised as one with the presented 'this'. The false appearance is thus not the 'snake' as such, nor the 'this' as such. It is the 'this' perceived as a 'snake'. It is the 'this false snake' that the cogniser withdraws from, not any elsewhere, elsewhen snake. The point to note is that the 'snake' is cognised in unity with the 'this' and sharing with the latter the reality of a perceived content. This could not be, if 'this' were perceived and the 'snake' were merely remembered. It is illegitimate to distinguish the 'this' and the 'snake' as perceived and imagined when there is no actual evidence in experience to warrant such distinction. Nor can it be said that the 'snake' is a memory-image with its image character suppressed. A memory-image with its past reference suppressed is no longer a memory-image and in the absence of what constitutes its essence as a memory-image we have no right to characterise it as a content of memory. Moreover non-distinction means absence of distinction, and distinction means reciprocal negation or bheda. But reciprocal negation, according to the Prābhākaras, is nothing else than the negated contents. Hence where the contents are present, their reciprocal negation or distinction also must be, and therefore there cannot be any absence of distinction in such circumstances. In the present case, since the distinct contents, viz., perception and recollection, are



present, their distinction must also be present by necessary implication. Hence the assumption of an absence of distinction is precluded by the circumstances of the case. Again, according to the Prâbhâkaras, every cognition *qua* cognition illumines itself. Hence there is no experience which is unaware of itself. This being the case, both the presentation and the representation must be aware of themselves as presentation and representation respectively. How then can the representation fail to appear to itself as a representation and thus fail to be distinguished from the presentation? Moreover, when the false appearance is cancelled, what is rejected or cancelled is a unitary positive content and not a mere negative non-distinction. Thus the experience of correction also proves a unitary positive object as the content of the corrected appearance.

While the Prâbhâkaras make the mistake of disrupting the unity of the false appearance and thus contradict the evidence of actual experience, the Naiyâyikas who advocate Anyathâkhyâti acknowledge both the unity and the positivity of the false content. The false appearance, according to the Naiyâyikas, is a complex unity resulting jointly from perception and recollection. It is in fact a single presentative content consisting in the presented 'this' in the form of the elsewhere real snake. The falsity arises from a mispresentation, in the cognition of the here and now 'this' in the form of an elsewhere real object. The presentation of the 'this', in other words, effects by a process of complication as it were a perception of it in the form of an object which is remote and distant.

The Sankarites point out that the Naiyâyika is right in stressing the unity and the positivity of the false appearance. But his analysis of it as a perceived 'this' in the form of an elsewhere real thing is open to serious objections. The 'snake' that is perceived as the 'this snake' is not apprehended as an *elsewhere* jungle snake magically translated before the cogniser. The actual testimony of consciousness does not bear out the Nyâya view of an elsewhere snake-

METAPHYSICS GF FALSE APPEARANCE—II

form getting mysteriously attached to the ‘this’ appearing before the perceiver. We perceive the ‘this’ as a snake, i. e., as a particular fact possessing the specific character of a snake, and not as an individual fact appearing in the guise of another. The Nyāya contention, that we have here some sort of extraordinary perception of an elsewhere, remote character in the locus of the ‘this’ that is apprehended by the eye, is untenable for the following reasons. The Naiyāyika holds that there is here in the first place an ordinary contact of the visual sense and the ‘this’ which produces an ordinary perception of the ‘this’. But with it is also produced a recollection of an elsewhere snake and the recollection serving as a connecting-link between the visual sense in ordinary contact with the ‘this’ and the snake-form of the elsewhere snake revived by memory brings about a *complicated* perception of the form of the elsewhere snake in the locus of the ‘this’. And thus is produced a complex qualified perception ‘This is a snake’, the ‘this’ being perceived by ordinary perception and the snake-character being extraordinarily perceived in the ‘this’ by an extraordinary contact through the recollection of the snake as the connecting-link. But the difficulty in the Nyāya view is that the facts adduced in support of it do not bear out the Nyāya theory. In the case of the fragrant sandalwood, the fragrance, the Naiyāyika holds, is cognised by the eye through an extraordinary complicated perception through the contact of cognition or knowledge. The ordinary perception of the sandalwood by the eye through contact with the visual sense revives the past experience of its fragrance, and this experience serving as the connecting-link between the eye and the fragrance produces a visual perception of the fragrance. This, however, is very far from being the actual case. Actual report of consciousness shows, the Śankarite argues, that we are not aware of perceiving the fragrance. As a matter of fact we are conscious of perceiving the sandalwood and we are aware of being *reminded* thereby of the fragrance. Thus the Nyāya view does not square with the

facts of experience. Moreover, the Nyāya theory, if accepted, will make inference psychologically impossible. Inference is knowledge mediated by the cognition of an invariable relation between a mark observed in a particular subject and something else of which it is a mark. The resulting knowledge is the cognition of this something else as the property of the particular subject in which the mark is observed. But if the perception of the mark were to produce a recollection of what it is a mark of, then this latter will at once connect itself with the observed locus of the mark through an extraordinary contact of cognition or knowledge. Thus we shall have an extraordinary *complicated perception* of the thing to be inferred through the contact of knowledge, and the appearance of the perception will prevent inferential cognition of the thing. For example, in the inference of 'fire' in 'the mountain yonder' from the observation of 'smoke rising from the mountain yonder', the 'smoke' being perceived will produce the recollection of its invariable associate 'fire'. But 'fire' as so cognised will at once connect itself with the 'mountain' as the observed locus of the mark through the cognitive contact of recollection so that we shall have a *complicated* perception of 'fire' in the 'mountain yonder' instead of an inference of it. The appearance of the perception will make the appearance of the inference impossible, for where the conditions of perception and inference are both present, it is perception that arises and inference does not arise because of the appearance of the perception.

It follows therefore that the presentation of the 'snake' is not due to any extraordinary contact of the eye with an elsewhere 'snake' through recollection or cognition as the connecting-link. The example of recognition cannot be given as a case in point. In recognition the perceived content is a sense-given fact. The past reference which qualifies the given fact is a matter of memory and not of perception. Anuvyavasāya or introspection in the Nyāya sense also cannot be cited as a case of extraordinary perception through the contact of knowledge. It is only Naiyāyikas who admit

introspection in the sense of *anuvyavasāya*. As this is not admitted by other schools *pratyāsatti* in the sense of an extraordinary contact of sense with a remote and distant fact cannot be proved by the doubtful example of *anuvyavasāya*. Further, cognition does not connect itself with a cognitum irrespective of its context. On the contrary its connection with the cognitum is subject to the context in which it was first cognised. But the snake that is perceived is perceived in the locus of the rope. The perceived snake is thus the 'here and now' snake and the 'here and now' snake (the snake as located in the present rope) was never cognised as such in the past. How then can a recollection of an elsewhere cognised snake serve as a connecting-link with a snake cognised 'here and now'?

Nor can the *Naiyāyika* say that the so-called extraordinary contact is only another name for the presence of certain defects. If *pratyāsatti* were a name for certain defects (*doṣas*), then the cognition resulting from such defects will be defective or false cognition. But the *Naiyāyikas* say that the perception of the snake is the perception of the form of an *elsewhere real* snake and not the perception of anything unreal. The *Naiyāyikas* contend that though the snake is real, its form qualifying the rope is an unreal qualifying of it. But if this be the case, then *Naiyāyikas* fail to show how real defects can produce an unreal qualification. Besides, defects presuppose their respective substrates in producing effects. Hence they can produce effects either in their substrates or in things which are in contact with their substrates. Defects therefore cannot have any efficiency in regard to objects unconnected with their substrates, i.e., with elsewhere objects with which neither the defects nor the substrates of the defects are in any way connected. It cannot be said that the defects are themselves the connections that connect the substrates with the so-called unconnected objects. If this be the case, there will be no errors of inference, since on account of defects all remote and distant objects will get into our experiences through defects as the connecting-links



and thus be perceived contents. Moreover, if defects be themselves contact of sense and object, then the errors of perception will be sense-produced, and not defect-born, and therefore cannot be called errors, strictly speaking.

There is also another difficulty in the Nyāya view of Anyathākhyāti. A cognition evokes practical reaction towards the object cognised by the cognition. If therefore the false experience were the cognition of a jungle snake it would not induce practical reaction towards a 'here and now' snake, i.e., a snake cognised in the locus of the rope. Nor will it do to say that the rope and not the elsewhere snake is the objective ground of the snake-perception. For the object and that which is cognised as the object cannot be different from each other. The object which appears in the cognition is the object that is cognised by the cognition. Since it is the snake that appears in the cognition as object, it must be the object of the cognition. The rope does not appear in the cognition and the rope therefore cannot be the object presented in the case in question.

The Naiyāyika may say, however, that the facts are not as they are stated. It is not a fact that the rope does not appear in consciousness at all. It does appear, as a matter of fact, as a generic 'this'. And the jungle snake also appears, but not in its total character as a jungle snake but as a bare snake-form detached from its original substrate and attached to the rope appearing in consciousness as a bare 'this'. And thus we have the complex, qualified perception, "This is a snake", or, "This has the form of a snake". The resulting cognition is thus the cognition of the real rope in its generic character as 'this' as qualified by the real snake-feature of an elsewhere real snake. The only unreal element in the complex whole is the relation relating the real snake-form to the substrate of the rope appearing as 'this'.

The Naiyāyika thus assumes, the Sankarite replies, an attributed relation between the 'snake-form' and the 'this'—an attribution which is without foundation in reality. But the actual testimony of consciousness does not bear out the

Nyāya view. When we reject the false appearance, we do not reject only the relation between the 'this' and the snake-form. We reject the snake itself as a false or a merely apparent snake. Further we reject the snake as one with the 'this', i.e., as forming one indivisible unity with it. As a matter of fact, there is no distinction in consciousness (as long as the illusion lasts) between the 'this' and the snake, the illusion continuing in the form "This, a snake" or "This is a snake". And when we correct the illusion we do not reject a mere relation, but the snake itself in its individual completeness as an unreal appearance. If the rejection were the rejection of an unreal relation, then it would be the rejection of nothing and would thus be without a positive content to be rejected.

The Nyāya view is also inconsistent with the nature of the practical reaction that follows in the wake of the illusion. When we perceive the snake, we withdraw from it in fear. This would never happen if the perception were of an abstract snake-character and not of a substantive snake. The perceiver reacts to what he cognises as a snake, and since the snake-form does not appear except as qualifying a snake it cannot be said that he perceives the rope as a snake. The snake-appearance thus proves the generation of an objective apparent snake in the locus of the rope.

That the snake-illusion cognises the rope in the character of an elsewhere snake is against the evidence of experience. There is no evidence to prove that the immediately apprehended snake is only the cognition of an elsewhere real snake-form of an elsewhere real thing. If defects could effect this miracle, why should they not effect the miracle of generating an objective apparent snake in the locus of the rope? Nor can it be said that the illusion cognises not the 'this' as a 'snake', but the 'this' as non-different from 'a snake'. This is against the deliverance of consciousness. It also contradicts the experience of correction. We do not reject 'non-difference from a snake', we reject the snake itself as a false and a merely apparent snake. And the same remarks



apply to the contention that the illusion cognises an elsewhere real snake. If this were so, correction would not reject the snake simply but would also posit it as real elsewhere.

The satkhyāti view of the Rāmānujists is also inconsistent with the actual deliverance of experience. The Rāmānujist holds that a false appearance is a real, partial feature in the object. But this partial feature is taken to be the whole truth about the object and this is why it is a false appearance. But the satkhyāti analysis misses the real point at issue. The partial feature is a real feature only as a partial element in the complex totality. It is however no real feature as the only and exclusive property of the object. Therefore as the only and exclusive feature of the object, the partial feature is no real fact at all. As a part which is also the whole, as partial and yet complete and exhaustive, it is thus a mere appearance which has no reality except as an object of the experience to which it appears.

Thus we arrive at last at the anirvacanīya or indescribable as the content of a false appearance. As appearing in consciousness, the false is other than the unreal (asatvilakṣaṇa). And yet as cancelled and sublated it is also other than the real (satvilakṣaṇa). It is thus other than the real and the unreal, i.e., the indescribable or the logically indefinable. The false, in other words, is what appears as eternally negated in the very substrate in which it appears. It may be added that the concept of the false is necessitated by the consciousness of rejection and the presumptive evidence which such rejection implies. Without the concept of the false, correction as rejection for all time is inexplicable. Thus the fact of rejection creates presumption in respect of objective false appearance. It may be further noted that the false appearance presupposes a substrate of reality so that the false never appears except in a substrate which is real. The false, in other words, is what depends on a substrate of reality for its appearance without at the same time possessing the same grade of reality as its substrate. This means that



the negation of the false appearance does not entail also the negation of the substrate in which it appears. The false therefore is a dependent apparent fact within a substrate of a higher, more durable reality.

NEGATION

WHETHER negativity or *Abhāva* may be an objectively real fact has been a moot question of philosophy, both Indian and Western. While Western philosophers with their predominantly positive outlook have generally favoured a subjective view of negation, amongst Indian philosophers we have advocates both of the subjective and the objective conceptions. Our task in the present paper will be to discuss some of the principal Western and Indian views of the question and incidentally to suggest how the different view-points may be combined into a more synthetic comprehensive theory which will be more in agreement with actual experience and will meet the requirements of the case.

Amongst Western philosophers who have discussed the problem of negation in some detail, the name of F. H. Bradley deserves special mention. Consistently with the western positivistic outlook on experience, Bradley subscribes to a subjective view of the negative judgment. Since negation, according to him, is no objective fact, there are no objective referents of our negative judgments, strictly speaking. "We might say that, as such and in its own character, it (logical negation) is simply subjective: it does not hold good outside my thinking. The reality repels the suggested alternation; but the suggestion is not any movement of the fact, nor in fact does the given subject maintain itself against the actual attack of a discrepant quality. The process takes place in the unsubstantial region of ideal experiment. And the steps of that experiment are not even asserted to exist in the world outside our heads." (Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, Book I, Ch. III, §13). Hence, according



to Bradley, the negation signified by a negative judgment does not answer to any objective exclusion or repulse. Negation is only the rejection of a subjective suggestion as incompatible with the given reality. There is no objective attack of a suggested quality nor any objective repulse strictly speaking: the whole process resolves itself into an ideal experiment, an ideal suggestion subjectively withdrawn as inconsistent with the nature of reality. We may say then that, according to Bradley, a negative judgment involves triple ideality. What the negative judgment affirms is an unknown positive ground of the rejection. This is the affirmative element in the negative judgment and this is what the judgment asserts as real, i. e., refers to reality. As such, however, it is not completely real for it qualifies reality only transformed and transmuted in a fuller context. But what the negation discards or excludes is not even an asserted ideality. What it excludes or rejects is a mere suggestion, i. e., something that is less than a judgment and lacks reference to reality. It is this subjective suggestion which is below judgment and therefore an ideality of the second order which the negation discards as ideal or merely subjective. Negation is thus the rejection of a double ideality, the idealisation of what is itself doubly ideal. Hence the negative judgment involves triple ideality. What it affirms or asserts is the unknown positive ground of the negation. This is the positive element which is referred to reality. The rest is ideal experiment. Hence the judgment, "S is P", reduces, according to Bradley, to the assertion, 'S is (an unknown) Q'. The rest is not judgment but suggestion or unreflected thought and its rejection. The so-called objective repulse does not exist anywhere except in our heads; there is no objective counterpart to the subjective rejection, no objective repulse or exclusion of B from A. The negative judgment in Bradley's view thus reduces to a negative answer to a positive question. A question is not an assertion or judgment; it is a mere enquiry with a suggested pointing. The answer "no" is the recognition of the imaginary character of



the suggested qualification. The question "Is that a snake?" involves no objective reference and the negative answer is the recognition of the subjectivity of the unferred suggestion.

Bradley's account of negation is deficient in two respects. In the first place, Bradley's view leaves no room for correction as a form of negation. A correction is negation of a complete belief. Hence it is more than the rejection of an unferred suggestion. Correction implies prior belief and therefore prior judgment. It is the rejection of an objectively referred idea as false. Secondly, Bradley's analysis does not provide any basis for the distinction between the true and the false negative judgment. Since the negative judgment has no objective counterpart to its negative element, the true and the false negative judgments share the same fate of a subjective suggestion or attribution subjectively withdrawn. But this is not how we distinguish between a true and a false judgment. The true judgment has its objective counterpart, i.e., qualifies reality even if transmuted and transformed. But the false judgment is without objectivity in this sense. But Bradley's analysis will reduce both the true and the false negative judgment to a false suggestion with nothing but an unknown positive ground as its objective referent.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas amongst Indian Philosophers also deny objective absence or negation. The assertion of absence, according to the Prābhākaras, is nothing but the assertion of the bare locus, i.e., of the location of the absence as bare or empty. The Prābhākaras point out that the cognition of the location together with a subjective idea of a possible qualification amounts to a judgment of negation or absence. The judgment "No jar on the ground" is nothing but the assertion of the bare ground with the idea of the jar as a possible qualification. Hence there is no objective referent to the negative element in a negative judgment. In a similar way Bergson also denies real absence. The judgment of absence expresses our baffled recollection or expectation of a possible qualification.



Hence the cognition of absence is nothing but the cognition of a present object as qualified by a baffled feeling.

In a more metaphysical way the Sāṅkhya philosophers also deny the conception of real absence. Since the effect, according to Sāṅkhya, is pre-existent in the cause, there is no such thing as real emergence or real cessation. Hence what is, always was and always will be, and what we call emergence and cessation are only names for the transition from non-manifest to manifest being. The distinction between presence and absence is thus one between manifest and subtle being, between the potential and the actual. Hence everything potentially at least is in everything and there is no such thing as the absolute absence of anything in any other thing.

Diametrically opposed to all these views is that of the nihilistic Buddhist. For Bradley, Bergson, Prābhākara, etc., negation is disguised affirmation. For the nihilistic Buddhist, affirmation is disguised negation. To judge is to affirm, to assert reality, says Bradley. To judge is to negate, to deny, says the Buddhist. Judging is thus describing unreality or śūnya by negation of the negative. It is characterising the characterless, determining the indeterminate. Being is the negation of non-being and determinate being is the negation of indeterminate being. Judging is determining, defining the indefinite through the process of negation of negation. Definite position is the negation of indefinite position which itself is the negation of indefinite negation. Hence every affirmation is the defining of the indefinite, of the absolute negative or śūnya by negation of the negative.

The Naiyāyika realists reject both these extreme views. According to Nyāya, both presence and absence are objective facts. Facts may be either positive or negative. An affirmative judgment asserts a positive fact or presence, a negative judgment asserts a negative fact or absence. To affirm is to assert the inclusion of something in something else, the positive qualification of a thing by another thing or attribute of a

thing. To deny is to assert the exclusion of some thing from something else, the absence of some thing as a qualification of something else. The objective counterpart of an affirmation is the presence of one thing in another just as the objective counterpart of a denial is the absence of a thing in another thing. There is, however, a difference between presence and absence in one respect. Presence has no direct reference to absence, but absence is absence of an elsewhere, elsewhere present thing in a locus which is also a present object. Thus absence presupposes presence, but presence does not require absence as a point of reference. But in spite of this, absence has its own intrinsic being as a knowable, its svarūpasattva as a known objectivity, though it lacks positivity (bhāvatva) as well as sattāyoga or relation to the universal of being. Absence, in other words, has its intrinsic being as negativity as distinguished from presence which possesses intrinsic being, positivity, as well as (in the case of substance, quality and action) being as sattāyoga or relation to the universal of being. Absence as presupposing a present locus and a present negatum excluded from the present locus is related both to the present locus and the present negatum the exclusion whereof from the present locus constitutes its character as absence. The relation of absence to the present locus and the negatum is viśeṣaṇatā or adjectivity—a relation other than that of samyoga or samavāya. An objection to the Nyāya view is that adjectivity is an indirect relation presupposing a primary relation either of contact or inherence. Thus a thing becomes adjectival to another thing either by being in contact with it (the book on the table, etc.) or by inhering in it (the brown colour of the table). The book is an adjective of the table, through the relation of contact with it in space, and the brown colour qualifies the table by inhering in it. But no such intervening relation can be supposed between absence and its present locus or negatum. Contact is a relation that holds between substances, but absence is not a substance and so cannot be in contact either with its locus or the object that is absent. Further



absence cannot inhere in the locus and thus become its adjective or viśeṣaṇa for just as when brown inheres in the table the table becomes brown (inherence being a constitutive relation), so also if absence were to inhere in the locus, the locus would become absent. The Naiyāyikas say, all this is spurious reasoning. Adjectivity is a mediated relation only as holding between positives. It is, however, not mediated when holding between a positive and negative. Experience is the evidence here, just as experience is our evidence in respect both of external, disjunctive relations like contact and internal, conjunctive or constitutive relations like inherence. Experience shows that adjectivity is direct as between a positive and a negative just as experience also shows that it is indirect, mediated as between one positive and another. A negation is a direct determinant (svarūpasambandha) of its positive negatum and locus whereas one positive is adjectival to another only through an intervening relation of inherence or contact. A further objection to the Nyāya view is that adjectivity is a new relation not comprised within the seven kinds of knowables (padārthas) recognised by the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas are niyatapadārthavādins—believers in a fixed number of padārthas or knowables. Hence they are not at liberty to add to their number of padārthas according to their convenience. The Naiyāyikas say in reply that adjectivity is no additional eighth padārtha. It is a form of svarūpasambandha. By a svarūpasambandha is meant a sambandha or relation in which one or other of the relata or sambandhis is itself the sambandha or relation. Negativity (abhāva) is adjective or viśeṣaṇa of its locus and negatum and this means that abhāva itself is its relation to the locus and the negatum. Abhāva is one of the seven padārthas or knowables and as abhāva itself is its relation of adjectivity or viśeṣaṇatā, no additional eighth padārtha has really been assumed.

Since negation presupposes a real negatum as well as a present locus, pure negation either as negation of śūnya or nothing or of the sadvilakṣaṇa or contra-real as well as

niradhiṣṭhāna negation or negation without a location of the negation must be rejected as absurdities. This disposes of the Buddhist view of asatkhyāti as well as the Śankarite view of anirvacanīyakhyāti as the rejected contents of a corrected falsity. The Śankarite reduces the false to an indescribable objectivity which is other than reality, i.e., to a positivity without attachment to reality, while the Buddhist makes it into a sheer nought and therefore incapable of filling the false experience. But both these views contradict the intrinsic nature of a negative fact. And the same is true also of the Śankarite negation of the entire universe as false appearance: it is negation without a locus of the negation, negation from nowhere, the whole universe being the negatum and there being nothing left to serve as a location of the negation.

According to the Naiyāyikas, therefore, a bare negation is an absurdity, negation being always the negation of a real negatum from a real locus. And the negation is itself a real exclusion answering to an objectively real repulse of a real negatum from a real locus. There are thus negative as well as positive facts, real exclusions as well as real inclusions. Change, e.g. is an objective fact entailing real emergence as well as real cessation. And emergence and cessation are not intelligible unless there is objective absence. An entity emerges only in so far as it was not and begins to be. Thus antecedent absence is a necessary presupposition of real emergence. Cessation similarly is cessing to be, vanishing, being resolved into nothingness. Hence emergent absence is a necessary presupposition of cessation. And just as change and emergence and cessation are facts of experience, so also the difference between one real and another entailing reciprocal absence or reciprocal negation. And lastly, absolute absence is also a fact of experience quite as much as emergent, antecedent or reciprocal absence. There are not merely conjunctions and disjunctions in experience, but also absolute incompatibilities, dissociations or disjunctions that hold for all time. All these prove not



merely the objectivity of negativity but also its objective reality.

A brief reference to the Śankarite view will not be out of place here. The Śankarites accept the Nyāya realistic view of negation as suitable for the conduct of life, but they reject its ultimate truth or reality. Negativity is a trans-subjective fact, and no mere subjective suggestion or imagined possibility. But the objectivity of negation does not prove its ultimate reality or truth. The mistake of the ordinary realist is to equate the real with the objective. But the objective cannot be real for the obvious reason that it is in itself self-contradictory and incoherent. To be outside the mind is not necessarily to be real just as to be in the mind is not necessarily to be unreal. The criterion of reality is consistency and not objectivity, and in so far as the idea of the objective is not internally self-consistent it cannot constitute the criterion of the real. Absence is objective just as is presence, but the objectivity of absence no more proves its reality than the objectivity of a present fact such as the object of an illusion. And thus while both negatives and positives are objective facts and so possess empirical reality, they lack ultimate truth and reality as being internally discrepant and so self-destroying. They are thus contents without reality, indescribable appearances, eternally cancelled objectifications of unobjective consciousness as the subject in which they appear.

There are different classifications of negative judgements in Indian philosophy from different points of view. According to Nyāya, e.g., negation is either samsargābhāva or anyonyābhāva. Samsargābhāva is defined by the Naiyāyikas as the denial of a predicate of a subject in some relation other than the relation of identity and is either prāgabhāva, antecedent negation, or dhvamsābhāva, emergent negation, or atyantābhāva, absolute negation. Thus, when we say the ghata or jar is not yet (in the lump of clay) we assert the antecedent absence of the jar in the clay before it is produced or made out of the lump of clay. This is absence

of a ghata in the clay prior to its production and is without beginning. When we break an earthen jar to pieces, there is emergent absence of a jar in the pieces and we say that the pieces are no more a jar. This is dhvamsābhāva or emergent absence resulting from the destruction of a thing. It has beginning in time, it comes into being through the destruction of the jar, but is without end, for the same jar cannot be made again, i.e., one that is numerically identical with that which is destroyed. When, however, we say that there is no colour in air or no consciousness in a material substance, we deny colour or consciousness absolutely without any restrictions as regards time, past, present and future. We mean, i.e., that there never was, is or will be consciousness in material substance. This is atyantābhāva or absolute negation according to the Naiyāyikas. . Besides the above three which are different varieties of samsargābhāva where the denial is in some relation other than the relation of identity, the Naiyāyikas also recognise anyonyābhāva or reciprocal negation which is only denial of identity of the predicate with the subject. When we say, e.g., 'colour is not sound' the judgment does not assert the non-existence of sound but only denies the identity of sound with colour. Anyonyābhāva is also called bheda or difference.

Other forms of negative judgments are also recognised in Indian systems, e.g., anyatara-abhāva, ubhaya-abhāva, viśiṣṭa-abhāva, etc. Anyatara-abhāva is illustrated in the judgment 'A is either not-B or not-C'. Here one or other of 'B' and 'C' is denied of the subject 'A' but not both. Ubhaya-abhāva is illustrated in the judgment 'A is neither B nor C'. Here both 'B' and 'C' are denied of the subject 'A'. Viśiṣṭa-abhāva or qualified negation is the denial of a qualified predicate in respect of a subject. E.g., when we say 'there is no red rose on the table' what we deny in respect of the table is a qualified substance, viz., the rose (substance) qualified by the quality of red. Viśiṣṭa-abhāva or qualified negation thus may mean the negation of the substance, or the negation of the quality qualifying the substance, or the



negation of both the substance as well as the quality. Thus the judgment 'there is no red rose on the table' will be valid if there be no red rose on the table but some other red flower. It will also be valid if there be no red rose on the table but a yellow rose instead. It will also be valid if there be no red rose but a white lily instead.



PART II

LOGIC



CLASSIFICATION OF COGNITIVE STATES ACCORDING TO NYĀYA

ACCORDING to Nyāya, cognition is the wider class that includes under it the subclasses of (a) Pramā, valid cognition, (b) Apramā, non-valid cognition, and (c) also a kind of Tṛtīya prakārakam jñānam, tertiary type of cognition, i. e., cognition which is pre-logical and is neither true nor false. The Naiyāyika uses the term jñāna, buddhi, pratyaya synonymously for cognition in general. The Nyāya classification of cognition is not accepted by all systems. Mīmāṃsakas, e.g., reject the Nyāya conception of pre-logical or tertiary cognition. The Mīmāṃsakas point out that tertiary cognitions or cognitions which are of the nature of supposals or doubts provisionally entertained are not cognitions at all. According to Nyāya, every cognition is in the beginning samśayarūpa, i. e., of the nature of a provisionally entertained supposition lacking certainty till confirmation by valid evidence. The Mīmāṃsakas point out that there is no cognition which is not a judgment and which therefore does not entail reference to reality. In other words, every cognition is of the nature of an assertion claiming to describe reality in its own way. It is therefore either true or false in so far as its claim is confirmed by evidence or overthrown thereby. There is no room in experience for a tertiary kind of cognition which is neither true nor false. A tertiary cognition is thus a psychological myth so that the only two kinds of cognition possible are valid and non-valid cognition.

The Naiyāyika includes under valid cognition the forms of knowledge arising from the different pramāṇas. As the Naiyāyikas recognise four different pramāṇas or sources of knowledge, the knowledge which results from the four sources is also of four different kinds, viz. perceptual know-



ledge resulting from pratyakṣa or perception as a pramāṇa or source of knowledge, inferential knowledge or anumiti resulting from inference as a source of knowledge, upamiti or knowledge resulting from upamāna or comparison as a source of knowledge, and śabda jñāna or knowledge resulting from verbal communication as a source of knowledge. As against these different kinds of valid knowledge the Naiyāyikas recognise bhrama (error, sensory or inferential), saṃśaya (doubt) and smṛti or recollection as forms of knowledge of the non-valid kind. Smṛti of memory is not regarded by the Naiyāyikas as a form of valid knowing (1) because in the first place, it is not consciousness of the real (anubhūti) and therefore does not enrich experience which all knowing does, and (2) because the validity or otherwise of the recollection depends on the truth or otherwise of the primary experience which the recollection reproduces so that the recollection as such is not independently a source of knowledge or the opposite.

Saṃśaya or doubt also is not valid knowing according to the Naiyāyika because it lacks the finality or adhyavasāya of a valid cognition. In saṃśaya or doubt there is an indecision of the mind, a sort of wavering between two or more alternatives and no definite assertion of one to the exclusion of the rest. It thus lacks reference to reality and is of the nature of an entertained hypothesis, i.e., a hypothesis entertained for the purpose of logical scrutiny along with other rival hypotheses. In knowing, however, there is no wavering, no oscillation of the mind from one alternative to another, all knowing being of the nature of a decision made in favour of one as distinguished from all other possible alternatives. Thus saṃśaya lacking an essential character of valid knowing should be regarded, according to Naiyāyika, as a form of non-valid knowing though not necessarily as invalid knowing, non-valid knowing including, according to Naiyāyikas, all forms of knowing other than valid knowing.

THE DOCTRINE OF PRAMĀNA IN
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

THE correct equivalent of pramāṇa in English is 'source of valid knowledge' as distinguished from valid knowledge itself. In Indian philosophy a distinction is made between valid knowledge itself and the instrument or efficient cause of such knowledge. The word pramāṇa is used as the equivalent of valid knowledge while the word pramāṇa is used as the equivalent of the instrument or effective cause of such knowledge. Pramāṇa is defined as pramāṇakaraṇam pramāṇam, i.e., that which is the karaṇa or instrumental cause of pramāṇāna or valid knowledge is pramāṇa. What, then, is a karaṇa or instrumental cause? A karaṇa is defined as vyāpāravat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam, i.e., that amongst the sum-total of causal conditions which is vyāpāravat or operates towards the production of the effect and is an asādhāraṇa or uncommon condition of the effect is the instrumental cause or karaṇa of the effect. Thus space, e.g., is a sādhāraṇa kāraṇa of a physical effect. Time also is a general condition of all sorts of effect. Space and time are thus general conditions of effects and are therefore not to be regarded as the instrumental cause of any specific effect. Take, e.g., the case of perception. It is a mental event in time and is therefore an effect. As an effect it depends on time. But time also is a condition of other effects as well. Therefore time is not a peculiar or uncommon condition of perception as an effect and therefore is not the instrumental cause of perception. Again proximity of the object to the sense through which it is perceived is a condition of perception. But it is an inert condition and does not operate towards the production of the effect, i.e., is not vyāpāravat, an operative condition (the test being expenditure of energy). Therefore such proximity is not also an instrumental cause of perception. Vyāpāra is defined in Indian logic as tajjanya tajjanya-janaka, that is, vyāpāra is the operation which being karaṇajanya results in the production

of the final effect. Consider, e.g., the effect of felling a tree. The wood-cutter is the *kartā*, the causal agent, and the axe is his instrument; with the stroke of the axe the wood-cutter brings about the final effect, i.e., the felling of the tree. *Vyāpāra* is the intervening operation of the instrument (the stroke of the axe) through which the final effect is brought about. The *karaṇa*, therefore, is that among the assemblage of the conditions which is peculiar to the effect produced and is actually efficient in the production of the effect. In Indian philosophy *karaṇa* is also defined as *carama kāraṇa* or cause *par excellence*. In the instance of perception, e.g., the *karaṇa* is *indriyārtha sannikarṣa* according to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*, i.e., the stimulation of the respective sensibility by the object of the perception in question. The *sannikarṣa* or stimulation is the *vyāpāra*, the *indriya* or sensibility concerned is both *vyāpāravat*, actually operative, and *asādhāraṇa* or peculiar to the effect, viz., the particular perception of the object.

In *Nyāya* and some other systems *pramāṇa* as the instrumental cause is distinguished from the resulting knowledge which it produces. E.g., in perception the *pramāṇa* is sense-stimulation by the object, and sense-stimulation, if not physiological, is at least an infra-psychic process and causes an experience on the psychic level, viz., perception of the object. The *pramāṇa* therefore differs in this case from the resulting *pramāṇa jñāna*. In some other Indian systems, however, e.g., the Rāmānujist system, *pramāṇa* or knowledge itself is regarded as *pramāṇa* (*pramaiva pramāṇam*), i.e., the cognition is itself considered to be the cognitive process or *pramāṇa* which certifies it. In other words, one and the same thing in one aspect is regarded as *pramāṇa* and in another aspect as the resulting knowledge.

The question, 'what is knowledge?', has to be considered first before the question of the sources of knowledge can be fruitfully discussed. This raises the vexed question of knowing of knowing or the possibility of introspection. We cannot ascertain the nature of knowledge unless we know

knowing. How, then, is knowing known? According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, knowing is viśaya-prakāśa-svabhāva, i.e., it looks beyond itself at an object other than itself, it does not look at itself. How, then, can knowing know itself? The Naiyāyika answer is that knowing is known in a secondary act of retrospection or anuvyavasāya. Thus in some cases the primary act of knowing an external object is followed by a secondary act directed to the primary act of knowing as its object. The primary act looks not at itself but at the external object, e.g., at a jar as in 'Ayam ghaṭa'—'Here is a jar'. The secondary act called anuvyavasāya which is a numerically distinct act and follows on the primary act called vyavasāya also looks not at itself but at the primary act as its object. This is how knowing of knowing is possible though all knowing is self-transcendent and looks beyond itself (viśaya-prakāśa-svabhāva) and is not svaprakāśa or self-luminous. Prābhākaras, however, point out that according to the Nyāya view the secondary act reveals the primary act not as subjective knowing but as an object known, not as apprehension but as appreßended and thus misses the true character of knowing as knowing as distinguished from an object known. If I perceive a rope as a snake I do not perceive the rope in its true character and my perception of the rope as a snake is a false or erroneous cognition of it. For a like reason my knowing of the knowing not as subjective knowing but as an object known is erroneous or false and fails to reveal the true character of knowing as a subjective process. Further, since nothing can be asserted as real without valid evidence and since all evidence in the last analysis resolves itself into the testimony of consciousness, the Naiyāyika must substantiate his doctrine of anuvyavasāya by the evidence of consciousness. Thus the Naiyāyika proves the vyavasāya or primary act of knowing by the evidence of a secondary act of anuvyavasāya which apprehends the primary knowing act as its object. But how can the secondary act of anuvyavasāya certify the primary act without being itself certified? Thus the Nyāya theory



requires an *anuvyavasāya* of *anuvyavasāya* for every act of *anuvyavasāya* as its evidence and thus lands one into an intolerable infinite regress.

The *Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas*, therefore, reject the *Nyāya* theory of cognition as *viśaya-prakāśa-svabhāva* and offer instead their own theory of self-illumination of cognition. According to them, every cognition is not merely awareness of object but also and at the same time awareness of awareness and also an awareness of the subject that is aware, each in its distinctive form. Thus every act of knowing involves, according to *Prabhākaras*, not merely the knowing of an object but also knowing of the knowing and the knowing of the knower, each being known in its own distinctive character and form. Thus while the object is known as the *samvedya* or apprehended, the knowing is known as *samvit* or subjective apprehension and the subject knowing is known as the apprehender or *vettiā*. The *Bhāṭṭa*, *Mīmāṃsakas*, however, reject both the *Prabhākara* and the *Nyāya* view. How can knowing be both *kariā* and *karma* at the same time ? It is like an agent acting on himself or a razor cutting itself. Therefore, according to the *Bhāṭṭas* there is neither immediate knowing of knowing as *Prabhākaras* say, nor a retrospective knowing of knowing as *Naiyāyikas* say. In fact knowing is known only inferentially from its effects on the object known. Knowing, in other words, is *jñātaīā liṅga anumeya*, is inferentially known from the mark of known-ness it generates in the object. Thus the object in itself or the object not known or unknown differs from the object as known. From this known or content-character of the object we have an inferential cognition of the act of knowing that has generated this character of known-ness in the object.

The Sankarite Advaitins, however, reject all these views. The mere fact that knowing is knowing distinguishes knowing from all objects known and for this reason knowing cannot be either retrospectively or immediately or again inferentially known as an object. And yet since it certifies

all objects it cannot be itself uncertified. Knowing, therefore, is the same thing as knowing of knowing and is never an object known. In other words, the nature of knowing is such that though not an object either to itself or to any other numerically distinct act of knowing, it yet never remains unknown.

ENUMERATION OF PRAMĀÑAS

THERE are different enumerations of the sources of knowledge in the different system of Indian philosophy. The Cārvākas, e. g., recognise only one source of knowledge, viz., perception, while the Buddhists as well as the Vaiśeṣikas recognise two sources of knowledge, viz., perception and inference. The Jainas and Sāṅkhya philosophers as well as the Rāmānujists and the Dvaitins amongst the Vedāntins recognise perception, inference and sabda or verbal testimony as the three sources of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas besides recognising perception, inference and śabda also recognise upamāna or comparison as a fourth different source of knowledge. The Prābhākaras amongst the Mīmāṃsakas recognise five pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, verbal communication, comparison, and arthāpatti or presumption, while the Bhāṭṭas amongst the Mīmāṃsakas recognise a sixth source viz., anupalabdhi or non-cognition as a source of our knowledge of absence, besides the five of the Prābhākaras. The six sources of knowledge recognised by the Bhāṭṭas are also accepted as pramāṇas by the Advaitins amongst the Vedāntins. The Bhedābheda school of Bhāskarācārya recognises two more pramāṇas, viz., aitihya or tradition and sambhava or mathematical reasoning or calculation of chance and probability besides the six of the Advaitins.



PERCEPTION AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

PERCEPTION, as has been shown above, is regarded as a valid source of knowledge by all Indian systems. We have, therefore, now to consider the nature of perception as a source of knowledge. Before we go into the definition of perception given in different Indian systems we have to consider first how perception or *pratyakṣa* differs from *parokṣa*, i.e., mediate or indirect knowing.

The Buddhist distinguishes perception from mediate knowing by means of the kind of object which it reveals. Thus, according to the Buddhists, perception is *salakṣaṇa viṣaya*, i.e., has the unique (*sui generis*) momentary real as its object while intellection or mediate knowing is *sāmānya lakṣaṇa viṣaya* or has the abstract universal as its object. The distinction between perception and intellection is thus *viṣayagata*, i.e., arises from a difference of their respective objects. In the one case, i. e., perception, the object is the *salakṣaṇa* real, i.e., that which is the *lakṣaṇa* or mark of itself and of itself alone and is not the mark of, and therefore has no anything in common with, any other thing. In intellection, i.e., indirect knowing, however, what we know is not the real in itself but certain universals constructed by thought on the basis of our perceptions of unique reals.

The *Naiyāyika* joins issue with the Buddhists here and so do the *Mīmāṃsakas*. They point out that the Buddhist's view of perception as *salakṣaṇaviṣaya* does not square with the facts of experience. We perceive particulars, we also perceive universals. In fact, most perceptions of particulars are also perceptions of universals inhering in particulars. Nor is the Buddhist view of intellection as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa viṣaya* necessarily true in every case. Just as we infer universals as also we infer or have indirect knowledge of particulars as well. The distinction between perceiving and mediate knowing is, therefore, not *viṣayagata*, strictly speaking; it arises from a difference of their respective *karaṇas* or instrumental causes, and is thus *karaṇagata* and

not viṣayagata. Thus, pratyakṣa or perception is jñānā-karaṇaka jñāna, i.e., knowing that results from something other than knowing as its karaṇa or instrumental cause while parokṣa or mediate knowing is knowing mediated by knowing as its instrumental cause, i.e., knowing caused by knowing. In pratyakṣa, e.g., the effective cause or karaṇa is stimulation of sensibility by the object. The sense-stimulation is not itself knowing though it causes the knowing which we call pratyakṣa or perceptual cognition. In inference and other forms of indirect knowing, however, the resulting knowledge is mediated by some other knowledge. Thus in inference the knowledge of the conclusion is mediated by the knowledge of a universal proposition, vyāptijñāna, and pakṣadharmatā jñāna, i.e., the knowledge of the mark as a dharma or property of the pakṣa or the subject of inference. Similarly in sābdajñāna, the communication has to be apprehended as also the meanings of the words as learnt from usage will have to be recollected before the communication can have any intelligible sense and convey information to the hearer.

The Advaitins, however, differentiate pratyakṣa from parokṣa in a different way altogether. Neither viṣaya nor karaṇa, according to them, tell the full story. The question has therefore to be tackled from a different angle. All empirical knowing is knowing of the unknown. It is the unknown in fact that can really be known, the ajñāta that can be jñāta. The know cannot be known over again strictly speaking. Ignorance, therefore, is a necessary presupposition of knowledge, and direct and indirect knowing may be distinguished by means of the kind of ignorance which each removes or cancels. Pratyakṣa or direct knowing removes the ignorance that envelopes the svarūpa of the thing and thus reveals the thing in its distinctive individual character, while indirect knowing removes the ignorance that veils the bare existence of the thing and so reveals the thing as a bare fact without its distinctive individual character. It may be noted that this is only a restatement



of the Buddhist view without any commitment as regards the dynamic pluralism and phenomenalism of the Buddhist. It is also an advance on Buddhism in so far as it stresses an important aspect of all knowing as cancellation of ignorance.

DEFINITION OF PRATYAKṢA

PRATYAKṢA is defined by the Bhāṭṭas as *indriyārtha sannikarṣa janyam pramāṇam pratyakṣam*, that is, perception is knowledge which results from the stimulation of sense by the object. The objection to this definition is that it does not provide any criterion for distinguishing *pratyakṣa* as valid perception from *bhrāma* or sense-illusion. The Naiyāikas, therefore, define *pratyakṣa* as knowledge which results from the contact of object and sensibility and is *avyabhicārī*, i.e., does not contradict the nature of the object. This definition also is open to the following objections. In the first place, it does not distinguish perception as valid knowing from *niradhiṣṭhāna jñāna* or hallucinations which have no external or extra-mental objects as their source and therefore cannot be said to deviate from the nature of the objects they reveal. Secondly, both the Bhāṭṭa and Nyāya definitions do not apply to the eternal 'now' of the Absolute Experience. Divine knowledge is direct presentative knowledge of past, distant and future. It is not indirect inferential knowledge. Absolute Experience, in other words, is a sort of all-inclusive specious present in which all past, present and future are immediately present in one unitary presentative experience and yet Absolute Experience is not any *āgantuka jñāna* or knowledge as a generated event in time. Therefore, the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsaka definitions of perception are too narrow being subject to *avyāpti doṣa* as not applying to the 'eternal now' of Divine Perception.

The Naiyāyika, however, points out that in expounding his doctrine of *pramāṇa* he is concerned with it as it operates in human experience. The all-inclusive Divine Experience

does not require any *pramāṇa vyāpāra*, the application of a logical apparatus, for ascertaining the nature of reality, but human beings as finite individuals have need for such an apparatus, and therefore, the definition has application only to human experience and its application to reality. Even then, however, as the Buddhists point out, the Nyāya and Mimāṃsaka definitions fail to distinguish perception both from the conceptual elaboration of the purely sense-given data and from such abnormal experiences as hallucinations, dreams and objectless presentations due to sensory defects, such as the perception of two moons. Therefore, the Buddhists define perception as *kalpanā apodham abhrāntam jñānam*, i. e., as that cognition which is free from conceptual elaboration and is different from sense-illusions, hallucinations, dreams and objectless cognitions. What, then, is *Kalpanā*? According to the Buddhists, it consists in the forming of a general image and a concept immediately following on the sensation produced or caused by the *svalakṣaṇa* momentary real. As the process of naming accompanies the conceptualising act, it may also be called the act of naming the sensation produced. The usually recognised five different kinds of *kalpanā* involved in *pratyakṣa* of the *savikalpa* or judgmental type consist either in identifying objects which are different or in differentiating objects which are essentially identical. Thus *kalpanā* is either *dravya kalpanā*, or *jāti kalpanā*, or *guṇa kalpanā*, or *karma kalpanā*, or *nāma kalpanā*. E. g., when I perceive the object before myself as Kṛṣṇa and say 'Here is Kṛṣṇa before myself, I perceive the object by means of a name. This is *nāmakalpanā* or judgmental perception through a name. The name is a sound, a puff of breath and is not the person before myself. And yet the name passes as the thing named, i.e., though the name and the thing are different, they appear identified in the perceptual judgment. 'That is Kṛṣṇa standing before myself'. Similarly, in the judgment, "Venu-manayam", 'that is Kṛṣṇa with the flute', the flute and Kṛṣṇa are different, though they appear as one in the act of

perception. It is thus dravya kalpanā. 'Gopo'yam' 'He (Kṛṣṇa) is a cowboy', i.e., of the class of cowboys. This illustrates jāti kalpanā. The jāti is not different from the vyakti, the universal is not different from its particular instances, and yet is predicated of the particular instance, viz., Kṛṣṇa as subject as if it were different. In 'Śyāmo'yam', 'He (Kṛṣṇa) is of a dark complexion', Kṛṣṇa and his complexion are not different and yet are made to appear as different through the act of predication. Lastly, 'Gāyati ayam' 'He (Kṛṣṇa) is singing or playing on the flute', illustrates karma kalpanā. The act is not different from the agent acting and yet the singing or the flute-playing is made to appear as different through the act of predication.

BUDDHIST, NYĀYA AND OTHER INDIAN THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

PERCEPTION, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of sense, the pure sensation of an efficient point-instant of reality and is absolutely devoid of the constructions of the understanding. It is therefore the bare moment of pure sensation or sense-intuition and is thus unutterable and not knowledge in the strict sense. The Buddhists reject the Nyāya and other definitions of perception as knowledge originating in, or caused by, sense-object contact. Their main objection to such views, is that they define perception by reference to its origin and misses its intrinsic nature. In all perception there must be an element of novelty, i.e., a felt addition to our experience. Such novelty belongs only to the first moment of sensation. It is therefore the essence or core of a perception. What passes as perception ordinarily and is regarded as such by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and other realists under what they call savikalpa pratyakṣa or judgmental perception is not perception at all. It is the original sensational core followed by the construction of an image of that object and by an act

of identification of the image so constructed with the given in sensation. In the judgmental perception, 'this is a cow', the 'this' is the sensational core and is unspeakable in itself and the element 'cow' is a general concept constructed by the understanding and expressed in a mnemonic image (a connotative name) and identified with the given sensation by an act of imputation. The Nyāya and other realists consider both the pure sensation (*nirvikalpa*) and the judgmental perception to be sense-perception and caused by sense-object contact. The Buddhist, however, excludes all judgmental element from perception as such. The senses do not judge, they only present the real which is the pure affirmative element in perception. It is the understanding that elaborates the presented element into a known object by means of a concept. An empirical perception thus involves both the receptivity of sense and the spontaneity of the understanding and therefore is not pure perception. Pure perception is nothing but presentation as such without imaginative and conceptual elaboration. It is the bare datum in its immediacy. Perceptual judgment is a further elaboration, the interpretation of the datum by thought-construction. The perceptual judgment is thus an interpretation of the given datum, which is perception proper, by the concepts of substance (*dravya kalpanā*), of universal (*jāti kalpanā*), etc. This is how a perceptual judgment transforms the non-significant datum into a significant knowable object. Perception does not know though it apprehends, while judgment knows but only by distorting what it apprehends. A judgment of perception is of the form ' $X=A$ ' where X , the unutterable sensation, is identified, by imputation, with A , a concept and a mnemonic image, produced by the spontaneity of the understanding on the wake of the given sensation. The judgmental perception, therefore, is not perception at all but cognition of a thought-construct on the basis of a pure sensation. It is the uttering of the unutterable by means of a concept and a mnemonic image. The subject of the judgment is the datum in its immediacy and as such is un-



utterable. The predicate is an intelligible concept. Judgment is the act of predication, i.e., the interpretation or mediation of the unutterable immediacy by an intelligible concept and a name and is so far a deviation from, or distortion of, the given in its immediacy.

The Sanskrit equivalent of the term 'judgment' is *adhyavasāya*. It means a decision, or a verdict as an act of volition, i.e., a decision in regard to identification of two objects which are essentially different. It is thus cognition not of reality but of a phenomenon. In Sanskrit poetics (*alaṅkāra śāstra*) the term *adhyavasāya* is used as an assertion of the identity of two things which are not identical, i.e., a metaphorical assertion as distinguished from an express comparison as in a simile. A perceptual judgment is in this sense an assertion of similarity between things which are dissimilar, i.e., between the unique point-instant of sensation and the universal concept or image which the understanding constructs on the wake of the given sensation. As Stcherbatsky says, "the point-instant of reality receives in such a judgment its place in a corresponding temporal series of point-instants. It thus becomes an enduring object in time and owing to a special synthesis of consecutive point-instants becomes an extended body", and, getting all its sensibles and other qualities, appears as a universal.

Of the *kalpanās* or constructions involved in judgment the principal or fundamental is *nāmakalpanā*. Conception consists in expressing the sensation in terms of what is utterable, i.e., expressible in a name, as distinguished from the pure sensation which is the thing-in-itself as the subject of judgment which is unutterable. Thus conceiving may be regarded as naming, conceiving being possible through naming and naming being possible through conceiving. The predicate in a judgment is thus the utterance of the unutterable subject by means of a concept expressed in a name and the different kinds of predicates answering to the different kinds of thought-construction in judgment are thus the different varieties of names. Thus we have

answering to *nāmakalpanā* that variety of a name which we call a proper name. (A proper name as answering to a concept is itself a kind of universal that applies to the object named not as a point-instant of reality, but as a series or continuum of point-instants regarded as an enduring object). Similarly *guṇakalpanā* is predication of quality-names, *karmakalpanā* is predication of action-names or verbs, *jāti-kalpanā* is the predication of common names, and *dravyakalpanā* is the use of the names of substantives as predicates. E.g., when we say 'That is a horned animal', the horn, i.e., a substantive-name, is regarded as a predicate of the subject 'that'.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas give a different account of perception. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas there is no intervening image between knowing or perceiving and the object known or perceived, perceiving or knowing, according to them, being a direct apprehension of the reality. The difference between judgment and non-judgmental perception consists in a qualified and a non-qualified cognition of the object perceived. Substance, quality, action, universal, etc., are not thought-constructs as the Buddhists say but ultimate irreducible forms of reality as objective material of cognition. We have direct apprehension of these ultimate objects through different forms of sense-object contact. Thus in the case of a substance the perception of it is due to *samyoga* or contact of the substance perceived with the corresponding sense through which it is perceived. In the case of a quality qualifying a substance the *sannikarṣa* or contact is *samyukta-samavāya*. The quality is related to the substance by the relation of *samavāya* or inherence, the substance is *samyukta* or in contact with the particular sense concerned. Therefore the sense is also related to, or in contact with, the quality qualifying the substance through the mediate relation of *samyukta-samavāya*. In the case of a universal similarly the corresponding contact is either *samyukta-samavāya* or *samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*. Thus in the case of the universal of a



substantive reality such as 'ghaṭatva', 'jarness', the sannikarṣa or contact is samyukta-samavāya through which the universal is perceived. Thus 'ghaṭa' or 'jar' is samyukta or in contact with the sense and the jarness is related to the jar by the relation of samavāya or inherence and thus through samyukta samavāya or the relation of inherence in that which is in contact with the sense, in perceiving the jar we also perceive the jarness inherent in the jar. In the case of the perception of universals of qualities or actions, the particular contact or relation involved is samyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Blue, e.g. is a quality and blueness inheres in the blue as its universal and blue again inheres in the blue substance. We perceive the substance through the relation of contact with a particular sense, the blue of the blue substance through relation of samyukta samavāya or inherence in that which is in contact with the sense and the blueness of the blue through the relation of samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, i.e., through inhering in an inherent character of the substance which is in contact with the sense. In the case of ākāśa or ether and the perception of sound a restriction must be made. Sound is a quality of ākāśa as substance and the sense of hearing has as its physical basis the cavity of the ear which is ākāśa itself as limited by the size of the ear-cavity. Therefore there cannot be any contact or samyoga between the sense of hearing and its physical basis and the substance of which sound is a quality. The particular sannikarṣa here, therefore, is samavāya. Sound is thus perceived because of its inherence or samavāya in ākāśa a limited portion of which is the cavity of the ear and the universal of sound or śabda is perceived through samaveta samavāya, i.e., the universal of sound is samaveta or inherent in a particular sound which particular sound we perceive through its inherence (samavāya) in ākāśa and in perceiving the particular sound through samavāya we also perceive the śabdavta or universal of sound which inheres in the particular sound through the relation of samaveta-samavāya.

As regards samavāya we perceive it through the relation

of adjectivity or through the relation of samyukta viśeṣaṇatā. Inherence does not itself inhere in the relata which it relates for that will land us into a infinite series of inference of inference, etc. Therefore the relation of inference to what it relates is viśeṣaṇatā or adjectivity which is a variety of svarūpa sambandha, the svarūpa or essence of inference being its relation to the relata it relates. Hence in perceiving through the relation of contact (samyoga) the relatum which inference relates we have a perception of the inference also by the relation of samyukta viśeṣaṇatā, i.e., inference is a viśeṣaṇa or distinguishing character of the relatum and the relatum is in contact with sense and in perceiving the relatum through sense-object contact we also perceive the inference which distinguishes the relatum.

Abhāva similarly is perceived through the relation of samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā. Abhāva or negativity is related to its location (anuyogī) and the content which is negated in the location (pratiyogī) by the relation of viśeṣaṇaiā which is a variety of svarūpa sambandha and in perceiving the anuyogī through the sannikarṣa of contact or samyoga we have also, through samyukta viśeṣaṇatā, a perception of the abhāva or absence that characterises the locus. Thus in perceiving the table in which there is no chalk we also perceive the 'withoutness' (the absence of the chalk) that characterises the table.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do not recognise samavāya as one of the ultimate knowables (padārthas) as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do. Instead of samavāya they will have tādātmya or identity in the sense of bhedasahiṣṇu abheda or non-difference that admits of some difference. Therefore, where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas speak of samyukta-samavāya, samavāya samaveta-samavāya, samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā, etc., the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas will have samyukta-tādātmya, tādātmya, etc., as the corresponding sannikarṣa in sense-perception. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, savikalpa perception is viśiṣṭa jñāna or qualified perception, i.e., a perception in which one padārtha or knowable is perceived as an adjective of another. Thus when a substance is perceived



as qualified by a quality or an action or a motion, or a particular is perceived as an instance of a universal, or a locus is perceived as characterised by an absence, we have judgmental or relational perception. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that a necessary presupposition of such relational perception is the antecedent perception of the relata and of the relation individually and separately. Such perception of substance, quality, universals, inherence, etc., in their separate individuality is nirvikalpa perception or non-judgmental experience. Such perception may not be a psychological antecedent of judgmental experience, it may not be possible to point to any such non-relational experience as a psychological fact, but it must be assumed as a necessary prius of our relational experiences. Just as the unconscious has to be assumed to explain certain gaps in our conscious life though we are not conscious of the unconscious, so the nirvikalpa or non-relational has to be assumed as a necessary prius of relational experience as the latter cannot be explained without the former.

The Mīmāṃsakas, however, accept the nirvikalpa not merely as a logical prius but also as a psychological antecedent of our relational experience, though, according to the Mīmāṃsakas the difference between savikalpa and nirvikalpa is a difference of degree rather than of kind, the nirvikalpa being less differentiated, less articulate than our savikalpa experience.

Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, however, reject the Buddhist view that the savikalpa is a construction of the understanding and therefore void of truth. The savikalpa, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc., answers to real relational characters of objects and is not a superimposition of thought-constructs *ab extra* on an intrinsically non-relational manifold. For the Naiyāyikas, the relational as well as the non-relational represent different stages of knowing rather than of being so that though in the order of being there may not be relations without relata or *vice versa*, in the order of knowing relations and the relata

are first apprehended in themselves before they are apprehended as qualifying one another. It is clear from the above that if reality is essentially non-relational (a non-relational dynamic manifold as the Buddhists say, or a non-relational undifferenced essence of pure presentative consciousness as the Advaitins say), then the relational consciousness of the non-relational reality will be more or less a construction of the understanding and will so far be a distorted representation of its intrinsic nature. Hence both for the Buddhists and for the Advaitins savikalpa consciousness or judgment (and also inference as the further extension of one judgment through another) will be knowledge of phenomena as distinguished from reality. Thus the movement of experience from the nirvikalpa or non-relational plane to that of the savikalpa or relational will be a falling away from truth and reality. For the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas (and also for the Sāṅkhya philosophers for whom relational forms are real evolutes of Prakṛti as the original non-relational background of objective reality) nirvikalpa, i.e., non-relational, and savikalpa or relational judgmental experience are not negatively related as according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. On the contrary, the relational forms being not the impoverishment but rather the fuller and more developed forms of the non-relational experience, the latter is only a less adequate and less articulate apprehension of what is apprehended more clearly and distinctly and more in accordance with its developed intrinsic nature in savikalpa or relational experience. Thus the advance from the nirvikalpa to the savikalpa is not a falling away from truth as the Buddhists and the Advaitins will say but a marked gain in clearness and distinctness of apprehension.

The Rāmānujists, it may be noted in this connection, do not admit any experience, or any reality of which we have experience, to be non-relational either in the Buddhist or in the Advaitin sense, reality and our experience of it being relational all through. And yet the Rāmānujists distinguish between savikalpa and nirvikalpa perception, though in a



sense different from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas or the Buddhists. According to the Rāmānujists, what we call nirvikalpa experience is relational experience of the first order as for example when we say, 'this is a cow'. Here the 'this' perceived by the sense is judged as an instance of the universal of 'cowness' so that the experience is an experience of the 'this' (through its relation to the universal of a cow, an experience, in other words, of the 'this') through the relation of universal and particular. Compared and distinguished from this primary relational experience which is what the Rāmānujists call nirvikalpa pratyakṣa, we may also have secondary relational experience or relational experience of the second order as when we say 'this *also* is a cow.' Here the primary relational experience of the 'this' as a cow is mediated by previous relational experiences of cows, i.e., one relational experience is interpreted by means of other relational experiences so that the experience in question is a relational experience of the second order and is savikalpa or relational *par excellence* as compared to the primary relational experience which is a relational experience of the first order.

It may be observed in this connection that whereas for the Buddhist savikalpa perception is judgment entailing knowledge of the given by means of conceptual elaboration and thought-construction and therefore not apprehension of reality but only knowledge of phenomena, for the vaiyākaraṇas or grammarians all perception is relational perception involving judgment and naming and there is no such thing as nirvikalpa or non-relational perception. Between these two extremes we may place the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṅkhya philosophers, the Rāmānujists and also the Advaitins who recognise both nirvikalpa and savikalpa pratyakṣa, though according to the Naiyāyika the nirvikalpa is more a matter of inference and is not an object of introspection as a psychological antecedent of savikalpa and, according to the Advaitins, the savikalpa is a falsification, through superimposed relations, whereas the nirvikalpa-

is the non-relational reality presented in aparokṣa anubhūti or nonmediate apprehension.

CLASSIFICATION OF PERCEPTION

PRATYAKṢA has been classified into different classes from different points of view.

(a) One of these classifications—that between nirvikalpa and savikalpa—we have already discussed about.

(b) According to another classification, pratyakṣa is either vahīḥ pratyakṣa (external perception) or mānasa pratyakṣa (internal perception) or yogaja pratyakṣa (intellectual intuition).

External perception is of five kinds through the five different external senses, eye, ear, etc. Each of these has its own proper object. Thus through the eye we have perception of colours, etc., but not of sounds. Through hearing again we perceive sounds, not colours, etc., and so on.

Mānasapratyakṣa is perception through the internal organ or mind and consequently it consists in the perception of our own internal states of pleasure, pain, etc.

Yogaja pratyakṣa is intuition of past, distant and future objects, independently of sense-object contact, through concentrated meditation and focussing of attention.

It may be noted in this connection that besides the five kinds of external perception and internal perception of our mental states as a sixth kind, the Mādhva philosophers regard memory as a seventh kind of perception as vision or direct apprehension of the past, the dispositions of the past experiences acting as a connecting link between the present and the past. In other words, according to the Mādhva, the past lives in the present (*cf.* Bergson) as disposition through which we have an immediate contact with the past and thereby a perception of it in the form of memory.

It may also be noted that the Buddhists also recognise four kinds of perception. Thus according to them the first



moment corresponding to the Svalakṣaṇa is a pure sensation. It corresponds to the external perception of other Indian systems. It differs from them as being absolutely non-conceptual. Before the understanding works on the pure sensation and transforms it into a judgment there follows on the pure sensation a mental apprehension of it which is analogous to it as being direct, intuitive and non-conceptual. This is mānasa pratyakṣa, the sensation apprehended as mental according to the Buddhists. Thus while the first, i.e., the pure sensation, is a sensuous sensation the second is the apprehension of the pure sensation by the understanding and is therefore mental sensation. The Buddhists also recognise yogī pratyakṣa in the sense of non-sensuous intuition, i.e., an intelligible intuition which is neither sensuous sensation nor mental sensation. It is the timeless intuition of all that is and is a kind of omniscience. The Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra schools recognise saṃvedana or introspection as a fourth variety of perception, every act of consciousness being, according to them, also consciousness of consciousness or self-consciousness.

(c) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas distinguish between laukika pratyakṣa and alaukika pratyakṣa, or perception through laukika sannikarṣa or natural contact of sense and object and perception through alaukika sannikarṣa or non-natural, i.e., extraordinary, contact of sense and object. Thus ordinary perception of substance, quality, etc., is through the natural contact of samyoga, samyukta-smavāya, etc. Here the process is objectively determined and there is nothing extraordinary or out of the way in the resulting perception or the conditioning sense-object contact. In perceiving the table, e.g., through the relation of contact or samyoga we also perceive the colour of the table through the objective relation of samyukta samavāya, i.e., inherence in that which is in contact with the eye. But in certain other cases we have an extraordinary contact in some way not intelligible in the pattern of the normal objective movement of experience as the contact is brought about not by an objective relation

but through a subjective conditioning factor. Thus in the perception of the fragrant sandalwood by means of the eye there is no normal contact of eye with the fragrance of the fragrant sandalwood. In this case the visual appearance of the sandalwood revives the fragrance in memory and the subjective recollection brings on the contact of the eye with the fragrance of the sandalwood that is seen. The process here corresponds to what is known as complication in Western psychology, and in it an objective contact is brought about by a subjective process of recollection. The same is the case in ordinary sense-illusions, e.g., in the case of the snake-rope illusion where the snake-character (*sarpatva*) of the jungle-snake revived in memory is brought into contact with the eye apprehending the coiling thing before it resulting in the perception of the coiling thing seen as an instance of the universal of snake-character (*sarpatva*). These are cases of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* where *jñāna* or subjective cognition brings on an objective contact of sense and object. *Yogī pratyakṣa* or *yogaja pratyakṣa* is another variety of extra-ordinary perception, according to the *Naiyāyika*, in which the contact with the past, the distant and the future object is brought about not through ordinary *sannikarṣa* of *samyoga*, *samavāya*, etc., but through the subjective power of *yoga* as sustained concentrated attention. A third variety of *alaukika pratyakṣa*, according to the *Naiyāyika*, is *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* where the sense, in contact with a universal, thereby comes in contact with all the particulars, past, present, and future, under the universal so that in perceiving the universal through ordinary sense-object contact we also have perception of all the particulars subsumed under the universal through the extra-ordinary *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. This also is without any parallel in ordinary experience and is therefore an extra-ordinary kind of perception.

In 'Vedānta Paribhāṣā', a distinction is made between *jñānagata pratyakṣa* and *viśayagata pratyakṣa*, i.e., between a percept or an object perceived and the perceiving of the obj. ct. The difference between perceiving and the percept,



i.e., between perceiving an object and an object perceived is explained as follows. Since, according to the Advaitins, the ultimate reality is Consciousness or Caitanya, what we call knower, knowing and known are Caitanya or Consciousness limited by the forms of the knower or subject-consciousness, limited by the form of knowing and limited by the form of the known. For the sake of brevity we may call them respectively subject-consciousness, subjective-consciousness, and object-consciousness. Subject-consciousness or consciousness as knower is antaḥkaraṇa-avacchinna caitanya, i.e., consciousness limited by the form of the internal organ or mind. Subjective consciousness or consciousness as knowing is antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti-avaochinna caitanya or consciousness as limited by, i.e., as appearing in the form of, a temporal mental mode. Object-consciousness is consciousness limited by the form of the object known. We have a percept or an object perceived when the subject-consciousness coincides with the object-consciousness and becomes completely one with it. We have perceiving as distinguished from the percept when the subjective-consciousness or consciousness as a mental mode exactly coincides with the object-consciousness. The Advaitins also distinguish sākṣī-pratyakṣa or the perception of the witnessing Intelligence from empirical perception. It is knowing of knowing but not knowing of knowing in the Nyāya or Buddhist sense of internal perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa) which is a temporal mental event. It is, on the contrary, timeless knowledge of all temporal knowing acts as temporal and is a necessary presupposition of all such acts.

FALLACIES OF PERCEPTION

SOME of the fallacies of sense perception are mentioned in Sāṅkhyakārikā (Kārikā 7). There the illusions of sense are regarded as arising either from defects in the objects of perception or defects of the media of perception or defects of sense or other internal causes and are regarded as being either of the nature of mal-observation or of non-observation. Thus when the objects to be perceived are beyond the range of a sense (atidūrāt) or in too close proximity to it they are not perceived. Objects are also not perceived or misperceived when the relevant sensibility is not in order or there is inattention in the perceiver. Nor are objects perceived which are too minute for perception or are separated from the sense by a barrier, e.g., a wall. Nor are objects perceived when their perceptibility is over-powered by a stronger force or when they are mixed up with objects of a similar nature. E.g., birds flying very high in the sky are not seen because they are beyond the range of vision (atidūrāt). Similarly the ointment on the eye is not perceived because of its close proximity to the eye. Again when the sensibility is not in order there is no perception. Thus the deaf does not hear nor does the blind see. Similarly when the mind is otherwise engaged as in absent-mindedness there is no perception of objects immediately in front of the perceiver. Atoms again are not perceived because they are too minute for perception. When there is an intervening barrier, e.g., a wall, the objects behind the wall are not perceived. Again when the perceptibility of objects is overpowered as, e.g., the light of the stars by the light of the sun (as in daytime) they (i.e., the stars) are not perceived. Also when an object gets mixed up with other objects of the same kind, e.g., a drop of water in a lake, it becomes lost to perception. Lastly, it is added, when the preceptible characters remain only potential or non-manifest they are also not perceived, e.g., curd in milk.

The above are mainly cases of non-observation which



also sometimes lead to mal-observation but the cases of mal-observation mentioned as such by Indian philosophers are the following. A man perceives the white conch-shell as yellow because of a disordered liver and consequent jaundice. Again in uncoordinated binocular vision a man sees two moons instead of one. In the case of the snake-rope illusion what happens is that the rope is observed only in its generic character, and as its specific nature is not observed there is revival by similarity of the form of the snake. Here non-observation of the specific character leads to mal-observation.

CĀRVĀKA CRITIQUE OF INFERENCE AND OTHER PRAMĀÑAS

PERCEPTION being the only source of knowledge, according to the Cārvākas, they argue, those who prove the existence of soul, of God and of the other world by means of inference are refuted with the refutation of inference as a source of knowledge. That inference as a source of knowledge cannot be established will be obvious from the following considerations, say Cārvākas.

Inference is the process by means of which we pass from the perception of a mark or sign in the subject of the inference to the existence of something else in the said subject on the basis of an invariable relation between the said mark and the thing which is inferred. The subject in respect of which we infer something is called the 'pakṣa'. The sign or mark by means of which we infer the inferent in the subject is called 'hetu', 'sādhana', 'liṅga' or 'gamaka', and that which is inferred by means of the mark in the subject, i.e., the inferent, is called 'sādhyā', 'gamyā', 'liṅgi' etc. The invariable relation between the mark or hetu and the sādhyā or inferent is called 'vyāpti', 'niyama,' 'avinā-bhāvasambandha,' etc. It is to be noted that the vyāpti relation does not cause inference simply by virtue of its existence but only by being subjectively apprehended or

known. E.g., when we infer fire in the mountain yonder from the perception of smoke in the mountain yonder, a necessary condition of our being able to make the inference is not merely the objective vyāpti or invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire' but also our subjective knowledge of this objective relation. Savages of cocoanut island have no prior knowledge of smoke and fire. When they are brought for the first time into the proximity of the yonder mountain and perceive smoke rising therefrom, they will be unable to infer fire because of the absence of knowledge of the vyāpti or invariable relation between smoke and fire. Hence vyāpti as such does not cause inference but vyāpti jñāna or the subjective knowledge of the objective invariable relation. How, then, is the knowledge of vyāpti or invariable relation possible ? It cannot be perception or pratyakṣa. Perception, (pratyakṣa) is either external perception (bahih pratyakṣa) or internal perception (mānasa pratyakṣa), i.e., perception by the external senses (eye, ear, etc.), or perception by the internal sense or mind. Now external perception cannot cause the knowledge of an invariable or universal relation. The external senses can be stimulated only by particulars which are present and stand in close proximity to the senses. They cannot be acted on by the non-existent past or future objects nor by objects that are remote and exist beyond the range of the senses. But the universal relation between the mark and the inferent holds not merely between present particulars but also between past, distant and future instances of each. Nor can internal perception apprehend such an invariable relation for the obvious reason that internal perception depends on external perception, and the mind cognises as the objects of its internal perception nothing else than what external perception has made known. Nor can we say that knowledge of this invariable relation consists in the apprehension simply of the general essence of this relation as distinguished from its particular embodiment in concrete instances. For then there will always remain an uncertainty as to whether the particular instance in a



particular inference is in reality a concrete embodiment of this general essence.

Nor can inference be the source of the knowledge of this universal relation. For, this inference like the first will require the knowledge of another universal relation which again will require another inference through another universal relation and so on, thus landing us into an infinite regress of inferences.

Not can śabda pramāṇa or authoritative testimony communicated by language be the source of our knowledge of the universal relation. For, according to Kaṇāda and his followers, the Vaiśeṣikas, śabda or authoritative testimony is no independent third source of knowledge but is a form of inference in disguise, i.e., inference based on the trustworthiness of the speaker. Besides, knowledge caused by verbal communications itself presupposes inference. When we hear certain words and grasp the meaning of the words spoken as conveying some information, the entire process, on analysis, resolves itself into the following steps. There is, in the first place, the words apprehended by hearing as sounds. Thereafter an apprehension of the objects to which the words refer through an apprehension of the connection between the sound representing the words and the objects they stand for. The knowledge of this connection is based on our knowledge of social usage of such words in certain contexts. Therefore the extension of the meanings of words used in past contexts to present and future contexts involved in the understanding of any verbal communication is of the nature of an intellectual leap implying inference. The sound itself is not the thing signified but is only inferred to signify it in accordance with past usage. Nor can the authority of Manu and so-called other seers be invoked to ensure the truth of the universal relation conveyed by verbal communications. For the *ipse dixit*, or the bare dogmatic assertion of a Manu or any other seer does not amount to a valid assertion or logical truth.

Again, if authoritative testimony is to be accepted as

our only source of the knowledge of a universal proposition, then where a man had no chance of knowing a universal relation such as that between smoke and fire from an authoritative source, he will be debarred from inferring fire on seeing smoke.

Nor again upamāna or comparison can be said to be the source of our knowledge of universal relation. For, according to Nyāya, upamāna consists in applying a name to the thing which is so named by means of a comparative statement. Its function, therefore, is restricted to applying names to the objects named by the names through the knowledge of a comparative statement and not in causing the knowledge of any universal relation or vyāpti.

Further, the invariable relation or vyāpti which causes inference is defined as a nirupādhika relation, i. e., an unconditional invariable relation not determined by any extraneous condition, observed or unobserved. Therefore vyāpti can be established only if we dispose of all upādhis or extraneous conditions, observed or unobserved, that are likely to vitiate the vyāpti relation. But this is not possible by means of perception. Absence of perceptible conditions may be perceptible, but imperceptible conditions, the unobserved and unobservable factors can be known only by inference and therefore the absence of such imperceptible conditions can also be known only by inference. And thus we are involved in circular reasoning, viz., that inference presupposes vyāpti and vyāpti presupposes inference.

Further, an upādhi is defined as a condition that is in symmetrical invariable relation with the inferent or sādhya but not an invariable concomitant of the hetu, sādhana or mark. E.g., the relation between smoke and fire is an unconditional invariable relation but the relation between fire and smoke is a conditional (aupādhika) relation, invariability of the relation between fire and smoke being dependent on the presence of a condition, viz., greenwood (ārdra indhana). It is not every fire that is concomitant with smoke but only greenwood fire. E. g., the fire in a lighted



electric bulb is fire without smoke but no case of greenwood fire is smokeless fire. Greenwood, therefore, is a condition that must determine fire if the latter is to be an invariable concomitant of smoke. Greenwood is thus an upādhi in the above sense in the inference 'yonder mountain has smoke, because it has fire.' It is samavyāpya with, i. e., in symmetrical invariable relation to, the sādhya or inferent, viz., 'smoke' so that we can say that in every case of smoke from fire greenwood is an invariable antecedent and in every case of greenwood fire smoke is a necessary consequent. Greenwood, therefore, invariably accompanies, and is invariably accompanied by, the inferent 'smoke' in the above inference. That is to say, the relation between greenwood and smoke in the above inference is a symmetrical invariable relation (where greenwood is, smoke is, and where smoke is, greenwood is). But the relation between greenwood and fire is not a relation of invariable concomitance, every fire not necessarily being greenwood fire (sādhana avyāpakatve sati sādhya samavyāptam=upādhi).

The absence of any upādhi in the above sense is indispensable for the vyāpti relation which causes inference. But how can we know the absence of an upādhi which is in symmetrical invariable relation to the inferent? We can know the absence of a thing only as we know the thing itself. Therefore to know the absence of all upādhis in symmetrical invariable relation (samavyāpta) with the sādhya we must not only know the upādhis themselves, perceived and unperceived, but also know all instances of their symmetrical invariable relation with the sādhya. But this is not possible by perception. We can perceive only perceptible upādhis. But even in their case for a knowledge of the invariable relation with the sādhya in all cases past, present and future, we have to fall back on inference and as regards imperceptible upādhis they cannot be known by perception and can be known only by inference. Thus we can establish inference as a source of knowledge only by inference and this is a

vicious circle that vitiates all proofs of inference as a source of knowledge.

Therefore in the so-called cases where the knowledge of smoke seems to cause the knowledge of fire what really happens is a subjective habit of thought produced by past experience. The smoke-experience being associated in the past with the fire-experience a recurrence of the smoke-experience causes an expectation of the fire-experience in the mind. Such expectation, however, does not always prove to be true being falsified in many cases. Uncontradicted experience in the past is thus no ground for its extension to the future being in many cases contradicted and overthrown by subsequent incoming experience. That in many cases our expectation is justified is a matter of experience.

Hence it follows that no *adṛṣṭa* or unseen cause governs the phenomena of the world, as such causes can be proved only by inference, and inference, as we have seen, is not a source of valid knowledge.

How, then, is the behaviour of a thing to be accounted for ? The Cārvāka answer to the question is that the things behave as they do because of their *svabhāva* or inherent nature. And since we do not know whether this nature is an eternally fixed character of things we have no right to say that things must behave in the same way always and not behave sometimes freakishly.

• INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA)

As we have seen above, the Cārvākas recognise only one source of knowledge and reject inference as a source of knowledge on the ground that the invariable relation or *vyāpti* between the mark which constitutes the inferential reason or *hetu* and the object proved by means of the mark cannot be established as a valid induction from experience. The Buddhists, however, as well as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Jaina and Sāṅkhya philosophers, etc., recognise inference as a

source of knowledge besides perception. According to the Buddhists, the Cārvāka objection to inference is based on a wrong view of the universal proposition or propositions on which an inference is based. As a matter of fact, the invariable relation which constitutes the ground of an inference is not an induction from experience at all. It is rather an *a priori* construction of the understanding, i.e., a relation or relations which the understanding brings to experience instead of obtaining them from experience. Experience pure and simple is nothing but nirvikalpa pratyakṣa or non-conceptual apprehension of a point-instant of reality and as such is unspeakable. It is the understanding that transforms the unspeakable giving datum into a speakable or known object by means of elaboration in concepts and thought-constructs. What we call inference is a further extension of this work of thought or judgment and may be called a judgment of the second order, i.e., a judgment mediated by another judgment. Thus in ordinary perceptual judgment we have a point-instant as the unspeakable datum which is elaborated into a known object in the form of the judgment 'X is A' where 'A' is the thought-construct in terms of which the understanding conceives X. Inference is an advance one step further into the domain of ideality and is therefore twice removed from the unspeakable datum of pure perception. That is, in inference 'X' is interpreted as 'A' because of its being thought or conceived as 'B', i.e., while judgment is of the form 'X' is 'A', inference is of the form 'X, as being B, is A'.

While the Buddhists thus meet the Cārvāka objection to inference by stressing the apriority of the Vyāpti relations that make inference possible the realists, e.g., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, stress immediate contact with the universals of objects in perception in their doctrine of sannikarṣa and thus meet the Cārvāka objection so that universal propositions on which inference is based are quite accessible to judgmental perception, though for removing all doubts as regards the presence of disturbing factors such propositions have to be

sifted by the inductive methods of agreement in presence (*anvaya*), agreement in absence (*vyatireka*) and non-observation off the contrary (*vyabhicāra adarśana*). .

DEFINITIONS OF INFERENCE

INFERENCE has been defined in various ways. Thus, e.g.,

(a) It has been defined sometimes as "the cognition of the object through its mark." This definition is a definition of inference by its origin. Further, it does not clearly say whether it is a judgment of perception having a present object as its referent or an inference proper referring to an absent object through its invariable relation to the mark.

(b) Another definition defines inference from the objective side. Inference, according to it, is the cognition of an absent object while perception refers to a present object. While the first definition traces the origin of the inference to subjective apprehension through the cognition of a mark the second definition defines inference by the kind of object it makes known. Both the definitions are therefore one-sided and miss the character of inference in all its aspects. Further, when inference is defined as the cognition of an absent object what is really meant is that the object inferred is unperceived, i. e., not perceived and not that the object is absent. E.g., when fire is inferred in the mountain yonder from the perception of smoke in the mountain yonder what is inferred is not a fire absent in the mountain yonder but an unperceived fire present in the mountain yonder.

Some Buddhists define inference as the cognition of the general as distinguished from perception which is the cognition of the *salakṣaṇa* particular. This also is a definition of inference by reference to its object and also fails to bring out the distinction between judgment and inference even from the Buddhist point of view.

A fourth definition defines inference as a particular application of an invariable relation between two phenomena by a person who had previous observation of the connection or invariable relation in various other situations. Even this does not bring out the full significance of inference. We do not know from this definition whether inference is an addition to our knowledge as every pramāṇa or source of knowledge should be, nor do we know whether inference is the cognition of a present or an absent object.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas define inference as vyāpya darśanāt asannikṛṣṭārtha jñānam anumānam. This definition is more satisfactory than the other four we have considered. According to it inference consists in the cognition of an object not in contact with the senses through the cognition of its vyāpya or invariable concomitant. It thus distinguishes clearly between perception and inference. Inference is an inference of an asannikṛṣṭa artha, i.e., of an object not in contact with the senses. When an object is in contact with the senses and the conditions of perception are fulfilled it is perception that takes place and this makes an inference of it useless and therefore stops the inferential process. Thus inference, as distinct from perception must cognise an object not in contact with the senses. Further, in its logical aspect, it must consist in cognition of the object through the observation of a mark which is known as an invariable concomitant of the object. Thus it stresses the knowledge of the universal proposition expressing the invariable relation between the mark and the unperceived object which is cognised through the mark. Thirdly, in stressing the actual observation of the mark it also stresses the cognition of the mark in a particular locus, i.e., the cognition of the minor premise as a necessary condition of inference.

Thus inference, we may say, must fulfil the two essential conditions, viz., (a) vyāpti jñāna or cognition of the universal relation which is the ground of inference (corresponding to the major premise of Western logic) and (b) Pakṣadharmatā jñāna, i.e., cognition of the mark or

vyāpya as the invariable concomitant of the object inferred as a dharma or property of the pakṣa or subject of inference (corresponding to minor premise of Western logic).

PAKṢA, SĀDHYA, HETU OR SĀDHANA, SAPAKṢA AND VIPAKṢA DEFINED

THE pakṣa is the subject in respect of which something is inferred or proved by means of inference. E.g., in the stock example of Indian logic, 'parvato vahnimān dhūmāt', 'yonder mountain is on fire because it smokes', the pakṣa or subject of the inference is the mountain yonder in respect of which 'fire' is inferred. Pakṣa is therefore defined as *jijñāsita sādhya*, i.e., that object in respect of which a mental questioning or doubt arises as regards the existence of the sādhya or inferent, i.e., that which is inferred, in it. That, therefore, in respect of which there is no mental uncertainty as regards the existence of the sādhya or inferent cannot be the logical subject of an inference. Thus that in which the Sādhya (e.g., fire) is known for certain as existing (e.g., mahānasa or the domestic oven) cannot be the pakṣa or logical subject of an inference. In Indian logic it is called sapakṣa or a similar instance. The sapakṣa is thus something in respect of which there is sādhya niścaya, and no room for sādhya samśaya, i.e., no scope for any doubt or uncertainty as regards the existence of the sādhya. Similarly where instead of sādhya niścaya or certain knowledge of the existence of the sādhya we have sādhyābhāva niścaya, i.e., certain knowledge of the non-existence of the inferent, we have what is called in Indian logic a vipakṣa or dissimilar instance. Thus the mahāhrada or the great lake is something in respect of which we have certain knowledge of the absence of the sādhya or the inferent, i.e., of the absence of fire. It is thus the vipakṣa in the above stock example of the inference of fire in the mountain yonder from the observation of smoke in the mountain yonder. Thus yonder mountain



is a logical subject of the inference as being that in respect of which there exists doubt (either in the person making the inference or in the person for whose enlightenment the inference is made) as regards the existence of fire (which is not perceived) while the domestic oven (*mahānasa*) is a *sapakṣa* or similar instance as being known for certain as a case of the presence of fire and the great lake (*mahāhrada*) is a dissimilar instance or *vipakṣa* as being known for certain to be a case of the absence of fire.

The *hetu* is the ground of the inference, i.e., that through which or on account of which the *sādhya* or inferent is inferred in the subject of the inference and may be called *probans* or ground of the inference. In the example given above 'smoke' is the *hetu*, *sādhana*, or *liṅga* (mark) by means of which 'fire' is inferred. The real ground of the inference, however, is not the smoke as an unrelated particular phenomenon but smoke as a mark or sign of fire, i.e., smoke as an invariable concomitant of fire. The real ground of inference, therefore, is an observed particular phenomenon as a case of a universal relation between all phenomena of the same nature and the inferent in its universal character. Thus the real ground of the inference in the above example is not 'this smoke' as such but 'this smoke' as a mark of 'fire', i.e., the smoke as being a particular case of the universal 'smokiness' as invariably concomitant with 'fieriness'. The *sādhya* is what we infer in the subject of an inference. In the above example we infer fire in respect of the mountain yonder. Fire is thus the inferent, *sādhya*, or what we infer in respect of the subject of the inference which is the yonder mountain. We may call it the *probandum*.

In rendering the Indian *anumāna* by inference we have avoided the Aristotelian terms, major, minor and middle and also the use of the term syllogism as an equivalent of *anumāna* of the Indian logicians, for two reasons. In the first place, the Indian *anumāna* aims at both formal consistency and material truth and therefore insists on a guarantee of the material truth of the premises on which an inference

is based, i.e., both the universal proposition (*vyāpti*) and the presence of the mark in the subject of the inference (*pakṣa-dharmatā*) must be materially true propositions according to Indian logic. This is why they insist on an *udāharana* or a familiar instance as illustrative of the invariable concomitance which is the ground of inference, as an integral part of inferential reasoning. According to the Aristotelian standpoint, the inference

All men are immortal,
John is a man,
. . John is immortal.—

is a valid syllogism in the first figure. But it will be rejected by the Indian logician as a fallacious inference on the ground that the universal proposition, 'All men are immortal', is a mere assumption without material truth as no familiar instance can be cited of an immortal man in support of the invariable relation expressed in the universal proposition. The Indian logician has no concern with inferences with imaginary premises for the sake of intellectual gymnastic which lead only to imaginary conclusions lacking material truth, but only inferences that fulfil both the conditions of formal consistency as well as actual truth in experience.

Secondly, the terms major, minor and middle as conceived in the Aristotelian syllogism are major, minor and middle only when read in denotation, the major being major as being of the widest denotation, the middle being middle as being of intermediate denotation, and the minor being minor as being narrowest in denotation. In the Indian inference, however, the terms being read in connotation rather than in denotation (through avacchedaka or determining characters) the greatest in denotation will be the least in connotation and the least in connotation will be the greatest in denotation so that the minor of the Aristotelian syllogism will be the major in Indian *anumāna* as being greatest in connotation and the major of the Aristotelian syllogism will be the minor in Indian *anumāna* as having the smallest connotation. We therefore use the terms, 'subject of inference' as the



equivalent of 'pakṣa', 'probans' as the equivalent of hetu, sādhana or liṅga and 'probandum' for 'sādhyā' or 'inferent'. We also have avoided the use of the term syllogism as the proper equivalent of the Indian anumāna which we have rendered by the term 'inference' simply.

STEPS IN INFERENTIAL REASONING

THE Naiyāyikas hold that an inference in its logical aspect must consist of five steps expressed in five different propositions, though some of these steps may not be always necessary psychologically and may be skipped over in individual cases. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, in case of inference for others (parārthānumāna) the full logical form in five steps is necessary though in svārthānumāna or inference for oneself some of these steps may not be psychologically necessary.

The five steps of inference may be illustrated in the stock example of inference 'yonder mountain is on fire because it smokes', as follows. The first step is the pratijñā vākya or the proposition to be proved, viz., 'yonder mountain is on fire'. The second step is the hetu vākya or statement of the hetu or the ground of inference, viz., 'Because it smokes and whatever is smoky is fiery'. The third step is the udāharana vākya or statement of a familiar instance illustrating the invariable concomitance (e.g., of smoke and fire) which is the real ground of the inference. The fourth step is upanaya vākya, i.e., statement of the application of hetu (e.g., smoke) as the mark of the sādhyā (e.g., fire) to the yonder mountain which is the subject of the inference. The fifth and last step is the nigamana vākya or the statement stating the conclusion that follows. Stecherbatsky holds with the Buddhists that the pratijñā vākya and the conclusion are two identical propositions and therefore the five steps contain at least one that is redundant. The Naiyāyika, however, does not consider the pratijñā vākya and the nigamana vākya to be of the same logical import though in

verbal expression they are identical. The *pratijñā vākya* is the proposition *to be* proved while the *nigamana vākya* is the proposition *as* proved and there is as much difference between the two as between appearing in an examination and passing it.

Some schools, however, consider five steps to be not logically necessary. The *Mīmāṃsakas*, e.g., contend that the first three steps or the last three steps quite suffice for all logical purposes. The *Mādhyva* logicians, however, consider five, four, three, two, and even one step to be sufficient for inference. E.g., one may say 'The mountain as giving forth smoke must be on fire', in which case one single proposition amounts to a complete inference. In other words, according to the *Mādhyvas*, there is no fixed rule as regards the number of steps in an inferential reasoning, an inference being capable of expression in five, four or a smaller number of steps according to the option of the person inferring.

THE ANUMEYA OR INFERENT

WHAT is it that we infer in an inference? What, in other words, is the *anumeya* or the content inferred in an inference? The question has given rise to controversy amongst Indian logicians. In the stock example of inference 'Yonder mountain is on fire, because it smokes', what is it that we really infer? Do we infer the mountain or do we infer fire, or do we infer the bare relation between the mountain and fire, or fourthly, do we infer the mountain as qualified by fire or lastly do we infer fire as qualified by the mountain yonder? It is argued that the mountain is not the object inferred as it is perceived and when an object is perceived there is no scope for an inferential cognition of it. Nor is fire the object of the inference for fire is a well-known object. We have had direct experience of fire in various other places such as the domestic oven (*mahānasa*), etc. There is no use inferring what is already known. That will amount



to siddhasādhana, establishing something which is already known to be an established fact. Nor is the bare relation between the mountain and fire the object of the inference. For how can the relation be cognised without the relata? The fourth alternative, viz., that the object inferred is the perceived mountain as qualified by the unperceived fire is also rejected on the ground that the perception of the mountain precludes an inferential knowledge of it. Thus what remains is the last alternative, viz., that what we infer is fire as qualified by the mountain or fire as the fire of the mountain yonder (*parvata viśiṣṭa vahni*). Though fire might have been known elsewhere, it has not been known before as the fire in the mountain yonder and thus there is no ground for the charge of siddhasādhana or inferring what is perceived.

VYĀPTI, INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE OR INVARIABLE RELATION AS THE GROUND OF INFERENCE

We have seen above that the real ground of inference is not any perceived particular fact as such but the perceived particular cognised as the mark of something else. In other words, the ground of the inference is the universal relation that holds between the mark and that which it is a mark of. E.g., in the inference 'Yonder mountain is on fire, because it smokes' the real ground of the inference is not the smoke simply as a particular fact perceived but the smoke perceived as a mark of fire, i.e., the particular perceived smoke cognised as an instance of an invariable relation between smokiness and fieriness. The invariable relation or vyāpti thus constitutes the real ground of the inference. But it must be noted that it is not vyāpti as such but vyāptijñāna or cognition of the vyāpti or invariable relation that constitutes the real ground of inference. In other words, the invariable relation considered objectively as holding between certain categories of

facts (e.g., smoke and fire) does not suffice for inference. It is subjective cognition of the objective relation that makes inference possible. Thus the savages of the cocoanut island (*nārikela dvīpa*), who lack previous experience of fire and smoke and have not apprehended the *vyāpti* or invariable relation between smoke and fire, will not infer fire when they see for the first time smoke rising from a forest yonder. Here though the objective concomitance holds between smoke and fire yet the subjective cognition of the concomitant relation being wanting there is no inference of fire.

What, then, is *vyāpti* or a universal relation between phenomena, and how is it known? *Vyāpti* is defined as *svābhāvika sambandha*, a natural or essential relation between one phenomenon and another. An essential relation is further defined as *nirupādhika sambandha* or *upādhirahita sambandha*, i.e., an unconditional relation between two phenomena. The relation between A and B, for example, is a universal relation or *vyāpti* when it is involved in the very nature or *svabhāva* of A and B, i.e., when it does not depend on any extraneous condition or *upādhi* such as X.

This brings us to the question of *upādhi*. What, then, is an *upādhi* or extraneous condition the presence of which makes *vyāpti* relation impossible? An *upādhi* is defined as follows: *sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptam upādhi-riti lakṣaṇam*. An *upādhi* or disturbing condition in the *vyāpti* or invariable relation between the *sādhana*, *hetu* or the ground of the inference and the *sādhya* or probandum which is inferred by means of the *hetu* or ground is something which is non-pervasive (*avyāpaka*) of the *sādhana*, *hetu* or ground and is in equipollent or symmetrical invariable relation with the *sādhya*, probandum or inferent. Thus if the *sādhana* or ground of an inference is A and the thing inferred by A is B, then the ground of the inference will be the universal proposition 'All A is B'. The material truth of this universal proposition will depend on the unconditionality of the universal relation between A and B. E.g., if the relation between A and B depends on any lurking extraneous



condition such as X, then the relation between A and B arises not from the nature of A but from the presence of the unobserved factor X. The relation between A and B thus becomes a conditional or *aupādhika* relation and the conditionality arises from the presence of X in the situation as the condition or *upādhi* determining the relation. And X is an *upādhi* or extraneous condition as being non-pervasive of A and at the same time in equipollent invariable relation with B so that while 'All X is B' and 'All B is X' it is not true that wherever A is, X is, X being found in places where A is absent. Thus, instead of saying 'Yonder mountain is on fire, because it smokes', if we make another inference, viz., 'Yonder mountain smokes because it is on fire' we shall be making a fallacious inference based on a conditional relation between fire and smoke, the *upādhi* or condition determining the relation being 'green-wood' (*ārdrendhana*). Thus the proposition, 'Wherever fieriness is, smokiness is', is not a true universal proposition, the invariable relation between fire and smoke depending not on the nature of fire itself but on the presence of an extraneous condition such as 'green-wood'. 'Green-wood' is an *upādhi* as being non-pervasive of fire, every fire being not necessarily green-wood fire (as, e.g., the fire of the red-hot ironball) but green-wood is in symmetrical invariable relation with smoke, i.e., 'Where smoke is, green-wood fire is' and 'Where green-wood fire is, smoke is'.

Vyāpti being thus an unconditional relation between two phenomena, the question arises how can we be assured of the unconditionality of the vyāpti relation between two phenomena, i.e., how can we be, in other words, assured of the absence of disturbing conditions vitiating the vyāpti relation? Indian Logicians (barring the Cārvākas who reject all truly universal propositions and the Buddhists who consider the universality of relations to be due to *a priori* construction of the understanding) propose bhūyodarśana or repeated observation and tarka or the method of *reductio ad absurdum* as the positive and the negative ways of getting rid of disturbing conditions vitiating Vyāpti relations. Thus when two

phenomena are observed repeatedly together in varying situations, then the idea arises of an invariable relation between the one and the other. This is then strengthened by tarka or the negative argument of reduction to absurdity of all objections based on suspected and supposed upādhis affecting the unconditionality of the relation. Tarka is thus a negative aid in ensuring the unconditionality of the vyāpti relation which constitutes the ground of an inference. Its principal function consists in showing how the supposition or suspicion of any extraneous condition vitiating the vyāpti relation leads to undesirable consequences such as the denial of obvious and accepted facts. Tarka is thus not inference but only a negative aid to inference.

The different forms of tarka go by the names of the undesirable consequences to which objections to the vyāpti of an inference may lead. Thus when an objection to a vyāpti leads to an undesirable self-dependence we have what is called ātmāśraya. It is proving a thing by itself. E.g., when A is proved by A or made to follow from A it is a case of the undesirable consequence called ātmāśraya. Anyonyāśraya is another form of tarka. By it an objection is refuted by showing that its acceptance as valid will lead to the undesirable consequence of reciprocal dependence. Thus when A is shown to follow from B and B again is shown to follow from A we have the undesirable consequence of reciprocal dependence. It is in fact a more complex form of ātmāśraya and an objection is refuted when its acceptance can be shown to lead to reciprocal dependence. Cakraka or circular reasoning is another variety of tarka. Thus when A is derived from B, B from C, C from D, and D from A, we have circular reasoning. It is ātmāśraya in a still more complex form. Lāghava tarka and gaurava tarka are also other forms of tarka by means of which objection to an inference may be disposed of. Thus when an inference and the vyāpti on which it rests can be shown to have the merit of parsimony (lāghava) entailing fewer assumptions as compared to the acceptance of any hypothetical objection on the ground of a supposed or



suspected extraneous condition or upādhi, the inference scores on the ground of lāghava tarka or parsimony and the objection fails on the ground of gaurava or unnecessary multiplicity of assumptions. Anavasthā or the instability of an infinite regress is also another variety of tarka by which an objection to an inference may be disposed of. An infinite regress is a flaw in logical thinking as it commits one to an infinite series of assumptions and thus, besides lack of final stability, is open to the objection of an infinite multiplicity of assumptions (gaurava). An objection can be rebutted on the ground of anavasthā when the infinite series to which one is committed on account of the acceptance of the objection is not dṛṣṭa anavasthā, i.e., an infinite series which is not actually observed in experience. In the case of the seed and the tree, or the egg and the hen, we have, however, an actually observed unending series and such anavasthā is, therefore, no logical flaw in thinking. Lastly, we have also another form of tarka called pramāṇavādhitartha-prasaṅga. It is that form of tarka which refutes an objection by showing that it leads to some consequence which is contradicted by the valid sources of knowledges. E.g., if one is to suppose an invisible demon as the upādhi or extraneous condition that causes the vyāpti relation between A and B and is thus the upādhi or extraneous condition that underlies the invariable relation between A and B the objection can be refuted by showing that it is pramāṇavādhita, i.e., contradicted by the evidence of the valid sources of knowledge. An invisible demon is never an object of perception or of inference or of any other valid source of knowledge.

CLASSIFICATION OF VYĀPTI

VYĀPTI has been classified in different ways from different points of view. (1) According to the character of the relations, vyāpti has been classified (a) by the Buddhists into relations of tādātmya and relations of taduttpatti, i.e., into relations of co-essentiality of species and genus and relations of causality. According to the Buddhists, vyāpti relations are either invariable relations which can be expressed in analytical propositions or synthetic universal propositions. Thus when one says 'The śimśapā (tree) is a tree', this is a universal proposition expressing an identity between the species, śimśapā, and the genus, tree. The predicate here explicates part of the meaning of the subject. In universal propositions of causality, however, expressing an invariable relation between the effect phenomenon and the cause phenomenon, we have a universal synthetic proposition. The cause is not part and parcel of the connotation of the effect nor is the effect part of the connotation of the cause, and yet there is an invariable relation between the effect and the cause. The Buddhists hold that these two forms, viz., invariable relations of co-existence (tādātmya), as in the case of co-essentiality of species and genus, and the invariable relations of sequence, as between an effect and its cause, exhaust all vyāpti relations between themselves, there being no possibility of any third type of invariable relation. Further, these vyāpti relations are *a priori* forms of the understanding by means of which we arrange and order the given facts of experience and are not derived *a posteriori* from experience.

(b) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, reject the Buddhist classification as being not exhaustive. They point out that there are other kinds of vyāpti relations besides taduttpatti and tādātmya. E.g., the relation between the rise of the moon and the blooming of the water-lily, the appearance of the star Rohiṇī on one side of the horizon and the disappearance of the star Kṛttika on the opposite horizon, the



waxing of the moon and the rise of the tides in the rivers, the coming of the autumn season and the clearness of water in lakes, etc., are all instances of invariable relations, but they are neither cases of the relation of co-essentiality nor of causality. The Buddhist contention that tadutpatti and tādātmya are the only two forms in which the understanding orders experience thus does not bear examination. Invariable relations are inductions from experience and are not *a priori* constructions of the understanding, and experience abounds in instances not merely of invariable relations of co-essentiality and of causality but also of other forms as well.

(2) According to another classification on the basis of quantity and quality, vyāpti is said to be either (a) viṣama-vyāpti corresponding to the A propositions of Western logic which cannot be simply converted and where the invariableness is asymmetrical as, e.g., in the proposition 'All A is B' or 'Wherever smoke is, fire is', or (b) samavyāpti where the invariableness is symmetrical as in the U propositions of Hamilton and formally expressible in the form 'All A is all B', as in the vyāpti expressed, e.g., in the proposition 'Whatever is niṣiddha (prohibited) is adharma (wrong)'. The proposition can be simply converted into 'Whatever is wrong, is prohibited'. Or, (c) paraspara parihāra as in 'No A is B' corresponding to the E propositions of Western logic, e.g., the proposition 'Air has no colour' which can also be expressed in the form 'Whatever has no colour is not air', or (d) paraspara samāveśa along with paraspara parihāra, or a vyāpti relation expressing partial inclusion as well as partial exclusion, e.g., the relation between being a cook and being a male, the relation being expressible as the unity of the three propositions (i) 'At least in one case there is a male that is not a cook', (ii) 'At least in one case there is a cook that is not a male', and (iii) 'At least in one case there is a cook that is a male'. The last two forms, (c) and (d), are a speciality of Mādhva logicians, only the first two being usually recognised in Nyāya Mīmāṃsā, etc.

(3) Vyāpti again may be classified into agreement in presence only (*kevalānvayī*), agreement in absence only (*kevalavyatirekī*), and agreement in presence as well as absence (*anvayavyatirekī*). This classification is a speciality of Nyāya. The Buddhists do not recognise *kevalānvayī* or *kevalavyatirekī* vyāpti. According to the Buddhists, the positive and the negative are two aspects of one and the same thing so that in asserting a positive relation of co-presence between two things we are also thereby implying a negative relation of co-absence of their opposites so that when we say 'All A is B' we also thereby imply that 'What is not B, is not A', or, which is the same thing, 'Where B is not, A is not'. Further, according to the Buddhists, a universal relation is an *a priori* frame-work in which the understanding arranges the materials of experience and this frame-work is at once positive and negative in character so that in arranging data in the relation of co-presence we are thereby also arranging their negatives in the relation of co-absence. The Naiyāyikas as realists, however, will have nothing to do with construction of the understanding in the ascertainment of the vyāpti relation. Consciousness has nothing intervening as an image or thought-construct between itself and the object it reveals. Consciousness is like light that reveals the object and therefore whatever it knows about objects is derived from the objects themselves and not from consciousness within itself. Therefore vyāpti relations have to be recognised according to the deliverance of reality in consciousness. This is why the Naiyāyikas insist on *upādhiśaṅkānirāśa* for the ascertainment of a vyāpti or invariable relation. The mere fact that A appears in consciousness as before, or after, or simultaneously with B does not prove that there is an unconditional relation between A and B. One must assure oneself that the apparent relation between A and B is not really a relation between an unobserved X and B and, therefore, the elimination of all such likely disturbing factors (*upādhi*) is a necessary condition of our assurance of a vyāpti or invariable relation between A and B. Even then, however, we can



never be certain that our *vyāpti* relations will not be overthrown in future by the accidents of experience. In other words, a *vyāpti* relation being an *a posteriori* induction from experience must always fall short of apodeictic certainty though it may have the highest degree of probability as having been never contradicted in past experience. For the same reason, the *Naiyāyikas* contend that *vyāpti* relations have to be discovered on the evidence of experience and must not be artificially classified according to a preconceived scheme as the Buddhist does. This is why the Buddhist classification of *vyāpti* into *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* relations has to be rejected as being inexhaustive and incomplete, there being other forms of *vyāpti* relations found in experience besides the above two of the Buddhist. For the same reason the Buddhist contention that agreement in absence is only the other side of agreement in presence and that, therefore, there cannot be any *vyāpti* of the *kevalānvayī* type as agreement in presence only, or of the *kevalavyatirekī* type as agreement in absence only, has to be rejected as lacking evidence in experience. As a matter of fact we have *vyāpti* relations in experience which have no negative counterparts as also relations of agreement in absence which have no positive counterparts just as we have also *vyāpti* relations which have both their positive and negative examples. For, e.g., the invariable relation between *prameyatva* and *abhidheyatva*, i.e., between knowability and nameability, is a *vyāpti* or invariable relation which can be substantiated by any number of instances of agreement in presence but cannot be illustrated negatively as agreement in absence even in one single case. We cannot point to any case of 'What is not nameable being also not knowable', for, as soon as we point to it, it is both named and known. Similarly, experience abounds in instances where *vyāpti* can be illustrated only as agreement in absence but not as agreement in presence. The case of *smoke* and *fire*, again, is a case of *anvayavyatirekī vyāpti*, for the invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire' can be illustrated both as agreement in presence as in the

case of mahānasa or the domestic oven and also as agreement in absence as in the case of mahāhrada, the great lake where fire is absent and so also is smoke.

VYĀPTIGRAHA OR WAYS OF ASCERTAINING THE VYĀPTI RELATION: THE METHODS OF INDUCTION

(1) THE BUDDHIST METHOD: We have seen that, according to the Buddhists, there are two kinds of vyāpti or invariable relation and that they constitute an *a priori* framework of the understanding in which the materials of experience are arranged. Hence though the relations themselves, i.e., tadut-patti and tādātmya are *a priori*, the arrangement of the data of experience in these *a priori* frames necessitates the application of certain methods. These, according to the Buddhists, are the methods of induction. The earlier Buddhist method was the method of difference regarded as a method of subtraction. The later Buddhist method, called the method of pañcakāraṇī, is, however, a method of addition as well as subtraction in five steps. Since, according to the Buddhists, every effect has necessarily a cause preceding it, but every cause does not necessarily produce its effect because of intervening circumstances interfering with the action of the cause, the five steps of pañcakāraṇī are as follows:—

(i) A condition in which the effect-phenomenon does not exist,

(ii) A condition in which the effect-phenomenon comes into being or exists,

(iii) And immediately preceding the coming into being of the effect-phenomenon, the appearance of the cause-phenomenon,

(iv) The cessation of the effect-phenomenon, its ceasing to be,

(v) And immediately preceding it, the cessation of the cause-phenomenon.



Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal in his 'Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus' (chapter on the 'Methods of Hindu Science') expounds the pañcakāraṇī method as follows:—

- (i) Neither the cause or antecedent phenomenon nor the effect or consequent phenomenon (i.e., a condition of relative isolation in which both cause and effect are absent),
- (ii) Introduction of the cause-phenomenon (nothing else being introduced along with it),
- (iii) Immediately following it, the appearance of the effect-phenomenon,
- (iv) The removal or elimination of the cause-phenomenon (nothing else being eliminated along with it),
- (v) And immediately after it, the disappearance of the effect-phenomenon.

When these conditions are fulfilled, a causal relation is established between the antecedent and the consequent phenomena. The method may be expressed in symbols as follows:—

If A stands for the antecedent phenomenon and B for the consequent phenomenon, the five steps of the method will be as follows:—

- (i) Neither A nor B,
- (ii) The introduction of A alone,
- (iii) The appearance of B immediately following the introduction of A,
- (iv) The elimination of A, nothing else being eliminated,
- (v) And immediately following it, the disappearance of B.

The following is a concrete example of the method. Let us suppose that we are experimenting on the cause of malaria and we start with the idea of a particular germ as being the cause of malaria. Then our first step will be to find a healthy animal in which neither the germ is nor malaria is, i.e., a condition of relative isolation. The second step will be the introduction of the germ in the animal body. The third step will be the appearance of malarial symptoms such as

temperature, shivering, etc., in the animal in question. The fourth step thereafter will consist of the elimination of the germ (by quinine injection, e.g.). The fifth step, following on it, will be the disappearance of malarial symptoms from the animal in question. When these conditions are fulfilled, the particular germ will be established as the cause of malaria.

The Buddhists prove the validity of their five-step method by a pragmatic argument. If A, according to the Buddhists, were not the cause of B in the symbolical example given above, B would be appearing and disappearing without any cause since nothing else precedes its appearance or disappearance excepting the appearance or disappearance of A. But this means the overthrow of the principle of causality itself which is the *a priori* framework into which our practical world is constructed. Denial of the principle of causality will thus amount to the denial of the practical world. The method, therefore, has as much truth as our world of practical experience.

The Naiyāyikas, however, take exception to the Buddhists method on two grounds. They point out, in the first place, that the method proves A to be the cause of B only in the particular instance in question but does not establish A as the cause in other instances also and therefore the method does not provide any effective safeguard against the possibility of a plurality of causes. Secondly, the method also does not provide any effective safeguard against unobserved factors being introduced along with the introduction of A, or eliminated along with the elimination thereof, and being thereby the real determinant of the appearance of B.

The Buddhists in reply point out that the very fact that phenomena are contingent proves that they occur only on the occasion of certain special conditions preceding them and not on any and every kind of condition. This, therefore, precludes the possibility of a plurality of causes. Nor, the Buddhists hold, does the Nyāya contention that the Buddhist method does not provide any safeguard against an inductive



generalisation being vitiated by unobserved conditions bear strict examination. The positive and the negative universal propositions being nothing but the expression of the positive and the negative aspects of one and the same relation, a proposition being proved as necessary and universal in its positive aspect implies that there is an invariable relation also between the negatives of the terms appearing in the positive relation. Thus when we show that 'All A is B', we thereby also imply that 'Non-B is non-A'. This shows that the Nyāya charge of B happening without A or A being not followed by B due to unobserved conditions other than A or B is unfounded.

The Naiyāyika, however, does not consider the Buddhist answer to their objections to be convincing. The Naiyāyikas point out that kādācitatva or contingency of phenomena does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a plurality of causes as the Buddhists contend. The 'kādācit', occasional or contingent is capable of several alternative interpretations. It may be conceived as 'akāraṇa', uncaused, or 'abhāvākāraṇa', arising from nothing or non-being as its cause, or 'ajñātakāraṇa', i.e., as the effect of an unknown and unknowable cause, or 'aniyatākāraṇa', i.e., as having a variable cause, or again as niyatākāraṇa, i.e., as having a fixed and invariable cause. In the face of so many different possible interpretations of the 'kādācit' or contingent, the Buddhist has no right to equate the 'kādācit' or contingent to the 'niyatākāraṇa', to an effect having an invariable cause. The Buddhist reply to the possibility of unobserved conditions is also a piece of circular reasoning. Granting that there is an invariable and necessary relation, it will preclude the possibility of lurking conditions vitiating the relation. But the issue is whether we have any such necessary and invariable relation.

(2) *The Nyāya Method*: The Naiyāyika, therefore, proposes the method of 'anvaya', observation of instances of agreement in presence, 'vyatireka', observation of instances of agreement in absence, and 'vyābhicāra adarśana' or non-observation of the contrary as the true method of arriving at

inductions. The method may be symbolically illustrated as follows. Let us suppose a series of instances of an antecedent phenomenon followed by a series of instances of a consequent phenomenon such that in the instances of the complex of antecedent phenomena only one phenomenon is throughout present nothing else being present in *all* the instances, and in the instances of the complex of consequent phenomena only one phenomenon is similarly throughout present, nothing else being present in all the instances. Thus in the symbolical example given below :

| Antecedent phenomena | Consequent phenomena |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| A B C | P Q R |
| A C D | P R S |
| A D E | P S T |

we find that in the instances of the antecedent phenomena 'A' is the only antecedent that is throughout present just as in the instances of the consequent phenomena 'P' is the only consequent that is throughout present. This is anvaya or agreement in presence. When such agreement in presence is backed by instances of agreement in absence as shown below :

| Antecedent phenomena | Consequent phenomena |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| B C D | Q R S |
| C D E | R S T |
| D E F | S T U |

where what is throughout absent in the instances of antecedent phenomena is 'A', nothing else being throughout absent and what is throughout absent in the instances of consequent phenomena is 'P' nothing else being throughout absent ; and when such agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyatireka) is further supported by 'vyabhicāra adarśana' or non-observation of the contrary, no case of A being actually observed without P and no P



similarly being observed without A, we are justified in considering the relation between A and P to be an unconditional, invariable relation or *vyāpti*.

PLURALITY OF CAUSES

As regards plurality of causes, Indian logicians have proposed ways in much the same way as Western logicians for obviating the difficulty arising from it.

(a) One method proposed, e.g., is that of considering the phenomenon to be investigated along with its attendant circumstances. Thus when we come across several instances of an apparently same effect being caused by different causes in the different instances, the way out of the difficulty is to take the effect along with its attendant circumstances. This is, e.g., the method by means of which a physician diagnoses the cause of a particular kind of fever.

(b) Another way also suggested is to consider the apparently same effect in the different instances in its uniqueness and particularity. Thus when E, an apparently same effect, seems to be produced by different causes C¹, C², C³ in different instances, the remedy is to ascertain the distinctness and speciality of each effect in every particular instance. This will reveal that what we considered to be one and the same effect 'E' is in reality either E¹, or E², or E³, etc., corresponding to C¹, C², C³, etc., as their respective causes in the different instances.

(c) The third way proposed is to consider the different causes C¹, C², C³, etc. of the same effect E in different instances in respect of the form C which they (i.e., C¹, C², C³, etc.) have in common and consider it to be the real cause of the phenomenon E.

(d) The *Navya Naiyāyikas* propose a fourth way. Their device is to consider in the case of an apparent plurality of causes 'one or other but not all' (*anyatara*) to be the cause. According to the *Navyas*, therefore, in the case of C¹, C², C³,

etc., being observed to be the cause of E in different instances, the cause should be stated as being one or other of C¹, C², C³, etc.

CLASSIFICATION OF ANUMĀNA OR INFERENCE

(a) We have already seen that, according to Nyāya, vyāpti or the invariable relation which is the ground of inference is either kevalānvayī vyāpti, agreement in presence only, or kevalavyatirekī vyāpti, agreement in absence only, or anvaya-vyatirekī vyāpti, both agreement in presence and absence. According to the three kinds of the vyāpti or invariable relation on which an inference may be based, there are, according to Naiyāyikas, three kinds of inference, viz., kevalānvayī, kevalavyatirekī and anvaya-vyatirekī inference.

(b) According to another classification of the Naiyāyikas, inference is either Pūrvavat inference, or Śeṣavat inference, or sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference. Pūrvavat inference, according to Naiyāyikas, is the inference from cause to effect as when we infer, from 'dense masses of cloud in the sky', 'the coming of rain in the immediate future' (meghonnateḥ-vṛṣṭi). Śeṣavat inference, according to Naiyāyikas, is inference from effect to cause, as when, from 'the appearance of the muddy conditions of the roads in the morning', we infer 'rain overnight'. Both Pūrvavat and Śeṣavat inference are based on vyāpti relations observed specifically (viśeṣataḥ dṛṣṭa) between the cause and the effect-phenomena. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna is, however, an inference based on a vyāpti relation observed not viśeṣataḥ or specifically between the phenomenon which serves as the mark or ground and the sādhya or the thing marked or inferred, but only generally between objects of a wider class within which the hetu or ground and the sādhya or thing inferred are included as species or subordinate classes. Symbolically,



started Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference may be expressed as follows:—

$$\begin{aligned} \text{All } A &\text{ is } B \\ X &\text{ is } A^1 \\ \therefore X &\text{ is } B^1 \end{aligned}$$

In Pūrvavat and Śeśavat, the inference will be of the form:—

$$\begin{aligned} \text{All } A^1 &\text{ is } B^1 \\ X &\text{ is } A^1 \\ \therefore X &\text{ is } B^1 \end{aligned}$$

Thus in sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna the vyāpti is observed not between A^1 and B^1 specifically, but between A and B , of which A^1 and B^1 are species or sub-classes. A concrete example of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna is the inference of the sensibilities (indriya) as the instruments of perception. The eye, e.g., does not see itself. It is that organ or instrument with which we see. The eye, ear and other sensibilities or indriyas are atindriya, super-sensuous in this sense and cannot be perceived objects. They are thus objects of inference and the inference which proves the sensibilities as organs of perception is an inference of the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa type and may be stated as follows:—

Wherever there is action, there is an instrument with which the agent acts.

E.g., the action of cutting requires a sharp instrument, such as an axe.

Perception is a *cognitive* act.

Therefore it must require a *cognitive* instrument, viz., an indriya or sensibility.

(c) The Sāṅkhya philosophers classify inference into pūrvavat, śeśavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa like the Naiyāyikas. But pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference they include under the class of vīta anumāna proving affirmative conclusions. As distinguished from vīta anumāna they recognise another variety which is avīta anumāna and is based on

vyatirekī vyāpti or agreement in absence. Avīta anumāna proves a conclusion which is negative, through a vyāpti which is negative, vyatirekī, as agreement in absence, or a conclusion which is arrived at as in śeśavat by the process of elimination of other possible alternatives as being not tenable. The śeśavat as interpreted by the Sāṅkhya philosophers is thus a mixed inference proving a conclusion pāriśeṣyāt, i.e., by the method of exhaustion, or disposal of all other possible alternatives excepting one. It may be formally expressed as follows:—

(Within the universe of discourse)

Whatever is, is either A or B or C

X (within the universe of discourse) is neither A nor B
 ∴ X is C.

(d) The Māthva philosophers classify inference in another way. According to them, anumāna or inference is either kāraṇa anumāna, or kāryya anumāna, or akāryya kāraṇa anumāna, i.e., inference is either from cause to effect, or from effect to cause, or from one phenomenon to another phenomenon when they are invariably related, but not causally related. The speciality of the Māthva classification is thus the recognition of akāryyakāraṇī anumāna, i.e., inference of phenomena related in some relation other than the causal relation, the kāraṇānumānī and kāryyānumānī of the Māthvas being nothing but pūvavat and śeśivat inference of the Naiyāyikas.

THE FALLACIES OF INFERENCE

We have seen that according to the Mīmāṃsakas the first three or the last three, of the five steps or pañcāvayavas of the Naiyāyikas logically suffice for inference. Inference, therefore, can, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, consist of pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇī. Any fallacious inference, there-



fore, will thus involve a fallacy of the *pratijñā* or proposition to be proved, or a fallacious ground or *hetu*, or a logically faulty *udāharana* or illustration illustrating the *vyāpti* or invariable relation which is the ground of the inference. A fallacious inference will thus consist either of a fallacious thesis (*pratijñābhāsa*), or a fallacious reason or ground (*hetābhāsa*), or a fallacious illustration (*udāharana bhāsa*), or any two, or all of these.

A *pratijñā* or a thesis to be proved, as we have seen, must satisfy certain conditions in order to be a logically valid thesis or *pratijñā*. The thesis, in other words, must be some statement in respect of the truth of which legitimate doubt or uncertainty exists. If, therefore, any proposition is offered as a thesis to be proved by inference which is known to be true independently of the inference in question, the thesis does not require to be proved again by the inference and is a pseudo-thesis or *pratijñābhāsa*. Thus, if the proposition 'fire is hot' is made a thesis to be proved by an inference it becomes a pseudo-thesis as it is known from perception in advance of the inference that fire causes heat. It is, therefore, a known fact established by the evidence of perception and proving it by inference again entails *siddhasādhana* or proving what is already known for true. Knowing of the known is not knowing at all because it does not add to our knowledge. The fallacy in such a case is called the fallacy of a *siddha viśeṣana* thesis or *pratijñā*. If again any proposition is made a thesis to be proved by an inference which is known to be false independently of the inference, we have another form of a pseudo-thesis or *pratijñābhāsa* called *bādhita viśeṣana* *pratijñā*. E.g., if the proposition 'fire is devoid of heat' is offered as a thesis to be proved by an inference, it is a case of a pseudo-thesis of the *bādhita viśeṣana* type. We know in advance from perception that fire is never devoid of heat and therefore the proposition in question is obviously a false proposition. Any attempt to prove such a proposition is not only futile but also amounts to sophistry and intellectual dishonesty, contradicted as it is.

by valid evidence. A bādhita viśeṣaṇa pratijñā may be either pratyakṣa bādbita, contradicted by perception, or anumāna bādhita, contradicted by inference (e.g., the proposition "the sun moves round the earth") or śabda bādhita as when one's own words contradict the thesis one is going to prove (as, e.g., the proposition 'I have been dumb all my life and never opened my mouth' uttered by a person who is going to prove it by an inference, etc.). Or again a pseudo-thesis or pratijñābhāsa may be of the aprasiddha viśeṣaṇa type where the predicate to be proved in respect of the subject of the proposition is aprasiddha or without its parallel or analogue in experience and is nowhere actually found. E.g., the proposition, 'Buddha is omniscient or all-knowing as he is free from illusions' (moharahitatvāt) is a case of an aprasiddha viśeṣaṇa thesis as the predicate 'all-knowing' is fictitious or without its parallel in experience, no all-knowing or omniscient person being met with anywhere in experience.

As regards the fallacies of the hetu or ground the Mīmāṃsakas recognise four varieties, viz.. the asiddhahetu, the viruddha hetu, the anaikāntika hetu, and the asādhāraṇa hetu.

The asiddha hetu, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, is either svarūpāsiddha hetu, or sambandhāsiddha hetu, āśrayāsiddha hetu, or vyāpyatvāsiddha hetu. The svarūpāsiddha hetu is one that is asiddha, or cannot be established as real svarūpataḥ, i.e., in its own intrinsic nature. E.g., in the inference, 'Buddha is free from illusions (moharahita) because he is all-knowing'; 'being all-knowing or omniscient is the hetu or ground that is made to prove Buddha's freedom from illusions. But omniscience is never found in experience. Therefore, it is an intrinsically unreal hetu or ground and is thus a svarūpataḥ asiddha hetu.

A sambandhāsiddha hetu, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, is one that does not exist in the pakṣa or the subject of inference, i.e., where the sambandha or relation between the hetu and the pakṣa is unreal, we have that variety of a asiddha hetu which is called sambandhāsiddha hetu. In



the stock example, 'Yonder mountain is on fire, because it smokes', the ground of the inference is 'smoke' (as an inevitable concomitant of fire). This smoke must exist in the mountain yonder, i.e., its existence in the subject of the inference must be certified by actual observation. If there is no evidence of the existence of the ground in the subject of the inference, if, e.g., the smoke is observed to rise, not from the mountain yonder, but from a nearby kitchen, then it cannot prove the existence of fire in the mountain yonder. The hetu, in other words, must be pakṣavṛtti, i.e., must be vartamāna, or exist, in the pakṣa, if it is to prove the existence of the probandum or the sādhya in the subject of the inference. Where the hetu does not exist in the pakṣa, where, in other words, the sambandha or relation between the hetu and the pakṣa is wanting, we have that variety of an asiddha hetu which is called a sambandhāsiddha hetu. It may be noted in this connection that the fallacy of the asiddha hetu which the Mīmāṃsakas call sambandhāsiddhi, the Naiyāyikas designate by the name of svarūpāsiddhi. That is to say, the sambandhāsiddha hetu of the Mīmāṃsakas is the same as the svarūpāsiddha hetu of the Naiyāyikas. When the pakṣavṛtti of the hetu, i.e., the existence of the hetu in the pakṣa, is partial and not pervasive, i.e., when the hetu or ground exists in one part of the pakṣa or the subject of an inference but not in the other part or parts of the subject, we have that variety of fallacy of sambandhāsiddhi which is called bhāgāsiddhi. E.g., in the inference, 'parvatahradau vahnimantau dhumāt', 'the mountain and the lake are on fire, because they smoke', the hetu 'smoke' is real in respect of its relation to only one part of the subject of the inference, viz., the mountain and does not exist in the other part of the subject, viz., the hrada or lake. Such partial existence makes the inference fallacious, and the fallacy of the 'hetu' in the case in question is bhāgāsiddhi, i.e., partial asiddhi.

Since the hetu must exist in the pakṣa it follows that the pakṣa or the subject of an inference must itself exist. If the pakṣa is imaginary or unreal, then we are really proving

the sādhyā by means of the hetu in a substrate or locus that does not exist. This amounts to proving the sādhyā nowhere. E.g., in the inference ‘manimaya parvataḥ vahnimāna dhumāt’, ‘the jewelled mountain is on fire, because it smokes’, since the jewelled mountain does not exist, the smoke is observed to rise not from anywhere and therefore proves fire nowhere. Such a hetu or ground is a pseudo-hetu and the fallacy involved in the case in question is the fallacy of āśrayāsiddhi, unreality of the substrate or āśraya.

Since the hetu proves the probandum or sādhyā because of its invariable concomitance with it, where the relation of invariable concomitance between the hetu or ground and the sādhyā or object inferred by the ground is unreal, we have a vyāpyatvāsiddha hetu, i.e., a pseudo-hetu whose invariable concomitance with the sādhyā is unestablished or asiddha. E.g., in the inference ‘yonder mountain is smoky because it is fiery’, fieriness from which smokiness is inferred is not an invariable concomitant of smokiness. It is, therefore, a case of an unreal vyāpti relation between the hetu and the sādhyā and the fallacy involved in the particular case is the fallacy of a vyāpyatvāsiddha hetu (corresponding to the undistributed middle of Western logic). It may be pointed out here that the fallacies of pratijñā and of hetu above explained are all material fallacies which clearly show the difference between the anumāna of the Indian logician as a formal-material process aiming at both formal consistency and material truth and the syllogism of Aristotle which aims at formal consistency only. The fallacies above enumerated and explained will have no place in the Aristotelian syllogism which is a purely formal process.

Besides the different varieties of asiddha hetu we may also have, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, another form of a pseudo-hetu which is called viruddha or incongruent hetu. A hetu is viruddha, incongruent or contrary, when instead of being invariably related to the sādhyā or the object to be proved, it is an invariable concomitant of its viparīta, abbāva or contradictory. Thus in the inference ‘sound is

eternal because it is an effect' the hetu, viz., 'being an effect', is an invariable concomitant, not of the sādhya which is eternality, but of its contradictory, i.e., non-eternality, and is thus a viruddha or incongruent hetu. A viruddha hetu may be either a svarūpaviruddha hetu, i.e., directly contradictory, or a viśeṣaviruddha hetu, i.e., one which is incongruent not with the sādhya as such but with that viśeṣa or special form of the sādhya or object to be proved which is required in the special circumstances of the case. Thus, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theistic argument is a case of a viśeṣaviruddha hetu. The hetu in the inference is kāryatva or 'being an effect', and it is an invariable concomitant of kartr̄janyatva or intelligent authorship. So far there is no virodha or incongruence between the hetu, effect-character, and the sādhya in its general character, viz., intelligent authorship. What is required for the theistic case, however, is not any and every intelligent author but a 'trailokya nirmāṇa nīpuṇa kartā', an all-intelligent cause possessing the capacity of creating the three worlds. Such an intelligent cause must be all-knowing and must be free from the limitations of the body. But the hetu, as a mark of the sādhya, as illustrated in the case of such effects as the ghaṭa (the jar), paṭa (the piece of cloth), proves at best an incarnate author of limited intelligence such as a potter, a weaver, etc., but not a disembodied spirit of unlimited intelligence which alone can be all-knowing as being free from the limitations of the senses. The virodha or incongruence is, therefore, not between 'effect-character' as such and 'intelligent authorship', but between 'effect-character' and 'omniscient intelligent authorship', which is required for the theistic case.

An anaikāntika hetu or ground is another variety of a pseudo-hetu or pseudo-reason. It is a hetu or mark which is found both where the sādhya or probandum is and also where it is not. It is thus a too wide hetu or reason. The following is an example of an anaikāntika hetu. 'Śabda nitya, prameyatvāt,' 'sound is eternal because it is knowable'. Here knowability is the hetu by means of which eternality (in

respect of sound) is being proved. But knowableness exists in or is a character of both the eternal and the non-eternal. Another name of the anaikāntika hetu is sādhāraṇa, i.e., a hetu which is sādhāraṇa or common to the sādhyā or thing to be proved and the absence of the sādhyā.

The fourth variety of hetvābhāsa recognised by the Mīmāṃsakas is the asādhāraṇa or uncommon which is defined as the hetu or ground that exists in the pakṣa alone or the subject of inference (pakṣamātravṛtti) even where its sapakṣa or similar instances exist. An asādhāraṇa hetu is thus one which can be found only in the subject of the inference and nowhere else. The following is an example of an asādhāraṇa hetu. 'Earth is eternal, because it has the quality of odour'. Here being being characterised by odour as a distinctive quality is an exclusive property, asādhāraṇaguṇa, of earth only amongst the five different elements. Therefore, outside the earth the co-presence of 'odour' and 'eternity' cannot be found in the other four elements. Therefore, in respect of the other four elements, air, water, etc., though nityatva or eternity, i.e., the sādhyā, may be found, the hetu, viz., odour, is absent, odour being an exclusive quality of earth alone, and in respect of earth the co-presence of odour and eternity cannot be established prior to the inference, for, though gandhavatva or being characterised by odour is a known property of earth, nityatva or eternity is only sādhyā, i.e., something to be established by the inference, and not siddha, i.e., an established fact prior to the inference. Therefore, the co-presence of the hetu and the sādhyā, i.e., their agreement in presence, cannot be found anywhere and, therefore, the hetu, as being incapable of being established as in invariable relation to the sadhya through instances of agreement in presence, is a hetvābhāsa or pseudo-hetu.

As regards the fallacies of the udāharāṇa or illustration, they are, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, in the first place, either fallacies of the sādharmya udāharāṇa, or fallacies of the vaidharmya udāharāṇa. A sādharmya udāharāṇa is an illustration that illustrates the invariable relation or vyāpti



between the hetu and the sādhyā in its positive aspect as agreement in presence. E.g., when we say ‘wherever smoke is, fire is, as for instance in the case of the familiar domestic oven’, ‘the domestic oven’ illustrates the vyāpti between the hetu or ground, viz., ‘smoke’ and the object inferred, viz., ‘fire’, in its positive aspect of co-presence. It is thus a sādharmya udāharāṇa, and it is a valid illustration as being a well-known case of the co-presence of smoke and fire. If, however, we say ‘where fire is not smoke is not’, and illustrate the agreement in absence by citing the familiar instance of the ‘great lake’ where fire is not, and smoke also is not, the lake that we cite by way of illustration will be a case of a valid vaidharmya udāharāṇa. It is a valid illustration as being a well-known case of the co-absence of the sādhyā or thing inferred and the hetu or ground. Therefore, the fallacies of the udāharāṇa in the case of sādharmya udāharāṇa or illustration of the positive type will be an illustration in which either the sādhyā is not present, or the sādhana or hetu is not present, or neither the sādhyā nor the hetu are present, or something which by itself is impossible or incapable of existence. The fallacies of the sādharmya udāharāṇa are, therefore, either a sādhyabīna illustration or a sādhanabīna illustration or a ubhayabīna illustration or an asambhava illustration. Take, e.g., the case of the inference, ‘sound is eternal, because it is uncaused. Whatever is uncaused is eternal, just as is antecedent absence (prāgabhāva)’. Here the illustration illustrating the vyāpti or invariable relation between the hetu or ground, viz., ‘being uncaused’, and the sādhyā or object inferred, viz., ‘eternity’, is prāgabhāva or antecedent absence. Now antecedent absence is a case of the presence of the hetu ‘being uncaused’, because antecedent absence is beginningless and has no cause. But it is not a case of the presence of the sādhyā or the object to be proved which is eternity (nityatva) as prāgabhāva or antecedent absence comes to an end with the production of the object that was absent. Thus it is a case of a sādhyabīna illustration of the positive type and as such.

is a pseudo-illustration of the positive type, a sādharmya-*udāharanābhāsa*. In the same inference if emergent absence (*dhamsābhāva*) be cited as an illustration of the co-presence of the hetu, 'uncaused' and the sādhyā, 'eternality', we shall have a sādhanabīna illustration, as 'dhamsābhava' or the absence that emerges through the destruction of a thing, is not uncaused. It is thus another variety of a pseudo-illustration of the sādharmya type. In the same inference, if one were to use an earthen jug (*ghaṭa*) as an illustration of the *vyāpti* relation between the 'uncaused' and the 'eternal' we shall have an ubhayabīna illustration in which neither the sādhyā nor the hetu are present, for an earthen jug is neither 'uncaused' nor 'eternal'. It is thus a third variety of a pseudo-illustration of the positive type. Fourthly, if in the same inference, the invariable relation is illustrated by an instance of a horn of a man (*naraśringa*) we shall have a pseudo-illustration of the *asambhava* or impossible type as no horn is actually observed in any man in experience.

Corresponding to the four types of pseudo-illustration of the positive type we have four kinds of pseudo-illustration of the vaidharmya or the negative type. Since a vaidharmya illustration illustrates the co-absence of the thing inferred and the ground by means of which it is inferred, anything used as an illustration which is not a case of the absence of the sādhyā, or the absence of the sādhana, or in which neither sādhyā nor sādhana are absent, or which in itself is impossible, will be a case of a pseudo-illustration of the vaidharmya or the negative type. Thus in the inference 'sound is eternal, because it is uncaused, and whatever is not eternal is not uncaused', if the *vyāpti* as agreement in absence is illustrated by the example of *dhamsābhāva*, the illustration will not be a case of the absence of the sādhyā since *dhamsābhāva* is *nitya* or eternal in the sense of being *avināśī* or endless and is not a case of the absence of eternality. In the same inference if *vyāpti* negatively stated as co-absence is illustrated by the example of antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*) we have a pseudo-illustration of the

negative type which is not a case of the absence of the sādhana or hetu as antecedent absence is not a case of the negation of ‘uncaused’, prāgabhāva or antecedent absence being always uncaused. In the same inference, if the agreement in absence of the vyāpti relation is illustrated by the example of the sky (ākāśa), we have a case of a pseudo-illustration of the vaidharmya type which is neither a case of the absence of the sādhya nor a case of the absence of the sādhana or hetu, the sky (which is eternal) being neither a case of the absence of ‘eternity’ nor a case of the absence of the ‘uncaused’. In the same inference if a horn of a human being is cited as an illustration of the relation of co-absence, we shall have a pseudo-vaidharmya illustration of the type which is asambhava or impossible.

The Naiyāyika gives a different enumeration of the fallacies. According to the Naiyāyika, while perception is confined to present objects, the range of inference extends to past, distant and future objects also. This is why there is need of special care in ascertaining the unconditionality of the invariable relation on which an inference is based. Though the unconditionality can be ascertained by means of repeated observation (bhūyodarśana) and tarka or reduction of objections to absurdity, the results so arrived at can only have the highest degree of probability but not apodictic certainty. Our inductions, however carefully arrived at, can therefore never be free from uncertainty. Take, e.g., the induction ‘whatever is made of earth-atoms, admits of being inscribed with a sharp iron-tool’. This is an induction which has the support of experience and yet there is at least one case in which the induction fails, viz., glass which is made of earth-atoms but does not admit of being inscribed with an iron-tool.

The hetu or ground as the invariable concomitant of the sādhya or thing to be proved thus has to be very carefully ascertained and selected. The hetu or ground must fulfil the following conditions in order that it may serve as a logical ground of an inference, viz., (1) pakṣasattva or existence in

the pakṣa or the subject of inference, (2) sapakṣasattva, i.e., existence in whatever is a case where the sādhyā or thing to be proved exists, and (3) non-existence in the vipakṣa or non-existence where the sādhyā does not exist. In other words, the hetu must exist in the subject, must be found in all similar instances and must be found absent in all dissimilar instances. Where one, or other, or some, or all of these conditions are not fulfilled we have a case of a pseudo-hetu or hetvābhāsa. According to Nyāya, the pseudo-hetu or hetvābhāsa may be of five kinds, viz., savyābhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama, or (satpratipkṣa), sādhyasama and kālātīta. (1) A savyābhicāra hetu is one that is found both where the sādhyā is and where the sādhyā is not. It is thus the anaikāntika or sādhāraṇa hetu of the Mīmāṃsakas. In the inference 'parvato vahnimāna dravyatvāt', 'yonder mountain is on fire because it is a substance', the hetu, 'being a substance', is a savyābhicāra hetu because it is found both where fire is and also where fire is not, e.g., water. The 'viruddha hetu' is one which instead of being invariably related to the sādhyā is an invariable concomitant of its absence, sadhyābhāva, as in the inference 'yonder mountain is on fire because it has a lake'. The third type of pseudo-hetu is prakaraṇasama. Prakarana means the side and the opposite side of the subject-matter of a controversy. Thus if the controversy is about the existence of fire (in a mountain) the two sides in the controversy will be the side representing the existence of fire and the side representing the non-existence thereof, existence and non-existence being the two prakaraṇas or subject-matter of dispute. If in these circumstances one party were to advance a hetu which proves the existence of fire when the other party advances another hetu which proves its non-existence, we have then an instance in each of a pseudo-hetu of the prakaraṇasama type. Thus if one were to argue that the mountain is on fire because it smokes and another were to argue that there is no fire in the mountain because it is wet with water, the hetus used in the two inferences will be prakaraṇasama hetus or pseudo-hetus of the prakaraṇasama type. Such hetus are also called satpratipakṣa hetus. The Mīmāṃsakas reject the satpratipakṣa type of hetvābhāsa on the ground that since reality cannot have a self-contradictory nature,



the apparent contradiction between two hetus is a purely subjective affair, one of the two hetus being real and the other false. The *sādhyasama* is a fourth variety of *hetvābhāsa* or pseudo-hetu according to the *Naiyāyikas*, and its other name is the *asiddha* hetu. When in an inference a person advances as his hetu or ground for the inference a thing which is not accepted as *siddha* or established by the other party, it is a *sādhyasama*, *asiddha* or pseudo-hetu. In other words, anything offered as a hetu which is not accepted by all is an *asiddha* or *sādhyasama* hetu. The *Naiyāyikas* recognise three varieties of such *asiddha* hetu, viz., (1) *āśrayāsiddhi* or *pakṣāsiddhi* where the existence of the subject or *pakṣa* as the *āśraya* of the hetu is open to doubt and is not accepted as an established fact as in the case of the 'jewelled mountain' we have considered in the *Mīmāṃsaka* enumeration of the fallacies. *Svarūpāsiddhi* is the second variety of *asiddhi* recognised by the *Naiyayikas*. A hetu is *svarūpāsiddha*, according to *Nyāya*, when it does not exist in the *pakṣa* and thus it is the type of pseudo-hetu described by the *Mīmāṃsakas* as a *sambandhasiddha* hetu. The third type of an *asiddha* hetu is the *vyāpatvāsiddha* hetu which we have already discussed in the *Mīmāṃsaka* account of the fallacies. The fifth form of *hetvābhāsa* or pseudo-hetu is *kālātīta* or *kālātyayāpadīṭha*. The *Naiyāyikas* also call it by the name of *bādha*. Thus when a hetu is used in proving something it must be used in reference to its particular time in proving the object. If, e.g., it can prove the object only if it is illegitimately extended beyond its time of functioning, we have a *kālātīta* pseudo-hetu. Consider, e.g., the following case. We find that red, blue and other colours are continuants but are not manifested in perception without the co-operation of light. If on the basis of such examples one were to say sound also is non-temporary, i.e., a continuant, because it is manifested by the beating of the drum just as colour is manifested by light-contact, we shall have a *kālātīta* hetu. In fact the two cases of drum-beat producing sound and light-contact manifesting colour are not on a par. Colour exists even before we perceive it by means of light and light-contact only manifests in our perceptual experience what exists independently of the manifestation by light-contact. It is otherwise, however, in regard to the sound

produced by the contact of the stick and the drum. The sound does not come to manifestation only through drum-stick contact but comes into being also and was non-existent prior to the contact. Besides while colour manifests itself simultaneously with light-colour contact, an interval intervenes between the stick-drum contact and the manifestation of a sound in our perceptual experience. Thus the time of the sound perception does not coincide with the time of the drum-stick contact (*daṇḍa-samyoga*), and therefore causation by drum-stick contact is a *kālātīta hetu* as far as the production of sound-perception is concerned and is not on a par in this respect with colour-perception produced by colour-light contact. The *Mīmāṃsakas*, however, point out that it is only a case of a *bādhita viśeṣaṇa pakṣa*, i.e., a case of the existence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa* or subject of inference being *bādhita* or contradicted by evidence and therefore is either a case of *pakṣābhāsa*, a pseudo-pakṣa, or of *pratijñābhāsa*, a pseudo-thesis, and is not as *Naiyāyikas* say, a fifth kind of a pseudo-hetu or *hetvābhāsa* besides the four of the *Mīmāṃsakas* already stated and explained.

The Buddhist consider an inferential fallacy to be nothing but an infringement of the rules that govern inference. The rules of a logical inference are:—

(1) The presence of the reason in the subject of the inference, i.e., its presence pervasively in the subject in its whole compass.

(2) Its presence in similar instances only, i.e., in instances where the *sādhya* is present.

(3) And its absence in all dissimilar instances, i.e., its absence in every case where the *sādhya* is absent.

A fallacy of inference will thus be a fallacious reason violating the first, the second, or the third rule, or any two, or all of these rules. The violation of the first rule will be a fallacy against reality since the first rule ensures application of the logical constructions involved in the *vyāpti* relation of the second and the third rules to a point of reality. Thus when this reference to reality is lacking or false, we have an unreal reason. The second and the third rules are only the positive and the negative aspects of one and the same rule



and any infringement of this rule will be a fallacy, not of reality, but of consistency (cf. "Buddhist Logic" by Stcherbatsky).

SABDA PRAMĀNA: VERBAL COMMUNICATION AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

LANGUAGE is obviously a source of knowledge. There are different kinds of language. E.g., there is the language of drums among the savages, the language of signals, gesture-language (*ceṣṭā*), the language of omens (*śākuna*), written language (*lipi*) and spoken language. *Śabda pramāṇa* in Indian philosophy stands for spoken and written language as a source of knowledge. What, then, is the essence of language, spoken and written, as a source of knowledge according to Indian philosophy? In the first place, *śabda pramāṇa* consists of sounds (and their equivalents in writing). But any and every sound does not constitute *śabda* or sound as a source of knowledge, but only alphabetical sounds or sounds corresponding to the alphabets. E.g., the babble of the river is a sound but it is not an alphabetical sound and is therefore not *śabda pramāṇa*. The alphabets, or sounds corresponding to the alphabets, convey knowledge, but they do not convey knowledge unless they are arranged in a certain definite order. Any and every combination of alphabetical sounds, e.g., a nonsensical arrangement of alphabetical sounds, such as ha—ja—ba—ra—la, abracadabra, etc., does not produce knowledge. But alphabetical sounds arranged in certain fixed orders alone have meaning and therefore arrangement is as essential to the meaning as the sounds themselves. In fact, the same sounds arranged in one order have one meaning and in a different order have a different meaning. Thus the word 'nadi' and 'dīna' have the same alphabets as their constituents but as the arrangement of

alphabets in one case differs from that in the other the meaning also differs, 'nādī' meaning a river and 'dīna' meaning a poor man. Alphabetical sounds arranged in meaningful orders constitute padas or words and words combined in certain fixed ways constitute vākyas or sentences. Sentences are the unit of śabda pramāña conveying information. How, then, does a word consisting of a certain combination of sounds has a meaning or objective reference? How does it come to signify an object other than the sounds which are its constituents? Here we have two different Indian theories, viz., the theory of Nyāya, and the theory of the Mīmāṃsakas. According to Nyāya, the objective reference of śabda is a matter of convention, the convention itself being promulgated by Iśvara or Lord at the time of creation. According to this view, therefore, there is no intrinsic relation between śabda and śabdārtha, between a name and its meaning, the relation being determined by the will of the Lord. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, however, the relation between 'śabda' and its 'artha' is an intrinsic relation, every śabda referring to its respective artha or meaning by intrinsic force. In the case of proper names, however, the Mīmāṃsakas make an exception subscribing to the theory of convention in such cases, though the convention according to them, is only social and not divine as the Naiyāyikas say.

We have seen that a sentence consisting of 'padas' or words arranged in a certain order constitute the elementary form of śabda pramāña, but the sentence, according to Indian philosophers, to be significant, must conform to the four conditions of (i) 'ākāṅkṣā' or mutual expectation between the words, a nominative, e.g., requiring a verb and a verb requiring an objective, (ii) 'yogyatā' or mutual suitability, (iii) 'āsatti' or sufficient proximity (e.g., if I utter one word to-day, viz., the nominative, and another word to-morrow, viz., the verb, and the third word the day after to-morrow, the three together would not constitute a sentence, there being no sufficient proximity), (iv) tātparya or unity of purport or meaning.

There is difference among Indian philosophers as regards what language really communicates. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that śabda communicates acts to be done and not facts that are. In respect of accomplished facts śabda is anuvādaka of



other pramāṇas, i.e., it conveys over again what is conveyed by other sources of knowledge such as perception, inference, etc. In respect of these, therefore, śabda is not an independent source of knowledge, not conveying any information which cannot be otherwise obtained. In respect of acts to be done, however, as in requests, invitations, commands, etc., śabda and śabda alone is our source of knowledge of what is conveyed. What is requested, commanded or asked for cannot be perceived or inferred, but can be known only from śabda. The Mīmāṃsakas try to defend their view by showing that the so-called nouns of our language resolve, on philological analysis, into roots meaning acts. As śabda has prāmāṇya, authority or evidential value and validity as an independent source of knowledge only in respect of acts to be done, it follows that only the karma-kāṇḍa of the Vedas, i.e., that branch of the Vedas which describes Vedic injunctions and prohibitions (vidhiniśedha) has prāmāṇya, the jñāna-kāṇḍa relating as they do to things that are and not acts to be done being devoid of evidential value and validity. The Vedāntists as well as the Naiyāyikas repudiate the Mīmāṃsaka view as it will lead to the repudiation of the ātma-svarūpa-para-vākyas of the Vedas describing the nature of the Ātman as the eternally accomplished reality (i.e., as siddha as distinguished from a sādhya object), i.e., the Vedānta mahāvākyas such as 'Tattvamasi' etc., as apramāṇa or invalid.

Sabda pramāṇa, according to the Naiyāyikas as well as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, comprises both laukika or secular utterances and Vedic or scriptural declarations. According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, however, Vaidika śabda is the only śabda pramāṇa, laukika śabda being either apramāṇa, false, or a disguised form of inference based on the trustworthiness of the speaker. According to Nyāya, śabda pramāṇa is pauruṣeya, i.e., both laukika and Vaidika śabda have a personal source, laukika śabda being pramāṇa only when free from the faults of the speaker (vaktrdoṣamukta) and Vaidika śabda being pramāṇa as emanating from the Lord Himself as its personal source.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, however, though laukika śabda has a personal source and is authoritative only

when free from *vaktrdoṣa* or faults of the speaker, Vaidika śabda is *apauruṣeya*, impersonal command, or law without a law-giver, and as such has intrinsic evidential value and validity. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, however, repudiate laukika śabda as a form of śabda pramāṇa and recognise Vaidika śabda as the only śabda pramāṇa having intrinsic validity as impersonal verity of the moral order.

How, then, does śabda establish itself as pramāṇa or evidentially authoritative in the consciousness of the individual? What, in other words, is its *modus operandi* in positing itself in consciousness as valid or true? According to Nyāya, śabda establishes its authority through the consciousness of phala-sādhanatā which it generates in the individual. In so far as the content of an information conveyed by śabda is recognised as conducting to certain ends, desirable or undesirable, is the śabda recognised as valid or authoritative.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, however, do away with the conception of any end subserved by śabda. A Vedic imperative (*vidhiniṣedha*), positive or negative, is not authoritative because of any end to which it may conduce. There may be some end involved but that is a logical implicate of the imperative as an imperative but is no part of its prāmāṇya or authority as a moral imperative binding on the consciousness of the agent. The fact that the imperative has been prescribed entails that an end would be attained by its accomplishment. It would not have been prescribed if there were no end to be attained by it. But it is just a logical implicate of the imperative and does not explain its moral authority in the consciousness of the agent. The imperative force of the prescription has therefore to be otherwise explained and the Bhāṭṭas explain it on the analogy of physical causation. It is, according to them, bhāvanārūpa or a form of subtle causality on the consciousness of the moral agent. Moral impulsion is thus a form of causation. It constrains the individual, as it were, acting on his consciousness as a subtle force from outside and thus realises itself as authoritative. Thus a prescription in the first instance acts from outside as a subtle impersonal force (*śabdibhāvanā*) in the consciousness of the individual and the individual thereafter is roused to ārthibhāvanā, i.e., to the

realisation of the prescription by the exercise of his will.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas here join issue with the Bhāṭṭas. Moral impulsion, according to them, is not causation (*bhāvanārūpa*), it is *jñāpaka* or of the nature of enlightenment and not *kāraka*, compelling or constraining. Moral causation is not on a par with physical causation. We have causality on the physical plane as when one billiard ball impinges on another and makes it move. We have causality in the chemical plane as when several atoms attract one another to form a molecule of water (reciprocal causation). We have causality in the plane of life again as when a live frog is pricked with a needle and an unforeseeable element enters into the reaction which follows. We have causality also in the mental plane, viz., the causality of the will which acts with the foreknowledge of the future end to be achieved. But moral causation is different from all these. Moral impulsion is not compulsion. It merely reveals the law as authoritative, as something worth realising, and there its action ends.

UPAMĀNA AS PRAMĀNA: COMPARISON AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

COMPARISON or upamāna as an independent source of knowledge in addition to *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* is recognised by Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins, but not by Cārvāka, Buddhist, Jaina, Sāṅkhya, Rāmānujist and Mādhvā philosophers. According to these latter, comparison is included in one or other of the three *pramāṇas*, viz., *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

Upamāna or comparison was defined at first as the knowledge of likeness and extended later on to knowledge of likeness as well as unlikeness. Vātsyāyana defines upamāna as *sādharmya-vaidharmyajñāna*, i.e., classification according to the knowledge of likeness and unlikeness of things. E.g., according to Vātsyāyana's view, classification of books in a library into books on economics, books on philosophy, etc., will entail the process of upamāna. Later Naiyāyikas, however, define



upamāna as samjñā-samjñī jñāna, i.e., knowledge of a thing named by a particular name (samjñī jñāna) from the prior knowledge of the meaning of the name from usage. Thus we know from the dictionary or from one who knows that the word 'gavaya' is the name of an animal possessing a certain resemblance to the cow and when we perceive before us an animal which we note to be not a cow and yet to be very like a cow of our familiar experience we recall the name 'gavaya' and the comparative statement or atideśavākya which constitutes its meaning and apply the name 'gavaya' to the animal that we perceive. Thus upamāna, according to later Nyāya, consists in correct application of a name to an object through the mediation of a comparative statement learnt previously from usage as constituting its meaning.

Mimāṃsakas, however, recognise comparison as a pramāṇa in a sense quite different from that of the Naiyāyikas. According to Mimāṃsakas, upamāna is sādrśya-jñāna-janya sādrśya-viṣayaka-jūḍāna, i.e., upamāna consists in the knowledge of a second likeness arrived at from the knowledge of a first likeness. Thus when from the knowledge of A's likeness to B we come to know of B's likeness to A, the knowledge of the second likeness is caused by upamāna or comparison according to Mimāṃsakas. E.g., when we perceive a 'gavaya' before ourselves as possessing a strong resemblance to the cow that we perceived in the past, we at once conclude that the cow of our past experience must possess a similar strong resemblance to the animal 'gavaya' before us. That this is not a case of inference, the Mimāṃsaka says, will be obvious from the following considerations.

Inference presupposes or requires a hetu or mark which exists in the pakṣa or the subject of the inference and is also invariably related to the sādhyā or what is inferred. In the present case the subject of the inference is 'B' or 'the cow' of our past experience but the hetu 'likeness to B' or 'likeness to cow' does not exist in 'B' or in 'cow' but in 'A' or the perceived 'gavaya'. In other words, considered as an inference the argument will entail the fallacy of a svarūpāsiddha hetu in the Nyāya sense or sambandhāsiddha hetu in the Mimāṃsaka sense. If smoke rises from a kitchen and not from the



mountain yonder, it does not prove fire in the mountain yonder. The existence of the hetu in the pakṣa is an indispensable condition of valid inferential reasoning. Therefore the argument, though obviously valid, cannot be regarded as a form of inference. Again in a valid inferential reasoning the pakṣa or subject must actually exist, otherwise the hetu would be proving the inference in a place that does not exist and thus would be a case of an āśrayāsiddha hetu proving the sādhya nowhere. For example, in the inference, 'The jewelled mountain is on fire because it smokes' (*māṇimaya parvato vahnimūna dhūmāt*), the smoke proves fire nowhere as a jewelled mountain nowhere exists. In the above case, the cow which is the subject of the inference is the cow of our past experience revived in memory. But memory is no pramāṇa or valid source of knowledge, smṛti being true or false according to the truth or falsity of the primary experience which it reproduces. Therefore the existence of the pakṣa, i.e., of the cow recalled in memory, is asiddha, i.e., remains unestablished. Thus considered as an inference the argument entails the fallacy also of an āśrayāsiddha hetu and yet since the argument is obviously valid, the only escape from the difficulty lies in recognising upamāna as an independent source of our knowledge of the second likeness in the case in question.

The Mādhyva logicians, however, reject the Mīmāṃsaka view on the following grounds. They point out that the existence of the hetu in the pakṣa does not mean inclusion of the hetu in the pakṣa in a physical or any other sense. All that is necessary for valid inference is the existence of the hetu in some suitable place relatively to the pakṣa or the subject of inference. E.g., in the valid inference '*ūrddhvadeśe vr̥ṣṭi adhadeśe nadī pūrāt*', 'there must have been rain on the top of the hill because of the flooded condition of the river at the base', the subject of the inference is 'top of the hill' but the hetu 'flooded condition of the river' exists not on the top of the hill but at the base. Therefore pakṣavṛttitva, existence of the hetu in the sense of physical inclusion in the pakṣa, is not necessary. All that is required is 'samucita deśādvṛtti', i.e., existence of the hetu in a suitable place or time. Therefore this knocks the bottom out of the Mīmāṃsaka contention that

the above argument, considered as an inference, entails the fallacy of a svarūpāsiddha hetu. Nor is there much substance in the contention that it entails the fallacy of an āśryāsiddha hetu. Smṛti, memory, is not apramāṇa, non-valid knowing, as the Mīmāṃsakas say. On the contrary, the Mādhwā philosophers hold that besides the five different kinds of external perception through the five different external senses and the sixth form of internal perception by mind of our internal states, memory (smṛti) is a seventh kind of perception, a direct looking into the past as it were through mental dispositions (saṃskāras) which are just the past prolonging itself into the present, i.e., the past experiences enduring as present dispositions.

ARTHĀPATTI AS PRAMĀNA: PRESUMPTION AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

ARTHĀPATTI or presumption is recognised as a fifth additional source of knowledge by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntists and also by the Bhedābheda school of Vedānta represented by Bhāskarācārya. It is not regarded as an independent source of knowledge by Cārvāka, Buddhist, Sāṅkhya, Jaina, Nyāya, Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins and Dvaitavādins amongst the Vedāntins.

Arthāpatti is the process by means of which we assume something that will satisfactorily explain an observed discrepancy in experience. Thus arthāpatti is a form of inverted inference. In inference we start from premises and draw conclusions justified by the premises. In arthāpatti our starting-point is the conclusion itself and we work back to the premises that will justify the conclusion. It is, therefore, something like framing a legitimate hypothesis. The theistic proofs of the West may be regarded as cases of arthāpatti or presumption. They are not inferences logically speaking. Considered as inferences they are all open to the objection that there is more in the conclusion than is justified by the premises. From the finite world to an Infinite ground thereof obviously there is a leap not strictly inferential. It may be called for by the



nature of the world but cannot be inferred from it in the strict sense. Kant's transcendental analysis of experience into its presuppositions may also be regarded as a case of arthāpatti or presumption. From the empirical we can infer only the empirical, but from the empirical we cannot infer the metempirical presupposition of the empirical. Therefore it is a kind of presumptive argument by means of which Kant passes from objects of experience to the constitutive principles of objectivity.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, arthāpatti is a presumption necessitated for the resolution of an observed contradiction in experience. E.g., we see a snake in the first instance, but on a nearer view discover that it is a rope and not a snake. Here is an obvious contradiction. The object before us appears first as a snake and then as not a snake but as a rope. The contradiction is resolved by the conception of a mithyā or false object. The snake seen in the first instance is regarded as a false appearance of the rope. The Prābhākaras, however, give a slightly different account of arthāpatti or presumption. According to them, vastu dvairūpya, i.e., a dual or contradictory nature in reality is not possible. What arthāpatti resolves is no contradiction in the reality observed but only the saṃśaya or doubt that arises in the mind from apparent conflicting evidence.

Arthāpatti, according to these schools, is either drṣṭa arthāpatti or śruta arthāpatti, i.e., an assumption may be called for either (a) because of observed contradiction in experience or (b) because of contradictory or incomplete Vedic prescription. Thus arthāpatti is either drṣṭa arthāpatti or śruta arthāpatti. An example of the former is the snake-rope illusion where the apparent contradiction between two successive experiences, one negating the other, is resolved by the assumption of the mithyā or apparent object. Śruta arthāpatti is either 'śabda adhyāhāra' or 'artha adhyāhāra', i.e., either the adding of a particular word for completing the meaning of a Vedic text or prescription, or assuming some object as necessary to make a verbal communication significant. E.g., when someone says 'door' the meaning is incomplete unless other words are added to it such as 'shut the door', or 'open the door', etc. Again when the Vedas declare 'svarga kāma yajeta', 'he that



wants happiness in heaven must perform this particular sacrifice', the meaning of the injunction remains incomplete or unintelligible unless one assumes 'apūrva' as a link between the present sacrifice performed and the future happiness into which it matures, i.e., unless one assumes that the performance of the sacrifice now will release some sort of supernatural energy (apūrva) that will culminate in happiness in heaven at some distant date.

Arthāpatti, however, is rejected both by Nyāya and Sāṅkhya as an additional source of knowledge. According to them, it is a form of vyatirekī anumāna or negative inference.

ANUPALABDHI AS PRAMĀNA: NON-APPREHENSION AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

ANUPALABDHI as a sixth source of knowledge is recognised by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, Advaitins and Bhāskarites but not by Prābhākaras, Buddhists, Jainas, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Viśiṣṭādvaitins and Dvaitins amongst the Vedāntins.

According to the Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins, Jñānābhāva or absence of knowledge is in some cases a cause of abhāva-jñāna or knowledge of absence. When, e.g., all the conditions of perception are present and yet an object that is perceptible is not perceived, there is an immediate realisation of its absence caused by the absence of the perception in question. When, e.g., my visual sense is in order and I look in full day-light at a table just in front of myself and find that there is no book on the table I have an immediate realisation of the absence of the book caused by my non-perception of the book. The non-perception here is the source of our knowledge of absence, i.e., absence of knowledge causes the knowledge of absence. The conditions of perception are all present here. My visual sense is in order. The table is in sufficient visual proximity. There is sufficient light. And the book I do not perceive is a



perceptible object. When a perceptible object is not perceived when all the conditions of perception are thus fulfilled, the absence of perception produces the perception of absence. This is anupalabdhi as the sixth source of knowledge according to Advaitins.

The Naiyāyikas here join issue with the Vedāntins. The Naiyāyikas say that the source of our knowledge here is perception and not absence of perception. The absence (i.e., the absence of the book) in the present case is an adjective of the table. 'The table without the book' means the table characterised by the adjective 'withoutness' in question. The 'withoutness' is related to the table by the relation of viśeṣaṇatā or adjectivity. Viśeṣaṇatā is a variety of 'svarūpa sambandha', i.e., the svarūpa or nature of the abhāva or absence is itself both 'term' and 'relation to' the table. In other words, 'withoutness' is what is related to the table as its viśeṣaṇa or distinguishing character and is itself the relation of characterisation. The eye in perceiving the table perceives also the 'withoutness' that characterises the table through the relation of samyukta viśeṣaṇatā, i.e., the eye is samyukta or in contact with the table which table is related to the abhāva or absence characterising it by the relation of viśeṣaṇatā, and through the relation of samyukta viśeṣaṇatā, i.e., samyoga or contact with that which has the abhāva as its viśeṣaṇa or distinguishing character, the eye also perceives the abhāva or absence characterising the table. Thus the pramāṇa in this case is perception and the 'indriyārtha sannikarṣa' in this case is samyukta 'viśeṣaṇatā'. By anvaya and vyatireka, agreement in presence and agreement in absence, perception is proved to be the cause of the perception of absence. When the table is perceived, the abhāva on the table is perceived and when there is no perception of the table there is no perception of abhāva. Therefore, perception is the real cause of the knowledge of absence. In fact, Advaitins are not quite consistent in their views as regards non-perception as the cause of the knowledge of absence in this case. According to their view, when an antahkaraṇa vṛtti or mental mode darts forth through the channel of a sense-organ and reaching an object takes the shape and form of the object, exactly coinciding with it, there

is perception of the object (*jñānagata pratyakṣa*). Therefore, in the present case when there is perception of the table by the eye an antahkaraṇa vṛtti must have issued through the eye and reaching the table taken its shape and form and coincided with it. Therefore the vṛtti or mental mode having coincided with the table must also have taken the form of the absence that characterises the table. Hence if the table has been perceived, the absence characterising it must also have been perceived. Therefore, the cause of the perception of absence is *pratyakṣa* or perception and not non-perception as Advaitins say.

The Advaitins say that the so-called *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, agreement in presence and agreement in absence, hold between *pratyakṣa*, perception and *adhikaraṇa-jñāna*, the cognition of the substrate where the absence is cognised. When perception is, *adhikaraṇa-jñāna* also is, when perception is absent, there is no cognition of the substrate. Non-perception, however, requires *adhikaraṇa-jñāna* as its pre-condition. It is not non-perception nowhere but non-perception in some definite place or *adhikaraṇa*. *Adhikaraṇa-jñāna*, cognition of the substrate, is therefore a condition of the non-perception which causes the knowledge of absence. *Adhikaraṇa-jñāna* is thus the cause of a cause or a condition of a condition and is therefore *anyathāsiddha* or a conditional antecedent and is not the unconditional, invariable antecedent of the perception of absence.

As regards the second objection of the *Naiyāyikas* that the perception of absence is perceptual in character, the Advaitin reply is that it is the Advaitin's own view that the *Naiyāyika* is urging as an objection against the Advaitin. The Advaitin holds that the resulting experience is perceptual in character, that it has the force of immediacy or immediate realisation. But the cause of the perception, i.e., the source of our immediate knowledge of the absence in the case is *anupalabdhi*. There is no rule that where the cognition is presentative in character the source of the cognition must also be perception. In the stock example '*daśama tvamasi*', 'Thou art the tenth', the cognition is of the nature of immediate realisation though it is caused not by perception but by *śabda* or verbal communication.

The Advaitins point out that it is not the Advaitins who are inconsistent with their views in this case, but the Naiyāyikas themselves. The Naiyāyikas are 'niyata padārtha vādins', i.e., believers in an unalterably fixed number of ultimate objects. Their padārthas or objects of knowledge include samyoga and vibhāga under qualities and inherence under relation. Samyoga and vibhāga hold between substances and inherence holds between an adjective and a substantive. Now the relation between a table and the absence of a book that characterises it is not samyoga or vibhāga because the table is a substance and abhāva is not a substance. Nor can the relation between the table and the abhāva characterising it be the relation of samavāya or inherence. Samavāya is said to be a constitutive relation. The brown of the brown table inheres in the table and we say that the table is brown. But if abhāva or absence were to inhere in the table, the table would become absent. Therefore, the relation between the table and the abhāva or absence characterising it cannot be samyoga, vibhāga or samavāya. These three are the only relations included in the padārthas of the Naiyāyikas. And since the Naiyāyikas are 'niyata padārtha vādins' they cannot add to, or subtract from, the number of their enumerated objects of experience at pleasure. Now that they are in a difficulty as regards the relation of abhāva or absence to its adhikarana or substrate, they conceive a new relation of viśeṣanatā or adjectivity which practically undermines their 'niyata pardārtha vāda'.

[The last Advaitin objection, however, does not bear strict enumeration. Viśeṣanatā, according to the Naiyāyikas, is a variety of svarūpa sambandha. A svarūpa sambandha is one in which one or other of the relata is both term and the relation. In the present case abhāva is both the relatum or that which is related and the relation to the other term. And as abhāva is one of the padārthas included in the Nyāya list of padārthas, the number of padārthas as enumerated by the Naiyāyikas has not been exceeded by the hypothesis of viśeṣanatā as a relation.]



APOHAVĀDA OR THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NEGATIVE MEANING OF NAMES

WE have seen that, according to the Naiyāyikas, both particulars and universals are real and the relation between a universal and its particular instances is inherence. Also, according to the Naiyāyikas, in savikalpa or relational perception, we perceive the particular, the universal of which it is a particular, and the relation of inherence by means of which the universal relates itself to the particular. Thus when we have a determinate or savikalpa perception of a particular cow, we perceive 'the cow' as a particular, 'the cowness' of the particular cow and 'the inherence' of the cowness in the cow. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the particular and the universal are both real and so also is the relation of inherence by which the universal inheres in the particular. But while according to the Naiyāyikas 'particular', 'universal' and 'inherence' are all perceived in determinate perception, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the particular and the universal are perceived while the relation of inherence between the universal and the particular is known by inference and not perceived. According to Jainas, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṅkhya philosophers, though particulars as well as universals are real, no relation of samavāya or inherence holds between the universal and its particular instances, the universal and the particular being the same thing considered from different points-of-view. For the Buddhist, however, the particular is an unutterable point-instant of reality apprehended in pure sensation, and the universal is a construction of the understanding caused by the apprehended pure datum and is therefore ideal and not real. The Buddhists, however, distinguish between two kinds of ideality, (1) pure ideality not caused or prompted by a given point-instant of reality such as a sky-flower—a creature of the free imagination and (2) ideality prompted by reality such as the concept of cowness, which is a product of the controlled imagination. Further, all conceiving, according to the Buddhist, is also naming so that a name is a mnemonic image as it were, the outer form of every concept. According to the Buddhist, however, thinking prompted by



reality leads on, though ideal, to the reality which prompts it when acted upon so that a constructed image of the unutterable reality, though an image, as in a mirror, of the reality which prompts its construction and so void of intrinsic truth (*svataḥ prāmānya*) has yet extrinsic validity as leading to *avisamvādī pravṛtti* or successful practical activity fulfilling expectations.

The question therefore arises: How can a concept, an ideality, coalesce with a reality, an unutterable point-instant, and thus cause a judgment possessing practical truth and validity? The Buddhists explain agreement of the ideal concept with the given reality by their doctrine of *sārūpya*, common form or conformity between the ideal and the real conceived negatively as a common exclusion of the same objects and by their doctrine of *Apoha* or negative meaning of names. Thus when we have the presentation of a point-instant of blue, we construct a general image and a concept of blue on the basis of the given sense-datum which is unutterable in itself. But the given blue as datum excludes red, yellow, green, etc., and so does the image blue as constructed. This, therefore, serves as a link between the ideality that is constructed and the reality that is given. They, as non-different from one another as excluding all non-blue (i.e., their difference not being apprehended) coalesce in the judgment 'this is blue'. The doctrine of *Apoha* is nothing, according to the Buddhist, but this common exclusion exemplified in the negative meanings of all names so that every name signifies not an affirmation but a negative denial of the contradictory. Every name thus names not what an object is but only expresses the denial of what it is not. Against the *Nyāya* theory of the perception of universals in their particular instances, the Buddhist points out that if universals were real and really inherent in particulars and perceived as such, then why do we perceive, from a long distance, a cow not as a cow but merely as an instance of *sattā* or the universal of being (i.e., as a barely existing something) and not the substancehood (*dravyatva*), the cowness (*gotva*) and other universals also similarly inhering in the selfsame distant object?



THEORIES OF VALIDITY IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

THERE are four different theories of validity and invalidity in Indian Philosophy, viz., the Sāṅkhya theory of intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity, the Buddhist theory of intrinsic invalidity and extrinsic validity, the Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity and the Mīmāṃsaka theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. The Vedāntists (i.e., the Sankarites) subscribe to the Mīmāṃsaka theory, only differing from the Mīmāṃsakas in their view of empirical cognition as a temporal modalisation of the Pure Intelligence which is timeless.

The Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas regard cognition as a temporal mental event arising from empirical causes that can be definitely ascertained. The Sāṅkhya and the Sankara-Vedānta distinguish between two kinds of cognition, viz., (1) cognition as a temporal event which is assignable to definite empirical causes, and (2) cognition as timeless which is the presupposition of empirical cognition in time.

The empirical self, according to Sāṅkhya, is a transformation of the Intelligence-illuminated primal matter or Prakṛti and empirical cognition is a function or state of the empirical self generated by certain objective and subjective causes. Since the effect, according to Sāṅkhya, is pre-existent in the material cause, the validity or the opposite of cognitions as generated events must be regarded as being somehow inherent in the cognitions. You cannot make anything out of anything, the Sāṅkhya philosopher argues, and so the action of the cause can bring out only that which is inherent in the causal ground. By no device could the causal substance be made to yield what is not inherent therein, or otherwise the unreal and the fictitious like the sky-flower would be capable of being produced by causes.

The Sāṅkhya view is not accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas who favour a theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. The Mīmāṃsakas point out that the Sāṅkhya view falls with its doctrine of causality of which it is a logical corollary. The



notion of pre-existent effects is, according to them, the negation of the very essence of causation as a process of real effectuation. If the effect pre-exists in the cause and the cause only manifests the pre-existent effect, the manifestation is itself something that did not exist and comes into existence through the action of the cause. And thus the Sāṅkhya has to admit the manifestation as a new beginning. Further, how can validity and invalidity be alike inherent in one and the same cognition seeing that they are contradictories of each other like fire and water? Nor is the difficulty obviated by the assumption that validity is intrinsic to the valid cognition and invalidity is intrinsic to the invalid cognition. For in the absence of any reference to extraneous tests, how can cognition intrinsically determine itself as valid or invalid?

The Naiyāyikas also reject the Sāṅkhya view as untenable. If cognitions, they argue, were either intrinsically true or intrinsically false, they could not lead to unsuccessful practical reaction. But practical maladjustments and consequent disappointments are very common occurrences of life.

The Buddhists accept the Sāṅkhya theory of intrinsic invalidity and reject the Sāṅkhya theory of intrinsic validity. Since cognition reveals the momentary, *sui generis* real as a stable object related to other objects by causality and coessentiality, all cognition, the Buddhist argues, must be inherently false as being the cognition of a conceptual fiction (*avastu*). Metaphysically, therefore, every cognition must be regarded as intrinsically invalid, and the so-called valid cognitions are accepted as such only as leading to certain desired results and not as revealing reality or the true nature of things. Hence validity is extrinsic and of practical significance only while invalidity is inherent in the nature of cognitions as representations of stable objects.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas reject the Buddhist theory of intrinsic invalidity on the following grounds. They point out that a theory of intrinsic invalidity cannot account for the facts of unsuccessful practical reaction. Besides, every instance of a cognition cannot be made out as the cognition of a conceptual void. Even some forms of non-valid cognition are not without an objective-presentative basis. A *samśaya*, or doubt, e.g.,

arises only when some object is actually presented. An illusion of sense is similarly a mispresentation involving a presented fact. Thus doubts and sense-illusions have an objective basis in fact and so every cognition cannot be regarded as the cognition of a conceptual void.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that validity and invalidity are alike extrinsic both in respect of utpatti or causation and pratipatti or confirmation in consciousness as such. Thus according to them the causes which produce a cognition are not the causes which make it a valid or invalid cognition. Similarly the process of verification, i.e., the process whereby a cognition is recognised as valid or invalid is distinct from the process which constitutes the essence of the cognition as the apprehension of an object. Consider, e.g., the simple case of a cognition such as the perception of a blue. The mere fact that 'blue' appears in consciousness does not make the cognition a valid perception of 'blue'. Provided that there are no defects of media or sensibility and provided further that the sensibilities possess the requisite potency to produce a cognition that reveals its object, the resulting perception is valid or true. Moreover the cognition of blue does not immediately cognise itself as a cognition of 'blue', far less as a valid cognition of 'blue'. This is admitted by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas themselves who hold that a cognition cognises itself only mediately by inference. Nor is there any evidence to show that as soon as there is the perception of 'blue' there arises immediately following on it a cognition of the validity or invalidity of the perception in question. Introspection does not reveal any such secondary cognition following on the primary cognition. The perception of blue as a bare cognition is thus concerned only with revealing the blue. To ascertain the truth or otherwise of the revelation we must have recourse to extraneous tests other than the cognition itself, i.e., we must put the cognition to the practical test and if it succeeds, i.e., leads to the expected results, we may accept it as valid or true.

Against the theory of intrinsic validity the Naiyāyikas raise a series of objections: Thus (1) Udayana argues that since a valid cognition is more than a cognition as such and since a cognition *qua* cognition arises from certain definite



conditions, the valid cognition must arise from causes which include conditions in addition to those which produce a cognition as such. (2) Besides, if a valid cognition as a form of cognition were to arise from no other conditions than those which produce a cognition as such the invalid cognition as a form of cognition must also arise from the self-same conditions. And thus a cognition which is accepted as valid as being produced by certain conditions may also for the self-same reason be rejected as false, and *vice versa*. (3) Again, if the process by means of which a cognition is recognised as valid or invalid be identical with the process that constitutes the essence of the cognition as the revelation of an object, mental doubts and uncertainties as to whether a cognition is valid or invalid will be inexplicable. But such doubts are very common occurrences of life.

Hence the Naiyāyikas conclude: the causes which make a cognition valid or invalid must be other than those which make it a cognition as such. Also the process which constitutes the confirmation of a cognition in consciousness as valid or invalid must be distinct from the process which constitutes the essence of the cognition as the revelation of an object. And thus validity (and its opposite invalidity) must be regarded as extrinsic to the cognition both in respect of *utpatti* or causation and *pratipatti* or conscious realisation in the experience of the cogniser.

The Mīmāṃsakas who favour a theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity here join issue with the Naiyāyikas. The object of cognition, they point out, is that which a cognition reveals and a cognition is a cognition only as it reveals some object. This being so, it follows that a cognition cannot fail to be valid or true from the nature of the case. For how can a cognition be a cognition and yet fail to cognise or reveal its object? And how can it reveal its object without being valid or true? Intrinsically therefore every cognition is necessarily a valid cognition of an object, and the causes which make it a cognition must also make it a valid cognition of its object. No doubt there are cases where a cognition is rejected as false, but this is because it fails to lead to certain expected results and not because it fails to reveal its object.

The Naiyāyika distinction between a cognition and its validity, the Mīmāṃsakas argue, leads to insuperable difficulties. If a cognition be entitatively different from its validity or invalidity, then a cognition must be logically neutral, i.e., neither valid nor invalid. But a neutral cognition is a psychological fiction. Every cognition is a revelation of an object. It thus amounts to a judgment involving predication and must therefore be either true or false. A pure cognition which is neither a true nor false apprehension of an object is not a psychological datum. Besides, the alternatives valid and invalid exhaust the whole universe of cognitions between themselves so that a cognition which does not come under the one class must necessarily be included in the other. A tertiary cognition which is neither valid nor invalid is a logical absurdity. Nor does the Nyāya contention that a bare cognition is of the nature of a doubt or supposal (and not a categorical belief) bear close examination. Since saṃśaya or doubt, according to Nyāya, is a form of non-valid or invalid cognition (apramā), a bare cognition, as above explained, will amount to an invalid cognition and the conditions which produce the so-called bare or neutral cognition will also be the determinants of invalidity. But this amounts to a theory of intrinsic invalidity and involves the surrender of the Nyāya theory. Besides, the Nyāya view contradicts actual experience.

In fact, every cognition does not present itself as a form of doubt at first. Doubt paralyses activity and if cognitions were at first of the nature of doubt, they would not prompt practical activity in any case. The cogniser is not impelled to action by mental uncertainty but only by the certain knowledge of objects.

Where a doubt arises in respect of the validity of a cognition, there also the cognition in the beginning is accepted as truly revealing the object. The doubt that arises is due to the subsequent perception of defects in the causes or to the consciousness of contradiction.

To question the intrinsic validity of cognitions is, the Mīmāṃsaka argues, to invalidate every cognition and commit logical suicide.

For consider the test of practical fruitfulness. How can



a practically fruitful experience validate a cognition without being itself similarly validated? But this leads to an intolerable infinite regress. And if the practically fruitful experience is to be accepted on its own evidence, so may also be the primary cognition which it is supposed to validate.

Nor is practical fruitfulness always a test of validity. The practical fruitfulness of a dream-experience, e.g., does not ensure its acceptance as valid or true. A dream-thirst may often culminate in a dream-quenching of the dream-thirst, but this does not ensure the acceptance of the dream-water as a reality.

Nor can it be said that validity is cognised through the consciousness of the absence of contradictions. For the consciousness of non-contradiction must consist either in the consciousness of non-contradiction at the time of the cognition or the consciousness of non-contradiction for all time and in all conditions. But consciousness of non-contradiction during the time a cognition lasts is no proof of validity. A cognition which is non-contradicted in its first appearance is often found to be overthrown by later experience. And non-contradiction for all time is within reach only of an omniscient being, and not a humanly attainable ideal, ignorant, imperfect beings as we are.

Nor lastly can it be said that a cognition is validated by another numerically distinct cognition following on it.

For this secondary cognition must either be a cognition of the same object as the primary cognition or a cognition of a different object. If it be a cognition of the same object, then it is the same cognition repeated for the second time and must therefore require to be validated like the primary cognition. But this leads to an endless series of cognitions. And if it is contended that the series is not really endless and that it ends in a cognition that is valid in itself, the reply is, in this case there is no need of going beyond the primary cognition which may similarly be regarded as self-evident. Again, if the secondary cognition be the cognition of a different object, then there is no sense in speaking of a harmony between the primary and the secondary cognition. How can the cognition of a pillar (stambhajñāna) be made to consist with the cognition of a



pitcher (*kumbhajñāna*) and thereby validate or confirm the latter?

Moreover, Udayana's argument in proof of the extrinsic character of validity is confuted by a counter-argument which proves the opposite conclusion. Thus one may reason as follows: a valid cognition cannot be the product of any additional excellence or any additional absence of defects in the causes of a cognition as such, because it is a form of cognition just as invalid cognition which is a form of cognition is not due to any such additional factors. And this counter-argument has logical priority over Udayana's argument because it is based on a *hetu* or ground which is presupposed by the *hetu* or ground advanced by Udayana in his argument. Thus Udayana argues from the specific character of valid cognition as valid and concludes that this special character of validity must involve additional special factors in the assemblage of causal conditions. But this counter-argument is based on the generic character of valid cognition as a form of cognition as such and thus rests on a non-specific ground or *hetu* (*avīśeṣaṇa-hetu*). Since a cognition must first of all be a cognition before it can be either a valid or an invalid cognition, it follows that what is involved in its nature as a cognition as such must have logical precedence (*śighrabhāvī*) over its implications as a valid or invalid cognition.

Hence the *Mīmāṃsakas* conclude: every cognition is intrinsically valid or true. Where a cognition is rejected as false it is either because it is contradicted by some other cognition or because it is perceived to arise from defective causes. Invalidation or rejection is thus determined by extraneous factors. It does not arise from anything in the nature of the cognition itself but only from its relation to a contradictory cognition or a cognition of defects in its causes.

There are no doubt cases where a secondary cognition contradicting the primary cognition may itself be infected with doubt, but as such doubt is liable to be resolved by a tertiary cognition following on the secondary cognition, there is no reason for apprehending a *regressus ad infinitum*. Nor does this entail a surrender of the doctrine of intrinsic validity. Where the tertiary cognition is in agreement with the primary



cognition, the tertiary cognition only removes the false sense of invalidity which temporarily disturbed the intrinsic validity of the primary cognition. It thus plays a negative part only and does not lend any positive support to the primary cognition which shines forth as intrinsically true as soon as the disturbing factor is removed. Where the tertiary cognition confirms the secondary cognition, it dispels the doubt and strengthens the consciousness of contradiction and thereby overthrows the primary cognition as false or invalid. Hence the primary cognition validates itself through itself and is invalidated only by a secondary or tertiary cognition other than itself. Thus cases of a serial succession of cognitions present no special difficulty in a theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity.

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